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 1.1  In the first consultation paper arising out of our current project – Renting Homes
1: Status and Security, Consultation Paper 162 (henceforth “CP 162”) – we set
out our provisional proposals for the simplification of the law relating to the status
and security of tenure of those with the right to occupy premises as a home, other
than as freeholders or long leaseholders. At the heart of those proposals was the
proposition that the granting of rights to occupy premises as a home should be
seen primarily as a matter of contract between the parties. The terms of the
contract would be shaped by principles of consumer law which would outlaw
terms that were unfair.
 1.2 We argued that this consumer approach would have two principal advantages:
 (1) The contract would contain a full statement of the legal rights and
obligations of both landlords and occupiers under the occupation
agreement. Particularly, if expressed in Plain English, we argued that this
should assist both sides to the contract to understand their legal position
more readily than they can at present.
 (2) This approach would be generally more suitable for this sector of the
housing market. It would replace the complex and frequently
incomprehensible combination of contract law, landlord and tenant (real
property) law and statute law which had characterised the legal regulation
of the rented sector of the housing market in the past.
SCOPE OF OUR PROPOSALS
 1.3 The scope of our proposals was deliberately set wide. We argued that it should
cover the vast majority of arrangements whereby the right to occupy a home has
been granted by a landlord to an occupier. In particular, it would cover
arrangements which, under the present law, would be classified as licences as well
as tenancies.
Exclusions
 1.4 We acknowledged that there would have to be exclusions from the proposed
scheme. The letting of holiday homes or the grant of rights to occupy by a resident
landlord were two such examples. Also excluded from our proposals were
arrangements that did not relate to the renting of homes and which were, in any
event, subject to other regulatory regimes. We did not, therefore, consider business
tenancies, licensed premises and agricultural tenancies where alternative statutory
schemes exist. It also excluded long leases (where we adopted, as a cut off point,
leases in excess of 21 years) which amount, in economic and social terms, to a
2form of owner occupation rather than a way of renting a home. Otherwise, we
argued that there should be as few exceptions as possible.1
 1.5 Our final recommendations on the scope of the scheme we propose will, of course,
have to await our analysis of the responses to CP 162 and consideration thereof.
THE SUBORDINATE NATURE OF THIS CONSULTATION PAPER
 1.6 Despite its length, CP 162 was based on the straightforward assumption that there
would be a single landlord and a single occupier. It sought to set out proposals to
regulate the relationship between the landlord and occupier.
 1.7 In reality, people do not structure their lives in this simple and straightforward way.
The situations in which occupation agreements are made will be much more
varied and complex than this. A variety of examples can be envisaged:
 (1) the landlord may wish to contract with a married or unmarried couple
who wish to cohabit. They may be of different sexes or the same sex;
 (2) the landlord may wish to contract with a group of friends, for example, a
student letting;
 (3) the landlord may wish to contract with a group who have come together
for the sole purpose of sharing a flat or house;
 (4) the landlord may wish to contract on a basis that combines one or more of
the above, for example, a couple seeking to share with one or more friends;
 (5) once a person has been granted a right to occupy, they may wish to bring
in another as a lodger;
 (6) a person with a right to occupy may wish to permit another/others to share
or live in the premises on a non-contractual basis.
 1.8 After the agreement has been made the occupier may want new people to be able
to live at the property. This could be achieved by bringing them into the agreement
as occupiers having a direct contractual relationship with the landlord, whether as
a joint occupier with the original occupier or as a replacement for the original
occupier (who may have died or moved). Alternatively, it may involve the new
occupier having no direct legal relationship with the landlord. This may happen,
for example, where the occupier allows other people to live in the premises on a
non-contractual basis or grants a sub-occupation agreement. To reflect this variety
of situations, our scheme needs detailed rules which determine how each of these
transactions should be carried out, and what the position will be if it is not done
correctly.
 1.9 In legal terms, under our new scheme, persons who share accommodation may be
classified as: co-occupiers (either contractual joint occupiers or non-contractual
1 The final scope of these exclusions will depend at least in part on the outcome of the debate
on our suggestion that the six month moratorium on the court being able to order
possession be removed: see the summary at CP 162, para 9.162.
3occupiers), lodgers or sub-occupiers. We deal with each of these categories,
respectively, in Parts III, IV and V.
 1.10 In addition, occupiers may want to transfer their rights of occupation to others.
The circumstances in which this might be possible are considered in Part VI.
Problems can also arise when an occupier dies: do others have the right to succeed
to his or her occupation rights? These are considered in Part VII.
 1.11 All these situations raise potentially tricky legal questions. Who is bound by the
occupation agreement at any given time? What is the extent of the occupiers’
liability under the contract? What rights of control should the landlord have over
the identity of those who occupy the premises? What happens on the death of an
occupier; can rights of occupation be passed on by will?
 1.12 In the past, housing statutes have sought to deal with questions relating to
succession, assignment and sub-letting but have given less detailed attention to
joint tenancies and the rights of other members of an occupier’s household. They
have also made little express reference to the legal effects of dealings with the
landlord’s interest.
 1.13 Our scheme must endeavour to accommodate the range of situations that arise in
practice. It must be flexible enough to take account of the varieties of ways in
which people live and straightforward enough to enable people to know where they
stand if things go wrong.
 1.14 In thinking about each of these categories, we must consider the relationship
between the original occupier and joint occupiers, non-contractual occupiers,
lodgers, sub-occupiers, transferees and successors. We must also consider the
extent to which the landlord is bound by arrangements made with these people,
who were not parties to the original agreement.
 1.15 One aspect of this paper, to which we think attention should be drawn here, is that
we have sought to consider the effect of the creation of occupation agreements on
parties other than parties to the agreement. The question we have asked is: what
should the basis be for deciding what rights occupiers under agreements covered
by our new scheme have “against the world”? On what basis should the law decide
whether the landlord’s successor in title is bound by the agreements of their
predecessor? This involves the consideration of the interaction of our proposed
scheme with established principles of land law, particularly the law of landlord and
tenant. These issues are considered in Part VIII.
 1.16 We should make clear at this point that we are not suggesting that our new scheme
should be expanded to interfere with the principles of land law over these issues. In
practice, this will mean retaining a role for the lease-licence distinction. This
approach is consistent with the suggestion made in CP 162 that that distinction
should not have a role as between the immediate landlord and occupier, but that
the distinction would remain of importance in determining the scope of third party
rights and obligations. Our general approach is to propose that occupiers under
agreements which count as leases will have rights both against the new landlord
and against the world, whereas those under licences will not. However, we suggest
that the consequences of a new landlord being bound should be determined by
rules contained in our new scheme, rather than under the Landlord and Tenant
(Covenants) Act 1995.
4 1.17 In order to avoid wholesale repetition of the argument in CP 162, we have in
general taken the contents of that paper as read. Where necessary, we summarise
the principal features of the arguments made there; and we frequently cross-refer
to CP 162 for discussion of matters dealt with only briefly here. In this sense, this
paper must be seen as subordinate to CP 162.
 1.18 Nevertheless, it is essential that this paper both identifies the issues that need to be
addressed to make our proposed scheme work, and offers clear and
comprehensible solutions to the problems that arise in peoples’ day to day lives.
Notwithstanding the varieties of ways in which people may want to occupy their
homes, our objective is to create a legal framework that is sufficiently clear to
enable any occupier to know what his or her legal rights and obligations are, and
also to allow the landlord to know what his or her rights and obligations are.
 1.19 We will be looking for assistance from consultees for confirmation that we have
achieved these objectives, and for information and suggestions relating to
situations we have not contemplated.
ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS PAPER
 1.20 Bearing these preliminary observations in mind, we summarise the principal issues
addressed in this paper in a little more detail here:
 (1) Joint occupiers and non-contracting occupiers. As indicated above (para 1.7),
many people will want to occupy premises on a shared basis, as partners,
friends or in other groups. Part III considers what should be the basic
legal position where the landlord grants the right to occupy to more than
one person. It also asks whether there should be circumstances in which
existing occupiers should have a right to bring a new occupier into the
agreement. It examines the extent of the rights and liabilities of the new
occupier, both as against the other occupiers and as against the landlord.
It then turns to consider the position of others in the occupier’s household
who do not have a contractual relationship with either the occupier or the
landlord.
 (2) Lodgers. In many situations, an occupier may want to take another person
in to live in his or her home as a lodger. In Part IV we examine the extent
to which occupiers should have the right to take in a lodger. We look at the
position of the lodger as against the occupier and also as against the
landlord.
 (3) Sub-occupiers. Where an occupier does not wish to live in his home, or only
wishes to live in part of it, he or she may want to “sub-contract” their
rights of occupation to another. Part V deals with the question of the
extent to which an occupier may sub-contract his or her rights of
occupation – either to part only of the premises or extending to the whole
of the premises – to others. We consider the extent to which landlords
should be able to control this process. We ask what rights, if any, sub-
occupiers would have against the landlord, if requirements relating to the
obtaining of consent have not been complied with.
 (4) Transfer. In Part VI we consider whether occupiers should be able to
transfer (assign) their rights of occupation to another and, if they can,
what is the nature of the relationship between the new occupier and the
5landlord. We also consider the particular matter of the extent to which
occupiers may enter arrangements to exchange their rights of occupation
with another. Consideration is also given to the situation where a court
orders an adjustment of occupation rights.
 (5) Succession. Part VII considers the effect of the death of an occupier on the
occupation agreement and the extent to which occupiers should be free to
pass the rights under their occupation agreement to others.
 (6) Landlords’ successors in title. As mentioned above, Part VIII asks on what
basis the law should decide what rights the occupier has against other
classes of people. In particular, it considers what happens to the
relationship between the landlord and the occupier when the landlord
transfers their interest in the property to another.
 1.21 One of the issues that recurs throughout this paper is the extent to which a
landlord should be able to control any transactions which an occupier may wish to
enter into in relation to his or her rights of occupation. Thus, as a preliminary
matter, in Part II of this paper, we discuss the different rules relating to the current
requirements for obtaining the consent of the landlord before the occupier takes a
step, such as sub-letting or assigning the agreement. We propose a simpler set of
rules and a new terminology.
 1.22 In each case we consider whether occupiers should have the right to insist on
changes to the agreement or the occupation of the property. We consider how such
changes should be made. Where the parties to the agreement change, we discuss
what requirements should be placed on the landlord to amend the written
agreement. We also consider the effect there should be on the contractual
liabilities, past and future, of the landlord, the occupier and any new occupier, if
such a change is successfully carried out.
 1.23 Some of the changes require the landlord’s consent and will not be effective
without it. In Part II we consider the effects of purported but unlawful exercises of
the rights to transfer and make sub-agreements. In Part III we consider the effects
where the consent required to bring in a new joint occupier is refused.
THE NATURE OF THE OCCUPATION AGREEMENT
 1.24 In CP 162, we placed considerable emphasis on the occupation agreement as the
source of rights and obligations as between landlords and occupiers. It was made
clear in the discussion in CP 162 that the nature of this agreement would not be
determined solely by contractual negotiations between the landlord and the
occupier. Statute will determine:
 (1)  the structure of the contract;
 (2) the persons to whom the contract will apply; and
2 The right to take in lodgers and the rights of succession do not require the landlord’s
consent; there is, therefore, no question of any effect of a purported but unlawful exercise of
the right.
6 (3) the period of time over which the contract will last.
The structure of the contract
 1.25 We suggested3 that the contract would contain three different types of term:
 (1) Core terms;
 (2) Compulsory terms;
 (3) Default terms.
 1.26 Core terms: These terms would relate to the core elements of the agreement and
would include the names of the parties, the identity of the premises and the rent
payable. They are terms which would have to be agreed between the landlord and
tenant and properly recorded in the written agreement.
 1.27 Compulsory terms: We identified two types of compulsory terms. Firstly, there were
those that related to the circumstances in which a landlord could take proceedings
for possession; secondly, there were terms – currently implied by statute – which
would be set out expressly in the agreement. For example, we anticipated that
section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, which currently implies certain
repairing obligations on the landlord into tenancy agreements, would be adapted
to become an express compulsory term of our proposed occupation agreements.
These terms would in effect be imposed and not be capable of amendment.
 1.28 In this paper, where we provisionally propose the introduction of a compulsory
term into the occupation agreement, we shall broadly be reflecting existing
(statutory) tenants’ rights.
 1.29 Default terms: Other terms will be available if the occupation agreement does not
otherwise deal with the issue. We described these as the default terms. It must be
remembered that default terms may be replaced by terms that have been
negotiated by the parties, subject to the overriding principle of fairness in the
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.
 1.30 In short, while the occupation agreement is a form of contract, it is one whose
shape and content is, to a significant degree, determined by underlying statutory
rules.
The persons to whom the agreement will apply
 1.31 As the list of issues to be considered in this Part clearly reveal, occupation
agreements cannot be limited in their effect simply to those parties to the initial
agreement. If this were to be the outcome, the occupation agreements would not
cover the many complex living arrangements that people enter into. We seek to
ensure that our occupation agreements can accommodate the fact that there may
well be changes to the identity of the occupiers, and indeed landlords, under the
agreement. We want to ensure that, as far as possible, changes made to the
3 See CP 162, paras 6.89 to 6.124.
7agreement do not require the agreement to be terminated and a new one created.
We address these issues in this paper.
The period of time over which the agreement will last
 1.32 By including proposals for provisions relating to when possession proceedings may
be brought and that occupation agreements should not as a general rule be
determined without an order from the court, we have already signalled that the
terms of the contract – as shaped by statute – will determine the period of time
over which occupation agreements will exist.
 1.33 In this paper we examine a number of other situations in which the time during
which the agreement will persist is considered. For example, we consider what
should happen when one of a number of co-occupiers wishes to quit the premises;
we also consider what should happen to the agreement on the death of an
occupier.
 1.34 It should be understood, therefore, that the agreements which we propose
comprise a particular sort of statutory contractual arrangement. We hope that the
majority of the matters to be addressed in this paper will be capable of being
determined by the terms of the occupation agreement, as shaped by the underlying
statutory rules. These issues will be discussed, in context, below.
REGULATORY IMPACT
 1.35 We noted, in CP 162 at paragraph 1.95, that Government departments are all
required to undertake a regulatory impact assessment of legislative proposals. As
we explained there, although the Law Commission does not undertake this
exercise, nevertheless we would find information about the regulatory impact




 2.1 In Parts III, V and VI we consider a number of situations in which a requirement
to obtain consent will be required before a transaction can go ahead. For example:
whether an occupier is entitled to add a new occupier to a joint occupation
agreement, whether an occupier can create a sub-occupation agreement, whether
an occupier is entitled to exchange his or her agreement with another person are
all circumstances which will, we suggest, depend on the giving of consent by the
landlord.1 In Part IV we also raise the question of whether there are some
circumstances where a landlord should have to consent to the introduction of a
lodger.2
 2.2 Where consent is required, the further question will arise as to the circumstances
in which the person from whom consent is sought can properly withhold that
consent.
 2.3 To avoid constant repetition of the arguments, we hope it will assist the reader if
we discuss the question of consent separately. It can then be assumed that – unless
the context otherwise requires – the principles set out in this Part will apply in any
case where there are consent requirements.
 2.4 Three issues are considered:
 (1) How should requirements to seek consent be structured?
 (2) When should the withholding of consent be permitted?
 (3) What should be the effect of ignoring any requirement to obtain consent?
STRUCTURE OF CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
The current position
 2.5 The current law on the assignment of leases and sub-letting contains a number of
provisions relating to the question whether the landlord’s consent is needed. The
starting point is the agreement. But contractual terms are supplemented by
statutory provisions, which relate in particular to the restrictions, if any, on the
landlord’s ability to withhold any such consent.
 2.6 As in other areas of housing law, the general common law and land law are
supplemented by a number of specific housing-related statutory provisions.
Provisions in the Rent Act 1977, the Housing Act 1985, the Housing Act 1988
1 We do not consider here the issues where the head lease is not covered by our new scheme,
or where a mortgagee’s consent is required for the granting of a tenancy. These issues are
covered in paras 8.64 to 8.73 and 8.58 to 8.63 below.
2 Para 4.36.
9and the Housing Act 1996 deal, in a variety of ways, with the circumstances in
which sub-letting and/or assignment are permitted, and the consequences of
failure to obtain requisite consents. These rules are themselves affected by the
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988. The result
is a patchwork of provisions that is confusing, even for experienced practitioners.
 2.7 Under the current law, four possible situations exist:
 (1) no consent is needed and therefore a tenancy can be freely assigned or
sub-let;
 (2) there is an absolute prohibition, so that no lawful assignment or sub-
letting can occur;
 (3) consent is needed but it cannot be unreasonably withheld (a “fully”
qualified covenant); and
 (4) consent is needed but it can be unreasonably withheld (a “merely”
qualified covenant).
We deal with each of these situations in turn.
No consent needed
 2.8 At common law the tenant is able to assign or sublet without consent if there is no
express covenant which prohibits the tenant from doing it. In practice, it is rare for
a professionally drafted lease or tenancy agreement not to include an express
covenant dealing with the question of assignment and sub-letting.
 2.9 The only statutory intervention which prohibits the imposition of a requirement
for the giving of consent is found in section 93(1)(a) of the Housing Act 1985.
This gives secure tenants an absolute right to take in lodgers without the consent
of the landlord.3
 2.10 By contrast with a tenancy, a licensee – who has only a personal interest in the
property – will usually have no power to assign or sub-let unless the power to do so
is expressly given.
Absolute prohibitions
 2.11 Under the current law, absolute prohibitions on the making of assignments or sub-
letting are valid, save in three cases where rights for secure tenants are implied by
statute and cannot be over-ridden.4 The provisions of the Landlord and Tenant
3 We discuss the right to take in a lodger in Part IV below.
4 The Housing Act 1985 implies three relevant terms into secure tenancies which cannot be
expressly overridden: (i) the right to assign by way of mutual exchange under s 92, subject to
detailed procedures involving consent; (ii) the right to take in lodgers without consent under
s 93(1)(a) and (iii) the right to sub-let part of the premises with the landlord’s consent under
s 93(1)(b). These terms are not implied into introductory tenancies.
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Acts 1927 and 1988, which apply to qualified prohibitions, do not apply to
absolute prohibitions.5
 2.12 Even where there is an absolute prohibition in a tenancy agreement, there is
nothing to stop a landlord agreeing to an assignment or sub-letting. For this reason
absolute covenants against assignment or sub-letting are popular with private
residential landlords’ advisers, in that they give the landlord a great deal of
flexibility. The landlord can depart from the strict terms of the prohibition when
they so wish.
Qualified prohibitions
 2.13 A “qualified” prohibition is one which prohibits assignment or sub-letting unless
the landlord’s consent has first been obtained. Two types of qualified prohibition
may be identified:
 (1) A “fully qualified” prohibition is where consent is required, but it cannot
be unreasonably withheld.
 (2) A “merely qualified” prohibition. Such a clause merely requires the
landlord’s consent; it does not impose any restrictions on the withholding
of that consent. Thus under such a clause consent may, quite legitimately,
be unreasonably withheld.
 2.14 In practice, merely qualified prohibitions are usually deemed to be fully qualified
by virtue of section 19 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927.6 In other words the
landlord is only entitled to withhold consent where it would be reasonable to do
so. The Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 adds to this and applies to all fully
qualified prohibitions, whether drafted as such or deemed to be such by the 1927
Act.7 It imposes duties on the landlord to give a written decision (with reasons for
any refusal) within a reasonable time of receipt of a written request for consent. It
also imposes liability in damages for failure to comply with this duty.
 2.15 Under section 15 of the Housing Act 1988, a merely qualified prohibition on
assignment and sub-letting is implied into periodic assured tenancies (on which
the landlord has not taken a premium and in which there is no express
prohibition). The Landlord and Tenant Acts 1927 and 1988 do not apply to this
particular category of implied prohibition.8 Therefore in such a case, the landlord
can unreasonably refuse consent to the assignment of a periodic assured tenancy.
5 See para 2.14 below. Even where there is an absolute prohibition, an unlawful assignment
will still be valid, although in breach – see para 2.45 below.
6 This provides that consent may not be unreasonably withheld.
7 The Act derived from a report of the Law Commission, Leasehold Conveyancing (1987)
Law Com No 161.
8 Housing Act 1988, s 15(2).
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Simplifying the options
 2.16 We think there is scope for simplification of these options.
The landlord’s veto
 2.17 As is apparent from the above analysis, there is in practice very little difference
between an absolute prohibition and a “merely qualified” prohibition. The first
does not require the landlord to do anything; the latter does require the landlord to
take the step of saying no, but this can be done on any grounds whatsoever. Thus
the outcome is the same.
 2.18 In either case, and notwithstanding the term in the agreement, there is nothing to
prevent the occupier from asking the landlord to ignore the term and allow him or
her to take the step concerned. At the same time, the landlord has complete
freedom to choose whether or not to allow the occupier to take the relevant step.
In such circumstances, we consider that it would be appropriate to assimilate the
two.
 2.19 For the purpose of this paper, we describe this as the landlord’s veto.9
Consent provision
 2.20 The distinction should then be clear. Either there is a landlord’s veto, which means
that the landlord can simply say “no” to any proposal put to them; or there is a
consent provision, which means a provision in which the landlord’s approval is
required but which he or she can only refuse on reasonable grounds.
 2.21 When we refer to a consent term, in this paper, we mean a term that allows the
landlord to refuse consent only where it is reasonable to do so. The question of
reasonableness is discussed below.10 There will be particular circumstances in
which additional factors will need to be taken into account.11
 2.22 There may be situations in which a person seeking consent claims that he or she
asked for consent, but the person from whom the consent has been sought denies
that they received the request. Arguments could be avoided were there to be a
general requirement that any request be in writing. Such a provision would be
reinforced by a requirement that proof of service of the request be provided.
No consent provision
 2.23 There is always a third option, namely that the agreement contains no provision at
all requiring consent. In such a case the occupier can do as he or she wishes.
9 In a 1985 general report on covenants in landlord and tenant law – which was followed by
Leasehold Conveyancing (1987) Law Com No 161 and in part taken up in the Landlord
and Tenant Act 1988 – we criticised merely qualified covenants as “an anomalous and
misleading staging post” between absolute and fully qualified prohibitions. We
recommended that they should “be eliminated altogether from this area of the law”. See
Codification of the Law of Landlord and Tenant: Covenants Restricting Dispositions,
Alterations and Change of User (1985) Law Com No 141 at para 4.70.
10 See below paras 2.27 to 2.44.
11 See for instance the questions discussed in paras 3.35 to 3.36 and 3.56 below.
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Conclusion
 2.24 We provisionally propose that three standard possibilities should be
recognised:
 (1) no requirement for consent;
 (2) a requirement that the landlord gives consent, which can only be
withheld on reasonable grounds;
 (3) a landlord’s veto.
These will be contained in the occupation agreement as appropriate.
 2.25 We further provisionally propose that the relevant term in the agreement
should provide that any request for consent should be made in writing and
that proof of service, for example by recorded delivery, should be
obtained.
 2.26 The situations in which one or other of these positions should be a compulsory
term, which cannot be amended, or a default term, which can be, is considered in
the following parts of this paper.
WITHHOLDING CONSENT: REASONABLENESS IN CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
 2.27 As will be seen, in most cases where we propose that the occupier can only do
something with the landlord’s consent, our standard position is that consent can
only be refused on reasonable grounds. The obvious difficulty with the concept of
reasonableness is that there can be considerable scope for argument as to what is
or is not reasonable.
 2.28 There is a great deal of case law on the question of reasonableness and
unreasonableness, but most of this derives from the law relating to commercial
leases. These involve taking into account rather different considerations from those
which are likely to affect the granting of consents in relation to residential
occupation agreements. We do not think that principles developed in the context of
business leases should automatically be applied in the residential context.
 2.29 We have considered whether we should attempt a detailed statutory definition of
the concept of reasonableness. However, we have concluded that this would be just
as likely to generate argument as leaving the question of reasonableness to the
courts.
 2.30 What is important is that an appropriate balance should be struck between the
interests of landlords and the interests of occupiers in deciding whether or not
consent should be granted or may properly be withheld. We have concluded that
this should, in the last resort, be an issue that is left to the courts, just as the
question of the reasonableness of making an order for possession is a question that
is left to the courts.
 2.31 This does, however, raise the question whether the discretion of the courts to
determine what is or is not a reasonable refusal of consent should in any way be
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structured. We suggest that in particular contexts, there should be a further
refinement of what constitutes reasonableness.12 We would welcome views on
whether the general test of reasonableness should be the subject of a structured
discretion and if so whether there are particular factors the courts should be
required to take into account. These might include, for example, the likely ability
of a new occupier to be able to pay his or her share of the rent; or the likelihood
that they will behave in a responsible way if they take up occupation in the
premises.
 2.32 We provisionally propose that what is meant by “reasonable” should not,
in general, be statutorily defined.
 2.33 We invite views on whether the discretion of the court to determine
reasonableness in this context should be statutorily structured, and if so
what factors should be taken into account.
Special cases
 2.34 There will be particular instances where it will be necessary to consider specific
matters in reaching a decision on reasonableness.
Negotiated terms relating to consent
 2.35 For example, in contexts where a requirement to give consent is contained in a
default term, the parties will be free to agree an alternative term which specifies
factors that must be taken into account in determining reasonableness. A failure to
consider those factors could lead to the conclusion that consent was unreasonably
withheld.
Failure by the landlord to respond
 2.36 One of the problems that arises in practice is that the person from whom consent
is required may simply ignore any request for consent. It is already the law that in
the case of tenancies to which the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 applies the
person to whom application for consent is made must reply within a reasonable
time.13 This duty may be enforced as a claim in tort for breach of statutory duty.14
 2.37 We think that it is not unreasonable to propose an extension of these provisions to
our proposed scheme, so that a continued failure to respond to a request for
consent should not prevent the occupier from taking the step concerned.15 The
question remains whether the period within which the requirement to give consent
12 See eg the discussion at paras 6.29 to 6.37 below, in relation to consent to mutual exchange.
13 Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 s 1. Consent may be given subject to conditions; if withheld,
written reasons for refusal must be given. Where the recipient of an application is not the
person able to give the consent, that person is under a duty to pass it on to the person who
can give the consent: s 2. Where a tenant has granted an interest to another, and that other
wishes in turn to grant a further interest, but this cannot be done without the consent of the
head landlord, a similar duty to give consent within a reasonable time is imposed: s 3.
14 Ibid, s 4.
15 A similar issue arises in relation to the duty on the landlord to provide an address: see CP
162, para 6.79.
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should be satisfied should remain simply “reasonable” or whether it should be
more precisely defined. Our preliminary view is that a more precise definition
would be more useful.
 2.38 We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in the
agreement that where a person whose consent to a transaction is
required fails to respond within a given period to a request for consent,
this should be regarded as an unreasonable refusal of consent, so that the
requisite consent should be deemed to have been given.
 2.39 We invite views on what that appropriate period should be.
Provision of reasons for refusal
 2.40 We also think that where landlords are entitled to refuse consent they should
provide reasons for refusal; otherwise the occupier will find it hard to judge
whether or not the refusal is reasonable. It will also be of assistance to the occupier
if the landlord is required to state their reasons for refusal in writing. Again this
provision is already found in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988;16 the principle
should therefore be extended to all agreements falling within our proposed
scheme.
 2.41 We provisionally propose that where landlords think they have reasonable
grounds to refuse consent, they should be required to inform the occupier
of the reasons why consent was refused.
 2.42 We invite views on whether the landlord should be required to provide a
written statement of reasons and, if so, whether this should be a universal
requirement to apply in all cases or one that only arises where the
occupier asks for it.
 2.43 The further question remains of what the sanction should be on the landlord who,
having been asked for a statement of reasons, fails to produce one. The most
draconian sanction is to provide that the landlord who fails to provide reasons, or
fails to provide the correct reasons,17 should be deemed to have provided reasons
that failed to demonstrate that the withholding of consent was reasonable. This
approach would be consistent with our provisional proposal where the landlord has
failed to respond within a defined time period.18 Alternatively, or in addition, the
current remedy – an action in tort for breach of statutory duty – could be made
available.
 2.44 We invite views on the sanction that should be applied to the landlord who
fails to provide a written statement of reasons, following a request –
properly made – so to do.
16 Landlord and Tenant Act 1988, s 1(3)(b)(ii) and s 3(2)(b)(ii).
17 This might occur in a large office where a set of reasons relevant to one case was
inadvertently sent to another; in such a case it might be thought that the draconian solution
suggested would be too severe.
18 See para 2.36 to 2.39.
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EFFECT OF TRANSACTIONS WHERE NECESSARY CONSENTS HAVE NOT BEEN
OBTAINED
 2.45 Under the present law, transactions in breach of covenants against assignment or
sub-letting – whether absolute, merely qualified or fully qualified – do not prevent
an assignment or sub-letting being valid.19 Instead they render the tenant20 liable to
eviction for the breach of the agreement. Statutory provisions may result in the
tenancy being taken outside relevant housing legislation, so that a tenant loses
his/her protective housing status.21 Statute may also prevent the tenancy coming
back into protection again even after the unlawful transaction has ended.22
 2.46 We accept that this situation is necessary in the context of commercial leases or
long leaseholds. But we think that – for the purpose of housing law – the present
state of the law is unnecessarily confusing.
Our approach
 2.47 For the purpose of our scheme, we think that where the occupier has made an
arrangement with a new person to occupy the premises, contrary to the landlord’s
veto, or without obtaining the requisite consent, the following consequences
should flow:
 (1) Any agreement entered into without the required consent should still be
valid as between the parties to the unauthorised agreement.
 (2) As against the occupier who entered the unauthorised agreement, the
landlord should have the right to take proceedings for possession on the
ground that a term of the occupation agreement had been broken.
 (3) As against the person who imposed the veto or who had reasonably
refused consent, any purported transaction made in breach of a veto or a
term requiring consent should not be valid. Thus a landlord would not be
bound by the consequences of a transaction carried out by an occupier in
the teeth of a veto or where consent had been reasonably withheld.
 2.48 We provisionally propose that the occupation agreement should make
clear that any transaction carried out by the occupier, which was either
contrary to the landlord’s veto or subject to consent which has been
reasonably withheld, will expose the occupier to the possibility of
possession proceedings for breach of the occupation agreement, and will
not bind the landlord.
19 See Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Higgins [1983] 1 WLR 1091.
20 Who will be the head tenant in a case of unlawful sub-letting, and the assignee in a case of
unlawful assignment.
21 See Housing Act, 1985 s 91(2) and s 93(2), and Housing Act 1996 s 125(5)(a) and s
125(6).
22 Housing Act 1985, s 91(2) and s 93(2). Note that there is no equivalent provision in the
Housing Act 1988.
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 2.49 Where necessary consent is not obtained, the effect is that the occupier will
continue to be the occupier, but the position will be different as between an
unlawful sub-occupier and an unlawful assignee.
 2.50 An unlawful sub-occupation agreement will take effect in the way agreed between
the sub-occupier and the occupier, who becomes the sub-occupier’s landlord. But
on termination of the head agreement, the head landlord will not be bound by the
sub-occupation agreement as they have not consented to it.
 2.51 By contrast an unlawful purported assignment will not take effect in the way
agreed between the purported assignor and assignee. Instead the occupier (the
purported assignor) will continue as such, while the purported assignee (if they
move in) will merely be the occupier’s guest.23 If the occupier or the landlord
terminate their agreement, there will be no question of the landlord having to
accept the purported assignee as an occupier at that point, as the agreement to
which the purported assignee tried to become a party will have ended.
When should receipt of rent count as consent by the head landlord?
 2.52 The head landlord can, in unlawful assignment or sub-occupation agreement
cases, decide to give their consent on discovering what has happened. An
assignment involves an immediate change for the landlord, in that they start
treating the new person as the occupier, whereas in a sub-occupation agreement
the head landlord’s legal position does not alter until the termination of the head
agreement. Where a head landlord takes rent directly from a purported assignee,
knowing of the attempted unlawful assignment, then they should be taken to have
consented to it. The assignment should become effective from that point.
 2.53 The position is more complex where the head landlord continues to take rent from
the occupier despite knowing of an unlawful sub-occupation agreement. We want
to avoid the creation of a new category of “tolerated but unlawful sub-occupier”,
where the landlord permits an unlawful sub-occupation agreement to continue for
an indeterminate period, which will not be binding on the landlord at the
termination of the head agreement.
 2.54 Under the current law a landlord might be taken to have waived the breach by
continuing to accept rent from the occupier in full knowledge of the unlawful sub-
occupation. We believe the current detailed rules on waiver, and remedy of
breaches in forfeiture cases, are not appropriate in our new scheme. Instead
repossession for breach will be subject to reasonableness, which will more
appropriately deal with issues relating to repossession against the original occupier.
23 This will only give the purported assignee a right to sue the purported assignor for damages,
as it will not give any right to override the landlord’s refusal of consent so as to make the
purported assignment effective. If the purported assignee starts paying the rent to the
occupier, then an unlawful sub-agreement will be created instead of the purported
assignment. If the landlord stops receiving rent they can be expected to check why. If the
landlord knowingly takes rent from the purported assignee, then they may effectively be
giving consent – see below paras 2.52 to 2.55. There will only be a problem if the landlord
can be deceived into taking rent from the purported assignee in the belief that it is from the
occupier.
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 2.55 Under our new scheme we believe that the potential problem of landlords
artificially claiming that they did not realise that they did not know they were
receiving rent from a new occupier, and thus claiming that they had not given their
consent to the new arrangement can be avoided. Where this has happened, at the
point when the head agreement is terminated, the sub-occupier could then argue
that the degree of delay on the part of the landlord was such as to amount to the
unreasonable refusal of consent (in that the head landlord had lived apparently
happily with the situation for all this time) so that the allegedly unlawful sub-
occupation agreement was really lawful. While there should not be a rule requiring
the landlord to refuse rent from, or take possession proceedings against, the
occupier in order to maintain their refusal of consent to a sub-occupation, their
failure to take any action might be used as evidence that their refusal was contrived
or otherwise unreasonable.
When should receipt of rent count as creation of a new agreement by the
landlord?
 2.56 So long as the original occupier’s agreement is not terminated, the landlord will
not have any direct relationship with the unlawful occupier. The only effect on the
landlord of the unlawful occupation will therefore be that it will entitle the
landlord to take action for damages (or eviction) for breach of contract against the
original occupier, rather than against the unlawful occupier.
 2.57 In some cases the landlord will decide to apply for possession against the occupier
for the breach of the agreement. In such cases, any unlawful occupiers24 will be
liable to be evicted without separate proceedings when the possession order against
the occupier is enforced, just as happens to the rest of the occupier’s household. 25
 2.58 In other cases the original agreement will terminate without the landlord obtaining
a possession order. This might be because the landlord follows the abandonment
procedure or accepts a surrender from the occupier.26 Alternatively it might be
because the occupier gives notice to quit.27 Any rights of occupation of the
unlawful sub-occupier or the unlawful purported assignee will fall away with the
termination of the agreement. The landlord then has a choice of whether to grant a
fresh agreement to the unlawful occupier, or to take possession proceedings against
them as trespassers.
 2.59 Where the landlord starts knowingly accepting rent from the new occupier, they
would thereby be deemed to accept the person as a new occupier under a new
agreement and would thus be subject to the duty to issue a fresh written
agreement. We do not think it right that landlords should have the ability
indefinitely to postpone taking proceedings for possession, and in the meantime
24 Whether they are unlawful sub-occupiers, or are no more than guests of the occupier
following an ineffective unlawful assignment.
25 Who would have been served with notice of the possession proceedings at the property
where possession was sought on a discretionary basis – see our proposals at 3.115 to 3.123.
26 See CP 162, paras 10.62, 10.65.
27 See CP 162, para 10.49.
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purporting to collect money in lieu of rent, pending proceedings for possession
which do not materialise.28
 2.60 We accept that it may not be reasonable to expect a landlord to start proceedings
on the very day they learn of the existence of the new occupier. We also accept that
it may not be reasonable to expect a landlord to refuse payments in these
circumstances. We think there should be a period of grace during which the
landlord would be entitled to accept money on the basis that it was advance
damages for trespass, not rent. However this period should not be an indefinite
one. It should only last while the landlord investigates the new occupier, to see
whether or not the new occupier is someone the landlord would be willing to take
on as the occupier. If the landlord decides not to take the new occupier on but
decides instead to take possession proceedings, the period should be extended
pending the eviction.
 2.61 Any payments made pending a decision on whether to evict should be made purely
as a way of advance payment of trespass damages, or by a person who claims to be
a lawful occupier and does not want to build up rent arrears.
 2.62 If they are made in return for the landlord not proceeding with eviction then they
should be seen as rent and lead to the creation of a fresh agreement. The fresh
agreement would normally be a type II periodic agreement,29 so the landlord could
evict the new occupier on notice using the accelerated possession procedure.
 2.63 If the landlord ultimately decided they were happy with the new occupier, they
could replace that agreement with one on the same terms as held by the original
occupier (which might have been a type I, or a fixed term, or otherwise on better
terms).
 2.64 We provisionally propose that after a prescribed maximum period during
which the landlord should be able to take such payments without starting
possession proceedings, a fresh agreement, covered by our new scheme,
should be taken to have been created if, after termination of the original
agreement, the landlord accepts payments from an unlawful occupier in
return for delaying, or not taking, possession action against them as
trespassers.
 2.65 We invite views on whether there should be a prescribed maximum period
of time during which the landlord should be able to take such payments,
without starting possession proceedings, and without being taken to have
created a new agreement. Alternatively should it be left as a matter of fact
28 Where a person occupies property as a trespasser, the land owner is entitled to
compensation for this occupation. The technical term is “mesne profits”, or payments in
relation to the property for the trespass. Although the sums thus payable are often the same
as the rent would be, they are not classified as “rent” so as to ensure that the trespassers
cannot argue that they are a tenant of the land owner. The payment for occupation would be
classified as “advance damages for trespass” in cases where an action for trespass had not yet
been commenced, but could be.
29 See below on social landlords.
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to be determined by the court whether the landlord has agreed to refrain
from or delay possession action in return for the payments?
 2.66 There may be cases where a social landlord would not want to enter a long-term
type I agreement with an unlawful sub-occupier but would be willing to enter a
short-term type II agreement, either to allow them time to move out or while
deciding whether they should have a type I agreement. In CP 162 we invited views
on whether social landlords should have a free choice as to when they may use the
type II agreement; or whether there should be a general requirement for them to
use type I agreements, with a statutory list of exceptions.30 If the former option
were to be preferred, there would be nothing to prevent a social landlord from
making a type II agreement in this situation. On the other hand, if the use of type I
agreements became a general requirement, it would be necessary and sensible to
allow social landlords to let in such circumstances on a type II agreement.
 2.67 We provisionally propose that, if there is to be general requirement on
social landlords to use type I agreements, one of the exceptional
circumstances justifying use of a type II agreement would be where the
landlord wished to make a temporary arrangement with a new occupier
who has been granted the right to occupy without the landlord’s consent or
in breach of a landlord’s veto.





 3.1 As noted at the outset of this paper, CP 162 was written on the deliberately
simplistic assumption that the landlord would be entering into a contract granting
the right to occupy premises with one person – the occupier. This was necessary to
explain the basis of our proposed scheme.
 3.2 In this part we consider:
 (1) the current law of joint occupation, and how the principles of that law
should be adapted to our proposed scheme;
 (2) the creation of joint occupation agreements;
 (3) the liability arising under joint occupation agreements;
 (4) the circumstances in which new occupiers may enter a joint occupation
agreement;
 (5) how joint occupiers may seek to leave the agreement; and
 (6) non-contractual arrangements.
THE CURRENT LAW OF JOINT OCCUPATION
 3.3 At present, the rights of those who have entered agreements to share property are
determined primarily by the principles of the law on joint tenancy and tenancy in
common, found in land law. It is important to stress that these principles apply to
all cases where there is co-ownership of land, not just to cases where land has been
rented.1 Furthermore, the principles do not apply to licensees who are sharing.
 3.4 While it is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to give a full account of this
law, a number of points should be noted.
 3.5 First, an important distinction between joint tenancy and tenancy in common is
that under joint tenancy a “right of survivorship” applies. This means that, on the
death of one joint tenant, the survivor takes over the whole of interest in the
property. This will often suit those who have lived together for many years,
whether as husband and wife or in other long-term relationships. But where
property has been acquired on the basis of sharply different contributions this may
be unfair. Tenancy in common provides that property is held on undivided shares
but, on the death of a co-owner, the interest holder has full testamentary powers to
leave his or her share by will to another.
1 The Law Commission has recently considered these principles in its recent publication
Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper (2002), which can be found at
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/misc/property.htm.
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 3.6 Secondly, another feature of joint tenancy (as opposed to tenancy in common) is
that liability to meet the obligations under the joint tenancy agreement is, unless
there is any provision to the contrary, “joint and several”. This means that each
tenant is liable to meet in full the obligations under the agreement. This is so even
where one tenant who was supposed to contribute to meeting those obligations
fails to make the proper contribution, for example to payment of the rent.2
 3.7 Thirdly, the law relating to joint tenancy limits the number of persons to whom a
legal joint tenancy can be granted to four.3 Any further joint tenants have only an
equitable interest in the property. These are rules of long-standing, well
understood by conveyancers and an integral part of the land registration
requirements of HM Land Registry.
 3.8 While these principles can be applied relatively easily in cases where the co-tenants
are all named on the tenancy agreement, problems start to arise where premises
are shared by a number of people, but only one is named on the agreement; or
where one or more of the co-tenants leaves and the remaining ones wish to bring
in new occupiers to take the place of those who have quit.
OUR APPROACH
 3.9 Our starting point is that we want to adapt those principles of the current law
relating to co-ownership which are relevant to fit our proposed scheme of housing
law. Our aim is to allow more flexibility by allowing a greater degree of access to
and departure from a continuing co-occupation agreement, without affecting other
co-occupiers.
 3.10 Thus we will seek to reproduce for the purpose of our scheme the principle of the
joint and several liability of joint tenants, and – where relevant – survivorship.
 3.11 But we propose a new right whereby occupiers may seek to bring a new occupier
into the agreement, with the consent of the landlord. This would replace the
present legal position, which requires the original tenancy agreement to be
assigned, or terminated and a new one created.4 We regard this process as
unnecessarily cumbersome and poorly understood.
 3.12 Turning to the termination of joint agreements, we propose that individual
occupiers should have the right to terminate just their own interest in a joint
agreement, rather than, as at present, requiring them to bring the whole agreement
to an end when they wish to leave.
 3.13 We also consider whether there is any need to entrench in the occupation
agreement a compulsory term giving occupiers the right to regulate who should
live in their home on a non-contractual basis. And we make proposals for
2 In such a case the joint tenant who has met the liabilities under the agreement is able to seek
to recover from the other joint tenant to the extent of his share: Chalmers, Guthrie and Co v
Guthrie (1923) 156 LTJ 382.
3 Law of Property Act 1925, s 34(2).
4 Secure tenants do not appear to be able to assign their tenancies to another person jointly
with themselves – see Part VI below.
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procedural changes to enhance the position of non-contractual occupiers in
possession proceedings.
JOINT OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS – CREATION
 3.14 We do not seek to disturb the current land law rule that the number of persons to
whom a legal joint tenancy can be granted should be limited to four. In the context
of the scheme we are proposing, however, we think that the distinction between
legal and equitable interests involves a great deal of legal technicality, which serves
only to confuse landlords and occupiers.
 3.15 We see no reason why, for the purpose of our scheme, when a landlord seeks to
enter an occupation agreement under our proposed scheme they should be
required to treat the first four occupiers named on the agreement any differently
from any others.
 3.16 There are, of course, good reasons to limit the numbers who may live in any
particular home, which derive from more general considerations of public health.
But these can quite properly be regulated through the law relating to
overcrowding.5
 3.17 We provisionally propose that there should be no limit to the number of
people to whom joint rights of occupation may be granted, subject to the
overall limit imposed by the laws against over-crowding.
 3.18 This provisional proposal would not prevent a landlord making an express
stipulation limiting the total number of occupiers to fewer than would be
permitted by rules on statutory overcrowding.
 3.19 The law on land registration would continue to require that the only first four
named joint occupiers in agreement covered by our new scheme which counted as
leases, rather than licences, could be registered at HM Land Registry. We have
proposed that our scheme should apply to all agreements for periods of up to 21
years.6 While currently none of the agreements covered by our new scheme would
need to be registered, on the coming into force of the Land Registration Act 2002,
leases for seven years or more will have to be registered and there will be voluntary
registration for leases between three and seven years.7 Nevertheless in the vast
majority of cases, registration of occupation agreements will not be required as
they would be for a period of less than three years.8
5 See Housing Act 1985, Part X.
6 See CP 162, para 9.18.
7 See Land Registration Act 1925, s 8 – leases of 21 years and under are protected as
overriding interests under s 70(1)(k). See also Land Registration Act 2002, s 4(1)(c) and s
33(b).
8 Even though a periodic occupation agreement may last for many years, its length is for these
purposes determined by the length of the periods at which the rent is paid (weekly,
fortnightly or monthly) not the total period of occupation under the agreement.
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JOINT OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS – LIABILITY
 3.20 We suggested above that questions relating to the extent of the liabilities that arise
under joint occupation agreements should be based by analogy on the current law
of joint tenancy. This would mean that joint occupiers would have joint and several
liability to meet the terms of the contract during the life of the agreement. In
addition, when a joint occupier dies, the remaining joint occupiers should normally
take over the rights and obligations under the agreement through the principle of
survivorship.9
Joint and several liability
 3.21 Landlords frequently want to enter a contract granting the right to occupy
premises as a home to more than one person. This may be for any number of
reasons. A very practical one is that the market rent of a flat or house may be
beyond the means of an individual occupier, but be within the collective means of
a group.
 3.22 Under the present law relating to joint tenancy, each member of the group is
normally liable to meet his or her obligations under the tenancy “jointly and
severally”.10 Thus each member of the group would be liable, individually, for the
whole of the obligations imposed by the tenancy.
 3.23 Although an arrangement may have started on the basis that each joint occupier
will make a contribution to the rent, should one or more occupiers fail to keep up
their contribution, responsibility for the total rent will fall on the shoulders of the
remaining joint occupiers.11
 3.24 In practice, while the original members of the group remain the same, there will
not usually be a problem. But it should be clear that the group as a whole remains
responsible for the payment of the whole rent and for meeting the other obligations
of the agreement.
 3.25 Problems often arise where one of the group leaves the premises, and the occupiers
are either unable to replace that person or under the terms of their agreement are
prevented from doing so.12 The question then arises: what rent should the
remaining member(s) of the group be paying? And more generally, what is the
scope of their liability under the contract? If there is joint and several liability
under the contract, then the remaining party or parties to the contract remain
liable for the payment of the whole rent, not just a proportion of it.
9 The issue is discussed at paras 7.7 to 7.15 below.
10 See C Harpum, Megarry and Wade, The Law of Property (6th ed 2000) at paras 9–02 to 9–08.
11 In the event of one of a number of joint occupiers having to pay the entirety of the rent, he
or she will have – at least in theory – the right to claim reimbursement from the other joint
occupiers: Chalmers, Guthrie and Co v Guthrie (1923) 156 LTJ 382. Under the new scheme,
we will reproduce and extend the effect of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, s
13(3) – which applies the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 to joint and several
covenants in leases – to all agreements under our scheme, including licences.
12 We discuss, at paras 3.29 to 3.50 below, the circumstances in which the right to occupy may
be taken up by a person who is not a party to the original contract.
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 3.26 In our view, the notion of joint and several liability is well established and
understood in the residential rented sector. Landlords would certainly expect to
impose it when entering agreements under our new scheme. This appears to us to
be reasonable.
 3.27 Our judgement is that it would be right to make joint and several liability the
normal contractual position that should apply if the agreement is silent on the
point. That position can be achieved if there were a default term in all occupation
agreements that joint occupiers would be liable jointly and severally. The parties
will then be at liberty to depart from this.
 3.28 We provisionally propose that, where an occupation agreement is entered
into by more than one occupier, there should be a default term that
liability of the occupiers under that agreement should be on the joint and
several basis.
NEW JOINT OCCUPIERS ENTERING THE AGREEMENT
 3.29 Next we consider whether there are circumstances in which a new person, not a
party to the original joint agreement, might be able to be brought into the
agreement, and if so how this might be achieved.
 3.30 Currently there is no statutory provision which entitles a new joint tenant to be
brought into a joint tenancy agreement. It can therefore only be done with the
consent both of the existing tenants and of the landlord.
 3.31 Under the present law of landlord and tenant, this can be achieved in two ways.
Either there can be an assignment of the interest by the current tenant or tenants
to the current tenant(s) plus the new tenant or tenants; or there can be a surrender
of the old tenancy to the landlord and the grant by the landlord of a new tenancy
to the new parties. While either route achieves the same result, there can be
differences on the extent to which pre-existing liabilities are carried forward into
the post-assignment/grant situation. We are anxious that our proposed scheme
should not be bedevilled by any uncertainties that may arise from such a
distinction.
A right to a joint agreement?
 3.32 We have therefore considered whether there should be circumstances in which an
occupier should be entitled to require the landlord to permit a new person to be
added to the agreement as a joint occupier.
 3.33 A number of steps have already been taken in this direction:
 (1) In 1996 the then Department of the Environment issued a circular,13 now
replaced by statutory guidance to which local authorities must “have
regard”,14 dealing with cases where there is a long term joint commitment
13 Department of the Environment, Local Authority Joint Tenancies Circular 7/96 (May 1996).
14 Department of the Environment and Department of Health, Code of Guidance on Parts VI
and VII of the Housing Act 1996: Allocation of Housing Accommodation, Homelessness
(1996) Annex C – published under Housing Act 1996, s 169 and s 182.
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to the home which is likely to continue. Situations envisaged included
joint commitment by spouses, friends, or unpaid live-in carers. The
guidance provides that local authorities “should normally” grant joint
tenancies to such groups, subject to there being no adverse implications
for good use of the stock. It also says local authorities should tell
applicants of the availability of joint tenancies and give written reasons for
any refusal to grant one.15
 (2) The Housing Corporation’s “Assured Tenant’s Charter” states that
assured tenants are entitled to know their landlord’s policy on the giving of
joint tenancies.16
 (3) The Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, section 11(5) goes further and creates
a right to bring in a joint tenant. The existing tenant and a potential new
joint tenant can apply jointly in writing to the landlord for the new person
to be included as a new joint tenant. The incomer must either already live
at the property as their only or principal home, or must intend to do so,
but there is no requirement for any particular relationship to exist between
the incomer and the current tenant.
The right is not an absolute one. The landlord can refuse the application.
But the landlord must consent unless it has reasonable grounds not to.
The Act does not define what would qualify as reasonable grounds. Like
the rest of the Act the provision only applies to the social rented sector,
not the private rented sector. It also applies to short Scottish secure
tenancies.17
 3.34 In the light of these developments, we think it would be appropriate to propose
that, at least in relation to type I agreements, it should be possible for an occupier
to be able to apply to his or her landlord to request that a new person should be
added as a joint occupier. If granted, the agreement to occupy should be expanded
to include that person. The right should not be absolute, but conditional on the
landlord giving consent.
 3.35 In accordance with our general approach, consent should not be unreasonably
withheld. The assessment of reasonableness would include the risk of prejudice to
the landlord from the possibility that the proposed new joint occupier might
become the sole occupier, but this should be based on an objective assessment of
risk, rather than an unreasonable fear. Such possibilities might be relevant where
the landlord thinks the applicant does not have a need for the type of housing
15 Where joint tenancies are not used, the guidance seeks to achieve a similar effect on the
death of the tenant. It says the local authority should give a tenancy of the property, or a
suitable alternative, to another member of the household who is not a statutory successor.
This only applies where the extra-statutory succession is to someone who has lived there for
a year, or has been looking after the tenant or their dependants, and only where it is a
priority given other demands on the stock. In fact, the person would seem to have to be able
to qualify for allocation through Housing Act 1996, Part VI as there is no relevant exception.
16 Housing Corporation, The Assured Tenant’s Charter (1998) p 15.
17 Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, s 34(6). These are the equivalent of introductory tenancies or
of certain uses of type II agreements by social landlords under our suggestions in CP 162,
paras 11.16 to 11.29 (relating to probationary type II agreements).
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provided by the particular landlord; or, in the case of social housing, is seeking to
exploit the right to joint occupation to jump the housing queue; or, more generally,
is unlikely to be able to pay the rent.
 3.36 We also think that one of the factors that the landlord should take into account is
whether the addition of one or more joint occupiers will raise the number of
occupiers in the premises above that which the landlord regards as reasonable or
desirable.
 3.37 We have asked ourselves whether the provision in the occupation agreement
providing for the right to apply to bring a new joint occupier into the agreement
should be a default term, which the parties can amend, or a compulsory one,
which they cannot. We anticipate that were the term to be a default one only it
would be so frequently contracted away as to render the proposed new right
illusory. In view of the developments listed at paragraph 3.33 above, we have come
to the provisional view that the term should be a compulsory one.
 3.38 We seek views on whether the right to apply to become a joint occupier should be
an open one, so that any one can apply; or whether it should be limited to
particular categories of people – for example, spouses or cohabitees (whether of
different or the same gender); or, as in section 11(6) of the Housing (Scotland) Act
2001, those whose only or principal home is, or is intended to be, the property in
question.
 3.39 We have also asked ourselves whether the proposed new right should apply to all
types of agreement or be limited to type I agreements. We accept that there is an
argument that the desire of occupiers to bring new parties into a home is
something that will occur in all parts of the rented sector of the housing market. If
we do not provide for it across the board, occupiers will in practice enter into
arrangements with joint occupiers without any reference to the landlord. On the
other hand it could be argued that the policy developments relating to joint
occupiers (see paragraph 3.33 above) have occurred exclusively in the social rented
sector, and that therefore these proposals should be similarly limited. It could also
be argued that private landlords should be able to have greater control over the
identity of their occupiers.18
 3.40 We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in the
agreement that an occupier should be able to apply to the landlord for
permission to have someone else brought into the agreement as a new
joint occupier. The landlord should be able to refuse consent unless it is
unreasonable to do so.
 3.41 In this context, the assessment of reasonableness should take account of all
relevant circumstances including in particular any prejudice to the
landlord that might arise if the new person ended up as sole occupier.
18 A similar argument is raised in the context of the right to take in a lodger not being extended
to type II agreements: see paras 4.29 to 4.36 below.
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 3.42 It should also take account of the numbers that would reside in the
premises and the landlord’s interest in retaining control over those
numbers.
 3.43 We invite views on whether the right to apply for a joint occupation
agreement should be limited to particular categories of people. If so, we
invite views on what those categories should be.
 3.44 We invite views on whether the provisional proposal should be limited to
type I agreements only, or should apply to all agreements falling within
our proposed scheme.
 3.45 If the landlord refuses consent and the occupier regards the refusal as
unreasonable, we consider that it is necessary that the occupier should be able to
apply to the county court to determine the question. The court would then have
the power to determine the reasonableness or otherwise of the refusal of consent.
 3.46 If the court agrees that the refusal of consent was unreasonable, we see no benefit
in suggesting that there should be further formalities to be completed before a new
joint occupier is added to the agreement. We therefore propose that, in an
appropriate case, the court should have power to order that a new occupier be
added to the agreement, as the result of which the new occupier would become a
co-occupier from the date of the order or any other date fixed by the court.19 We
think it right to ask whether the court should, at the same time, have a power to
amend any of the other terms of the agreement.
 3.47 We provisionally propose that where the occupier regards the refusal of
consent as unreasonable, he or she should have the right to apply to the
county court for a determination of the matter.
 3.48 We further provisionally propose that, in appropriate cases where the
landlord was held to have been unreasonable, the court should have the
power to add a new occupier to the agreement.
 3.49 We invite views on whether the court should have any wider power to vary
the terms of the agreement.
 3.50 In any event, the order would take effect as a variation of the original agreement. It
would therefore entitle both the new and existing occupiers to seek a revised
version of the agreement from the landlord, taking account of this variation.20
Effects of applications to bring in new joint occupiers
 3.51 If the landlord consents, or a court order is obtained, the person will become a
joint occupier under the agreement. Their status will then, in respect of the future
of the agreement, be the same as that of other joint occupiers. They will therefore
19 This power would be analogous to the power to make vesting orders under Family Law Act
1996, Sched 7.
20 We discussed the rights of occupiers to a copy of varied agreements in CP 162, paras 6.156
to 6.158.
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have joint and several liability with the original occupier as against the landlord, as
outlined above.
 3.52 There is a separate question as to whether the new joint occupier should take a
joint part in rights and liabilities under the agreement in respect of the period
before they entered the agreement.
 3.53 There is no obvious reason why they should obtain benefits. For instance it would
not seem right that they should be able to sue, under the agreement, for the effects
of disrepair during a time when they were not a party to the agreement.
 3.54 If they are not to obtain benefits, it would seem wrong for them to be saddled with
liabilities arising before they entered the agreement. The most common example
would be that they should not acquire joint liability for rent arrears built up by the
original occupier. This will mean that they cannot be sued for damages or debt in
relation to such defaults. That still leaves open the question of whether they can be
evicted on the basis of the original occupier’s previous breach of contract.
 3.55 We do not think it is appropriate to allow the possibility of eviction in such
circumstances. As joint occupiers cannot be evicted singly, this means the original
occupier will effectively become free of the threat of eviction for their previous
breaches (although they would still be liable, solely rather than jointly, for
damages).
 3.56 The consequence of this, we believe, would be that it would generally be
reasonable for a landlord to refuse consent to the addition of a new joint occupier
to the agreement where the existing occupier(s) were in significant breach of the
agreement at the time the application to join was made. The only exception would
be where the breach was so minor that a court would not consider it reasonable to
evict the occupiers for it anyway. If that were the case, the landlord would not have
lost an effective remedy (that is, the ability to take possession proceedings in
respect of the breach) by giving consent. We do not believe it is overly burdensome
to expect landlords to check for such breaches before deciding whether to give
consent, given that part of good management is to check that occupiers are
observing the terms of their agreement on an ongoing basis anyway.
 3.57 If the landlord does not consent, and a court order that the refusal was
unreasonable is not obtained, the person will not become a joint occupier. They
might of course still move in to the property, but this will give them no contractual
rights as against the landlord. Nor will it in itself give them any contract with the
occupier. Their status will therefore be the same as other non-contracting
occupiers, as outlined below at paragraphs 3.113 to 3.140. This will not directly
affect the landlord. In fact they may commonly already have had this status before
applying to become joint occupiers, for instance as the co-habitee or adult child of
the occupier.21 If they wish to enter into a contract to occupy the property, then
they will have to do so with the occupier, rather than the landlord. They will then
become the occupier’s lodgers or sub-occupiers, as described in Parts IV and V
below.
21 The rights of a non-contracting spouse are greater than others by virtue of family law – see
paras 6.57 to 6.71 below.
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 3.58 If a failed applicant for joint occupation does move in, and the landlord starts
knowingly to accept rent from them, this may alter the position. It will be a
question of fact, for the court to decide in the last resort in any dispute, as to
whether the landlord has thereby entered a new agreement with them, and
whether it is joint with the original occupier (who may or may not have
abandoned). It will be much harder for the failed applicant to demonstrate that the
landlord has accepted a joint agreement than it will be in other cases where the
occupier is replaced by the new person. The landlord will be able more easily to
argue their behaviour is consistent with the continuation of the original agreement.
This is especially so where the failed applicant is the spouse of the occupier, who
thereby has a right to tender rent on behalf of the occupier, as described below at
paragraph 3.134.
JOINT OCCUPIERS SEEKING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AGREEMENT
 3.59 There may be many reasons why those who have jointly entered an agreement
giving them the right to occupy a dwelling find that the arrangements cannot
continue as originally envisaged. A couple may fall out and decide to live apart; a
group of friends may find they are not getting on as well as they anticipated; one
joint occupier may receive an offer of employment in another part of the country,
or abroad. It is important that our proposed scheme can cope with these common
situations in a clear and flexible way that balances the interests of the occupiers
and the landlord better than the current law.22
 3.60 We suggest that, in practice, a joint occupier who wants to withdraw from a joint
agreement will, broadly, do so in one of two ways. Either he or she will make a
decision to leave by taking the proper steps and following any formalities required;
or he or she will simply depart without letting anyone know what his or her
intentions are. We accept that there will be many withdrawals that fall between
these two extremes.
 3.61 We discuss first what the formal route of withdrawing might be. We then consider
the situation when a person withdraws without following the formal route.23
The formal route
 3.62 There are two key issues that need consideration:
 (1) How can a joint occupier withdraw from the agreement?
 (2) What formalities, if any, should be fulfilled by a joint occupier who wishes
to withdraw from the agreement?
Type I agreements
 3.63 In CP 162, we proposed that there should be a type I agreement which would
confer substantial security of tenure on an occupier. We anticipated that this type
22 See eg para 3.73 below.
23 Of course, if the formal route can be made clear and straightforward, it may encourage more
to follow it.
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of agreement would be used primarily by social landlords. We also thought there
would be little point in there being a type I agreement for a fixed term, rather than
on a periodic basis,24 and we do not consider the possibility of a fixed term type I
agreement further here.
 3.64 In CP 162 we considered the principal ways in which an occupier might bring an
agreement to an end, formally, and proposed that the present ability of tenants to
give notice should be reproduced in modified form.25
 3.65 There is however one particular problem currently associated with the use of a
notice to quit by a joint tenant. It is settled law that a notice to quit served by one
joint tenant operates to bring the whole tenancy to an end, regardless of the wishes
or indeed the knowledge of any other joint tenant.26 It appears that attempts to
attenuate the effect of a notice to quit served by a single joint tenant have so far
met with failure.27 It can be argued that the ability of one joint tenant to end the
tenancy without the knowledge of the other, and possibly with the encouragement
of the landlord, can cause injustice and hardship.
 3.66 We acknowledge that the current law is commonly relied on, particularly by social
landlords where a relationship between two joint tenants has broken down and one
joint tenant leaves. Often this is in family sized property. The departing tenant
takes the children, leaving the remaining tenant effectively under-occupying the
premises. The landlord may agree to re-house the departing tenant in the original
property (or elsewhere) only if the departing tenant gives notice to quit.28 The
landlord can then regain possession of the original property because the whole
joint tenancy has been ended. Effectively the use of a tenant’s notice to quit
operates as a way around the remaining tenant’s security of tenure, as the current
repossession grounds only allow for the possibility of obtaining an order for
possession on the basis of under-occupation where the tenant has succeeded to the
tenancy.
 3.67 We want to ensure that our scheme does not prevent sensible arrangements being
made to take care of the various circumstances in which one joint occupier may
leave. But we are not convinced that adopting the present rules relating to a joint
tenant’s notice to quit achieves this objective.
24 CP 162, paras 7.12 to 7.17.
25 CP 162, para 10.49.
26 See Greenwich London Borough Council v McGrady (1982) 6 HLR 36 and Hammersmith and
Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478.
27 Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen [1999] 1 AC 313. The service of a notice is not a
disposition of property which can be set aside under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s
37(2)(b).
28 In many of these cases this has occurred where a local authority has received a homelessness
application from the departing tenant. However, this appears to be due to a
misunderstanding of the effect of Housing Act 1996, s 175(3) and s 191(1) – under which a
person who has a tenancy is already homeless if it is not reasonable for him or her to
continue to occupy it. A person will only make him or herself intentionally homeless if he or




 3.68 In our view, joint occupiers should be able to withdraw from a joint occupation
agreement by serving notice, but without artificially destroying the whole
occupation agreement. At the same time, there is an argument that provision
should be made to enable landlords to seek repossession in situations where the
occupier(s) who have been left behind are not appropriate29 to the home in
question.
 3.69 We are attracted by the provisions of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 relating to
the right of joint tenants to extract themselves from their agreement. Under section
13 of that Act a joint occupier has a right to serve notice ending only his or her
own interest, not the whole tenancy.30
 3.70 It may be argued that this could prejudice the remaining occupiers who may find
themselves liable on their own for the full rent. However, this is less prejudicial
than finding themselves evicted without warning. In any event, the effect of one
joint occupier leaving could also be mitigated by provisions which enable a new
occupier to be brought into the premises, either as a new joint occupier or as a
lodger.31 Broadly, we think that it is reasonable to expect occupiers to realise that if
they jointly take on a property which they cannot afford singly then they may
either have to find somewhere cheaper to live if one of the joint occupiers quits or
to find another person to join them.
 3.71 We certainly think that the remaining occupiers should be put on notice of the
departing occupier’s intention by requiring that person to give a copy of their
notice to the remaining occupiers. Alternatively it might be simpler to require the
landlord to send a copy of the notice to the remaining occupiers. In either case, the
notice would warn the remaining occupiers that they may need to take steps to
protect their position in the home.
 3.72 This still leaves the question of prejudice to the landlord. A social landlord with a
limited stock of housing designed to meet housing need might be left with an
occupier who does not have the degree of housing need normally required for
someone to occupy that property, and thus to whom the landlord would not offer
an occupation agreement if the occupier intended to live there on his or her own. If
the remaining occupier is unable to continue to pay rent (whether by means of
housing benefit or otherwise) on too large a property for his or her needs, then the
landlord could repossess the property on the basis of rent arrears, in an
appropriate case.
 3.73 The current law provides a solution for the landlord in this situation – the
departing joint tenant issuing a notice to quit – but it is an artificial one. One
irrational side effect is that it gives the social landlord an absolute right to repossess
29 Eg because the home is too large for the occupiers left behind or contains special facilities –
eg for people with disabilities – that are not needed by the remaining occupants.
30 Under the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, s 20 a landlord can similarly use the abandonment
procedure against some, rather than all, of the tenants – see para 3.104 below.
31 See the provisional proposals at paras 3.40 above and 4.5 below respectively.
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against the remaining occupier, without regard to reasonableness and with no
obligation to find him or her alternative suitable accommodation.
 3.74 If it is necessary to allow social landlords to repossess properties in this situation,
then we provisionally consider that it would be better to do so directly by means of
what we have, in CP 162, called the estate management circumstances justifying
repossession.32
 3.75 In CP 162, we invited views on whether these circumstances should, for the type I
tenancy, broadly follow the model of assured tenancies or the model of secure
tenancies. In the first, there is a broad power to gain possession, so long as suitable
alternative accommodation is provided. In the second, there is a defined list of
estate management reasons set out expressly in the legislation (and again subject to
suitable alternative accommodation).
 3.76 If the former option is to be preferred, no special provision need be made. After
the departure of the outgoing joint occupier or occupiers, the landlord could use
the broad estate management power to move the under-occupying remaining
occupier to alternative accommodation.
 3.77 If the latter option is adopted, a new specific circumstance justifying repossession
could be included in the list, on the model of that which already exists where a
statutory successor succeeds to too large a property.33
 3.78 However, it is not clear that such a basis for repossession would be desirable. On
the one hand, it assists the social housing landlord to better meet some of its
objectives, in securing best use of the landlord’s stock for housing purposes. On the
other hand, by doing so at the expense of the security of the occupier, it reduces
the level of security of tenure that is the foundation of the type I agreement (and
thus may be detrimental to others of the landlords’ objectives, such as the
maintenance of a mature, mixed community). Here, again, there is a conflict
between the rights of the individual occupier and wider housing management
priorities.
 3.79 We therefore consider it appropriate to ask for views on whether our provisional
proposal that a joint tenant should be able to give notice without bringing the
agreement to an end should be balanced with an extension to the estate
management powers of social landlords to allow repossession, with the provision of
suitable alternative accommodation, where the withdrawal of one or more joint
occupiers renders the property unsuitable for the remaining joint occupier or
occupiers.
 3.80 By way of supplementary questions, we also ask, first, whether any such
proceedings should be taken within a fixed time period, and if so, what that period
should be; second, whether there should be a period before which such
proceedings should not be able to be started, during which the remaining
occupier(s) could seek to find a lodger or a new joint occupier.
32 CP 162, paras 7.77 to 7.83.
33 CP 162, para 3.41, Table 3, Ground 16.
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 3.81 It would of course be the case that, whichever route was chosen, an order for
possession would be made only if the court found that it was reasonable to make
the order.
 3.82 We provisionally propose that a joint occupier under a type I agreement
should be able to terminate his or her interest in the agreement by written
notice to the landlord without this bringing the whole agreement to an
end.
 3.83 We further provisionally propose that a copy of the notice should be served
on the remaining occupiers.
 3.84 We invite views as to whether the copy should be served by the occupier
seeking to withdraw from the premises, or by the landlord.
 3.85 We invite views on whether, following the departure of one or more joint
occupier or occupiers, the landlord of a type I tenancy should be able to
seek repossession of the home, subject to reasonableness and the provision
of suitable alternative accommodation, if the home is no longer suitable
for occupation by the remaining occupier or joint occupiers.
 3.86 If there is to be a special ground of possession, we also invite views on
whether the landlord should be required to make use of it within any
defined time limit. If so, what should the time limit be? Should there be a
period before which the landlord should not be able to take proceedings, to
enable the remaining occupiers find a lodger or a replacement joint
occupier?
Type II periodic agreements
 3.87 In the case of a type II periodic agreement, the issues are less acute, not least
because the type II agreement does not attract any great degree of security of
tenure.
 3.88 We think that a joint occupier who wishes to withdraw from a periodic joint
occupation agreement should be able to issue a notice, on the same basis as with a
type I agreement. In other words, it will have the effect of determining his or her
obligations under the agreement, but will not bring the whole agreement to an
end.
 3.89 The remaining occupier may then seek to bring an additional person into the
premises, either through seeking to take in a lodger or by agreement with the
landlord to grant a sub-occupation agreement of part of the premises, or – with
consent – by bringing in a new joint occupier.34
 3.90 However, given the lack of security of tenure, we do not think that there is the
same need to confer a special opportunity for the landlord to seek an order for
34 See paras 3.29 to 3.50 above.
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possession. The landlord may achieve this relatively easily by the “notice-only”
procedure which attaches to the type II agreement.35
 3.91 In any event, as we anticipate that the primary user of the type II agreement will be
the private rented sector, the landlord will be more concerned with receiving
payment of the rent, than meeting housing need for social purposes.
 3.92 We provisionally propose that a joint occupier under a type II agreement,
should be able by written notice to the landlord to determine his or her
interest in the agreement without this bringing the whole agreement to an
end.
Type II fixed term agreements
 3.93 In CP 162 we expressed the hope that landlords might be encouraged to “write-
up” type II agreements and confer, through the terms of the agreement, a greater
degree of security of tenure than would attach to a type II periodic agreement.
 3.94 We also envisaged that, in such a fixed-term agreement, it would be possible to
insert a clause analogous to a break clause in a fixed-term commercial lease.
 3.95 Where a joint fixed term occupation agreement is made, with no break clause, all
the joint occupiers will remain jointly and severally liable under the agreement for
the term of the agreement. Should one of the joint occupiers wish or indeed need
to withdraw from the agreement, this can only be achieved by direct negotiation
with the landlord.
 3.96 In CP 162 we suggested that it should be possible for landlords and occupiers to
agree to bring a fixed-term agreement to an end, by a process analogous to
surrender which applies in the context of the law of landlord and tenant. However
we proposed that the current requirement that any express surrender be by deed
should be replaced by a simple requirement of writing. In the context of a joint
agreement, this could only be achieved where all the joint occupiers co-operate
and agree to surrender their rights to occupy.36
 3.97 Where a fixed-term agreement contains a break clause, we proposed in CP 162
that the occupier should be able to take advantage of any such break clause by
giving notice to the landlord on a similar basis to the occupier’s notice to terminate
a periodic agreement.37 It would be possible for all the joint occupiers to act
collectively in accordance with such a break clause and thereby terminate the
agreement.
 3.98 It would be possible for the landlord and joint occupiers to agree on the extent to
which the joint occupiers would, individually, have access to the break clause. By
analogy with our treatment of joint tenants under a type I tenancy, however, there
is an argument that, at least as a default position, each joint occupier should
35 See CP 162, paras 8.33 to 8.35.
36 Hounslow London Borough Council v Pilling [1994] 1 All ER 432.
37 CP 162, paras 8.60 to 8.68.
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individually have access to the break clause, which would then have the effect of
terminating only his or her obligations under the agreement. It would not bring the
entire agreement to an end.
 3.99 The remaining occupier(s) would still have the responsibilities and liabilities under
the agreement. He or she would also be able to take advantage of the right to take
in a lodger or to grant a sub-occupation agreement of the premises, as may be
appropriate and in the latter case as agreed with the landlord.38
 3.100 We provisionally propose that it should be a default term of fixed term
type II agreements with a break clause that where one of a number of joint
occupiers exercises the break clause, it will have the effect of only
terminating his or her rights under the agreement and will not bring the
entire agreement to an end. The remaining occupiers will be entitled to
remain in occupation, having assumed all the rights and obligations under
the agreement.
The liabilities of the occupier who has left
 3.101 On the basis that a former joint occupier has left the premises having issued the
appropriate notice, it would be clear that he or she would remain jointly legally
liable for any liabilities incurred until the date on which the notice became
effective, and would similarly be entitled jointly to the benefit of the agreement in
respect of that period. From that date he or she would not be subject to any
further liabilities, or benefit from any rights under the agreement.
The informal route
 3.102 The discussion above deals with the situation where a joint occupier desires to
withdraw from the joint agreement, and has followed the notice formalities which
satisfy his or her wish to be freed from the agreement, where permitted by the
terms of the agreement
 3.103 However, in many cases an occupier will withdraw from the agreement without
completing any formalities. While the withdrawing occupier will remain legally
liable jointly for the rent and for the other obligations under the agreement, this
will be little comfort to either the landlord or the remaining occupiers(s) if he or
she cannot be traced or is not worth proceeding against.
 3.104 In CP 162 we suggested the adoption of a procedure for landlords to take
possession after serving notice to check if the occupier has treated the agreement
as terminated by abandonment, based on section 17 of the Housing (Scotland) Act
2001.39 Section 20 of that Act provides for a similar procedure for the landlord to
use where it appears a joint tenant has abandoned the premises.40 There are some
38 See further paras 4.3 to 4.41 and 5.9 to 5.33 below.
39 CP 162, para 10.65. This does not involve the landlord terminating the agreement, but
rather checking that the occupier has abandoned the agreement. Thus any order by the court
is in the nature of a declaration, rather than a mandatory possession order.
40 The procedure applies where it appears that a joint tenant is not occupying the house and
does not intend to occupy it as his or her home. The landlord may serve notice on the
abandoning tenant stating: their belief that the tenant has abandoned the premises; requiring
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differences from the procedure for sole tenants, presumably to reflect the different
position where there are other tenants still in occupation and so there will be less
obvious evidence of abandonment.41
 3.105 We think that this procedure should be adapted to the situation under our new
scheme in England and Wales where a joint occupier has withdrawn from the
premises and effectively disappeared. Of course, it will only be effective where the
occupation agreement contains a clause requiring the occupier to occupy the
premises. The key feature of the procedure should be that it should apply where it
appears that the occupier does not intend to remain bound by his or her
obligations under the agreement. As there are greater difficulties in establishing
this where the property has not been completely abandoned by all the occupiers,
we believe we should reproduce the part of the Scottish provision whereby two
warning notices are required.
 3.106 We provisionally propose that the procedure whereby a landlord may seek to
terminate an occupation agreement, where it appears that the premises have been
abandoned, should also apply where a joint occupier has abandoned the premises.
If the first notice produces no response, the landlord should be required to serve a
second notice giving the occupier another eight weeks in which to apply to court to
challenge the finding of abandonment.
 3.107 The procedure would not terminate the whole of the agreement, but would only
terminate the departed joint occupier’s interest in the agreement. It follows that
the remaining joint occupiers would continue to be responsible for the obligations
under the agreement. In order that they may plan for this, the landlord should also
give the remaining occupiers notice of their intention to show that the departed
occupier’s interest has been abandoned.
 3.108 It is hard to predict the circumstances in which a landlord might wish to take
advantage of the abandonment procedure. However one consequence of the
process being completed is that the landlord and the remaining occupiers would
then be clear that the departed occupier was no longer a party to the agreement.
This might be the precursor to a social landlord bringing proceedings for
possession against the remaining occupiers on the possible estate management
basis discussed above.42
 3.109 We provisionally propose that, when the landlord intends to use the
abandonment procedure against a joint occupier who has withdrawn from
the tenant to reply within four weeks if he still intends to occupy the premises as his or her
home and informing the tenant of the consequences if the landlord then remains of the
belief that the tenant has abandoned the premises.
41 Under s 20 the actual termination of the joint tenant’s interest follows the serving of a
further notice on the abandoning tenant which, at the end of the notice period (which must
be at least eight weeks), will bring his or her interest to an end. The abandoning joint
tenant’s recourse to court, to challenge the abandonment decision, is more limited than that
for a sole tenant, who under s 19(1) has six months from the date of termination to take
proceedings. A joint tenant can apply to the court, provided any proceedings are started
within the eight week notice period.
42 CP 162, paras 7.77 to 7.83.
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the premises, the landlord should also notify the other joint occupiers of
this intention.
 3.110 We further provisionally propose that where a landlord has used the
proposed abandonment procedure against a departed occupier, the
remaining joint occupiers would continue to be jointly and severally bound
by the agreement in the same way as if the removed occupier had given
notice under a notice clause.
 3.111 Departed occupiers may react in four main ways to the initial warning notice:
 (1) They may fail to respond at all. In that case the procedure will entitle the
landlord to serve the second notice. Unless the occupier applies to court,
within the eight week period, to challenge that notice, the landlord will be
entitled to treat the agreement as terminated in respect of that occupier.
 (2) They may reply saying they wish to be released from the agreement. In
that case the landlord should similarly be entitled to treat the agreement as
terminated in respect of that occupier.
 (3) They may reply in a way which satisfies the landlord that they have not
abandoned the agreement. In that case the landlord will withdraw the
notice. It will still be possible for the landlord to take any action against
the other occupiers for any rent arrears. It will also be open to the other
occupiers, under the normal principles in joint and several liability, to seek
a contribution from the defaulting occupier if they have had to pay the
landlord the full rent.
 (4) They may reply in a way which does not make it clear that they no longer
see themselves as bound by the agreement, but also does not satisfy the
landlord that they have not abandoned. In that case the landlord should
apply to court for a declaration as to whether the occupier has in fact
abandoned. It would be for the court to decide on the evidence available,
including any evidence from the occupier, whether the occupier regarded
themselves as still bound by the agreement.
 3.112 We provisionally propose that, where there is a response from the departed
joint occupier to the initial notice, which is equivocal as to whether the
occupier has or has not abandoned, there should be a procedure to enable
the landlord to obtain an declaration from the court. If satisfied that the
occupier has demonstrated an intention no longer to accept being bound
by the agreement, the court should declare that the agreement has
terminated in respect of that occupier.
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NON-CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
 3.113 Where an occupier decides to permit others to live in his dwelling on a gratuitous
basis, such arrangements will fall outside the scope of our scheme as there will be
no contract which will fall within the scheme.43
 3.114 There are, nevertheless, three issues which we think need consideration in this
context:
 (1) Whether non-contractual occupiers should have any protection when
possession proceedings are brought against the occupier of the premises in
which they are residing.
 (2) Whether there should be any limits to the powers of landlords to impose
restrictions on non-contractual occupiers occupying the premises.
 (3) Whether the Family Law Act 1996 needs amendment to take account of
non-contractual occupiers under our proposed scheme.
Possession proceedings – proposals for protection
 3.115 In CP 162 we provisionally proposed, at paragraph 12.27, that in exercising its
discretion in possession proceedings, the court should be explicitly required to
consider various factors including the effects of making an order for possession on
the occupier’s household. This is clearly necessary where an entire household may
be evicted because of the activities of one of its members.
 3.116 We have noted that section 14(3) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 imposes a
specific duty on a landlord to investigate before starting possession proceedings
whether there are “qualifying occupiers” in residence. These are defined, by
section 14(6), as other people occupying the property as their only or principal
home who are the tenant’s adult family members or lawful sub-tenants or sharers.
The landlord must serve copies of any notice seeking possession on anyone found,
and those people then have a right to be joined as parties to any subsequent
proceedings.
 3.117 In mortgage possession proceedings, procedural rules which have a similar effect
apply in England and Wales.44 The mortgagee must serve a notice at the premises
14 days before the hearing, addressed to any occupiers there, that proceedings
against the mortgagor are being taken. The occupiers may apply to be joined as
defendants, at the court’s discretion. 45 Similarly in landlord and tenant cases if the
landlord knows of anyone who may be entitled to claim relief against forfeiture as
an under-lessee, the particulars of claim must be served on that person.46
 3.118 In order to ensure that there is no unfairness to non-contracting occupiers, we
think that a similar principle should be attached to our proposed scheme.
43 CP 162, paras 6.5 to 6.8.
44 See CPR Pt 55, r 10.
45 See CPR Pt 19.
46 See CPR Practice Direction 55.4, para 2.4.
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 3.119 Any requirement to notify non-contractual occupiers will only be necessary in
cases where the court must exercise its discretion before granting an order of
possession. We invite views as to whether the principle should apply to all
discretionary cases, or be limited to possession proceedings relating to type I
agreements.
 3.120 We provisionally propose that our new scheme should include rights for
non-contracting occupiers to be notified of any possession proceedings.
 3.121 We invite views on whether the procedure for so doing should be modelled
on the rights of “qualifying occupiers” in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001,
sections 14 and 15, or to the provisions relating to mortgage possession
hearings in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.
 3.122 We further invite views as to whether the people who must be notified
should also have a right to be joined as defendants, or should only be able
to do so at the court’s discretion.
 3.123 We further invite views as to whether these notice requirements should
attach to all discretionary possession proceedings or only those which
arise from type I agreements.
Restricting the landlord’s powers to regulate non-contractual occupiers?
 3.124 At present, some rights to succession and assignment depend on the successor
living in the property as their only or principal home.47 At least in theory, therefore,
such entitlements could be thwarted if the landlord could prevent the occupier
moving into the home those who might claim these entitlements.
 3.125 Traditional covenants against assignment and sub-letting also cover “parting with
possession.” This could suggest that no “parting with possession” was to be
permitted. Some private landlords go further and use clauses providing that the
property should only be used as a home for named people, prohibiting occupation
by persons under a particular age, or even restricting overnight guests.
 3.126 Such provisions may or may not be regarded as “unfair” under the Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, depending on the circumstances. The
Office of Fair Trading suggest at group 18(h) in their guidance48 that restrictions
will be unfair if they are not required to protect the landlord’s legitimate interests.
They state that terms against overnight guests are an example of a potentially
unreasonable prohibition.
 3.127 We invite views as to whether there are – currently or potentially –
significant problems arising from attempts by landlords to regulate those
who may live with the occupier on a non-contracting basis.
47 See Parts VI and VII below.
48 See CP 162, para 6.11 and Office of Fair Trading, Guidance on Unfair Terms in Tenancy
Agreements (November 2001).
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 3.128 If there are such problems, it would be possible to move away from the current
position, and instead permit the occupier to have primary control over who should
be able to occupy the premises on a non-contractual basis.
 3.129 This could be achieved in one of two ways.
 (1) The occupation agreement could contain a default term which allowed the
occupier the freedom to control who would occupy the premises on a non-
contractual basis, with departures from the default being regulated under
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations.
 (2) Alternatively, the agreement might contain a compulsory term
guaranteeing the occupier’s right to do so.49
In each case, the term would be subject to the premises not thereby being rendered
statutorily overcrowded, and to the contracting occupier being responsible for any
anti-social behaviour by non-contractual occupiers.
 3.130 At least in the absence of evidence of abuse by landlords, we are not at this stage
persuaded that a compulsory term is warranted.
 3.131 We provisionally propose that the occupation agreement should contain a
default term which allowed the occupier the freedom to control who would
occupy the premises on a non-contractual basis, with any departures from
the default being regulated under the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulations 1999.
Amending the Family Law Act 1996
 3.132 Nothing in our proposals seeks to alter the effect of the “matrimonial home rights”
contained in Family Law Act 1996, section 30.50 These provisions are mainly
concerned with regulating housing rights as between spouses who are occupiers,
rather than as between the occupiers and the landlord. Nevertheless, they include
an important right in section 30(3), which will need to be preserved, to have
payments of rent by the spouse who is not a tenant treated as made on behalf of
the other spouse who is the tenant. There is also the right in section 30(4) to have
a non-tenant spouse’s occupation of the home treated as occupation by the tenant
spouse for the purposes of housing legislation.51 Under section 35(13) or section
36(13), former spouses and current or former cohabitants who are granted an
occupation order also obtain these matrimonial home rights.
49 One of the objections to a compulsory term might be the lack of control that the landlord
would then have, eg over the numbers of non-contractual occupiers. Statutory rules on
overcrowding (for which we make provisional proposals as to repossession in CP 162 at para
7.91) are of limited effect, since a much higher level of overcrowding is set as the test for
criminal liability under Housing Act 1985, Part X than would be acceptable to most
landlords.
50 These provisions are designed to ensure that a spouse or co-habitee who falls within the
scope of the provision, but who is not a tenant, nevertheless has a right, as against the
tenant, to occupy the premises. See the discussion at paras 6.57 to 6.71 below.
51 This is currently important for preserving security, since each of the main Acts dictate that
security is lost if the tenant ceases to occupy the property as their principal home.
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 3.133 We provisionally propose that Family Law Act 1996, section 30 be amended
to refer to occupiers under our new scheme.
 3.134 Current housing legislation makes provision for those with “matrimonial home
rights” in connection with the adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement of
possession proceedings.52 These provisions are commonly interpreted as meaning
that the non-tenant spouse should have the same rights as the tenant, and even
that the non-tenant spouse should be able to defend against the making of a
possession order in the first place.53 In fact all that the provisions do, on the face of
the statute, is to preserve the rights in section 30 of the Family Law Act 1996 to
occupy and tender rent. They do not create a right to make applications or put
forward defences. If it were not for these housing law provisions those limited
matrimonial home rights would terminate, under section 30(8)(b) of the Family
Law Act 1996, on the making of a possession order.54 The housing law provisions
allow those matrimonial home rights to continue after the possession order “in
relation to, or in connection with any adjournment, stay, suspension or
postponement”. The result is that, for example, rent paid by the non-tenant spouse
counts as compliance with the terms of the suspension of a possession order or the
adjournment of proceedings. In CP 162, we provisionally suggested that the
agreement should not end until the execution of a possession order.55 In that case
we believe the matrimonial home rights should continue to the same point.
 3.135 Nonetheless we feel that the position should in fact be amended to reflect the
common misunderstanding. Above, we invited views as to whether occupiers, who
are not party to the agreement and who do not have matrimonial home rights,
should have a right to be joined in any repossession proceedings. We think the
argument in favour of joining those with matrimonial home rights is even stronger.
 3.136 We provisionally propose that, in relation to cases where the occupier
obtains an adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement of a possession
order, a partner’s matrimonial home rights to occupy and tender rent
should be preserved until the possession order is enforced.
 3.137 We further provisionally propose that the current law should be expanded
so that those with matrimonial home rights are given the right to be joined
to possession proceedings with the same rights as the occupier to defend
themselves against the making of a possession order and to apply after a
possession order for any adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement.
52 See Rent Act 1977, ss 100(4A) and (4B); Housing Act 1985, ss 85(5) to (5A) and Housing
Act 1988, ss 9(5) and (5A). In CP 162, para 12.10 we provisionally proposed reproducing in
our new scheme a right of adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement for occupiers
who are party to the agreement.
53 LAG: Luba, Madge and McConnell, Defending Possession Proceedings (5th ed 2002) p 32,
para 2.58 and Shelter: Moroney and Harris, Relationship Breakdown and Housing: A
Practical Guide (1997) p 251, para 11.31.
54 This problem was recognised in Penn v Dunn [1970] 2 QB 686, which led to the
introduction of these provisions in previous versions of the legislation.
55 CP 162, para 12.52.
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 3.138 We should note that occupation orders are only available between spouses or
opposite-sex couples, not between same-sex couples. If those with occupation
orders are given preferential treatment in terms of possession proceedings, as
compared with other non-contracting occupiers, this will not be consistent with
our view of same-sex relationships in the context of statutory succession.56
However, it is not appropriate for this project to seek to interfere with the basis on
which occupation orders are made in family law.57 Rather the existence of this issue
adds to the attraction of the option, suggested above at paragraphs 3.130 to 3.123,
of allowing all non-contracting occupiers to join in possession proceedings.
Other matters
 3.139 There are other respects in which non-contractual occupiers are protected by the
law. Examples include the following.
 (1) The non-contracting occupier may have the benefit of a duty of care in
negligence.
 (2) Statutory provisions such as the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 and the
Defective Premises Act 1972 can benefit non-contracting occupiers in the
property.
 (3) If an order for possession is made on a basis which requires suitable
alternative accommodation to be available, the needs of the tenant’s
family, not just the tenant, must be taken into account.
 (4) Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 the landlord and
contracting occupier can agree to give the benefit of any covenants to
other non-contracting occupiers expressly.
 3.140 We do not propose any alteration to these rules.
56 See paras 7.56 to 7.59 below.
57 The Family Law Act 1996 provisions originated in work by the Law Commission – cf
Family Law: Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home (1992) Law Com No
207. At that time the view was taken that same sex couples would be catered for adequately
by covering them in the list of “associated persons”, and there was no discussion of covering
them in the new category of cohabitees. The way that the provisions on occupation orders




THE RIGHT TO TAKE IN LODGERS
INTRODUCTION
 4.1 Under the Housing Act 1985, secure tenants have the right to take in a lodger.1
The landlord authority’s consent is not required. The only constraint is that the
premises should not, as a result, become statutorily overcrowded.2
 4.2 This is now a well-established tenants’ right. Successive governments have
considered that it advances socially useful objectives. For instance,
 (1) it allows occupiers of local authority housing to earn some additional
money,3
 (2) it makes flexible and informal provision for better use of the
accommodation, and
 (3) it is conducive to labour market mobility.
TYPE I AGREEMENTS
 4.3 In terms of the scheme we propose in CP 162, it also fits with the high level of
personal autonomy that the type I agreement is aimed at securing for occupiers.
 4.4 As the type I agreement is designed to substantively replace both local authority
secure tenancies and fully assured tenancies let by registered social landlords, there
is, necessarily, a choice between taking the right away from the category of social
tenants who currently enjoy it (secure tenants), or giving it to those that do not
(fully assured tenants). We think the former would be unacceptable.
 4.5 We provisionally propose that the right of a person to take in a lodger
should be extended to all those with type I agreements, by means of a
compulsory term to that effect.
Definition of “lodger”
 4.6 One of the notable features of the current law is that, while the right to take in a
lodger is found in the Housing Act 1985, there is no statutory definition of
“lodger”. The term is, of course, a familiar one in common usage. The question we
have to consider is whether, for the purpose of our scheme, a statutory definition is
necessary.
1 Housing Act 1985, s 93(1)(a); a similar right is not available to introductory tenants.
2 Housing Act 1985 ss 324 to 326.
3 Special tax treatment is afforded to the income generated from lodgers.
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 4.7 Although not defined in the Housing Act 1985, the term “lodger” is not unknown
in law.4 Woodfall suggests that the test whether a person is a lodger, as opposed to
a sub-tenant, must be determined by the degree of control retained by the
householder over the rooms which the lodger occupies.5 The difficulty, from the
point of view of this project, is that existing interpretations of the concept are set
within existing principles of housing law. Thus, “lodger” falls within the category
of “licensees” rather than tenants - essentially because lodgers do not have that
degree of exclusive possession which characterises tenancy.
 4.8 For the purpose of the scheme we are proposing we have sought, so far as possible,
to argue that the distinction between tenancies and licenses should be ignored, and
that, other things being equal, all contractual occupation agreements should fall
within the scope of the scheme.
 4.9 One way of attempting a definition of “lodger” might be to consider the nature and
extent of services provided by the landlord to the lodger. If the landlord cleaned
the lodger’s rooms, or provided meals for the lodger, such services might be
indications of the existence of a lodging agreement. The problem here would be to
define the nature of services which would be relevant. This approach could also
lead to argument about whether particular services were actually provided.
 4.10 A second approach might be to look less at the provision or otherwise of specific
services, but more generally at the degree of control the landlord exercises over the
lodger. This would build on the approach already familiar in the law. The problem
with this is that it lacks precision and may make it hard to determine, in any given
case, whether a person is a lodger or has some other status.
 4.11 A third approach, which we prefer, is to equate “lodgers” with those excluded from
our new scheme because of sharing living accommodation with a landlord. This
has the significant merit of being relatively straightforward and easy to
understand.6 In CP 162, we acknowledged that there would have to be some
exceptions to the general approach that all occupation agreements should come
within the scheme we propose. In particular we suggested that a person who shares
accommodation with a resident landlord should not have any statutory protection,
but should be able to be lawfully evicted by the resident landlord with the
minimum of legal formality.7
 4.12 We said, in CP 162 that, for these purposes, a resident landlord would be a person
who occupies the premises as their only or principal home. We further observed
that the only situation where the resident landlord would be able to remove the
4 See eg Douglas v Smith [1907] 2 KB 568.
5 See also Appah v Parncliffe Investments [1964] 1 WLR 1064.
6 The same position applies to the owner-occupier who determines to take in a lodger. The
concept does not use the lease-licence distinction. Currently some licences are covered by
the requirements of s 3 and s 5 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 for four weeks notice in
prescribed form and court proceedings before eviction. Tenants, as well as licensees, can be
excluded from these protections by s 3A of that Act, and one of the exclusions is for sharing
with landlords.
7 CP 162, paras 9.109 to 9.112 and paras 9.133 to 9.139. Common parts such as means of
access and stairways would not count as accommodation for these purposes.
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sharer without having to seek a court order would be where the occupier was
actually occupying the premises as his home.8
 4.13 This still begs a number of questions. For example if an occupier takes in a lodger,
but then goes away for a holiday, will the occupier remain in occupation?
Presumably yes, as the absence from the home did not indicate that the occupier
was going to reside elsewhere “as a home”. Would the situation be different if the
occupier went abroad for a fixed period to take up employment? Or was taken into
hospital? Or was sent to prison? It could be argued that in all these situations, the
absence from the home did not destroy the intention to occupy the premises as a
home. Would it make a difference if the person was away for 6 months? A year?
Five years? Could the quality of “lodging” be lost by a long absence?
 4.14 To meet these theoretical possibilities, it might be suggested that any person who
comes in to premises as a lodger simply retains the status of lodger, whatever the
resident landlord decided to do.
 4.15 This suggestion in turn raises the possibility that an occupier might take in a
lodger while present in the home; then move on to repeat the exercise in other
properties. This could result in a chain of “lodgers” whom the occupier/resident
landlord had no intention of treating as lodgers, in any ordinary sense of that word.
Rather the exercise would be a “sham” designed to give the occupier/resident
landlord the ability to evict the so-called lodger without first having to go to court.
 4.16 The case-law on “sham” transactions should be robust enough to prevent an
occupier/resident landlord acting in this way.9 While some may argue that we
should not be proposing a test that might be the subject of sham transactions, we
think, nevertheless, there is much to be said in favour of merging the concept of
“lodger” with that of the person who occupies premises where there is a landlord
who shares accommodation with the lodger.
 4.17 We provisionally propose that there should be a statutory definition of
“lodger” for the purposes of the right to take in lodgers.
 4.18 We further provisionally propose that “lodger” should be defined as a
person who occupies premises where there is a resident landlord who
shares accommodation with the lodger, irrespective of whether the person
does so under a tenancy or a licence.
 4.19 We invite views on whether the unprotected status of an occupier as a
“lodger” should continue, even where the resident landlord no longer
actually shares the accommodation with the lodger but retains the
contractual right to do so.
8 Unless the landlord was effectively forced into obtaining a court order by the protection
afforded by Criminal Law Act 1977, s 6 – see CP 162, paras 3.34 to 3.37.
9 See eg Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809; A G Securities v Vaughan [1990] 1 AC 417.
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A consent requirement?
 4.20 As noted above, one feature of the current right is that it is exercisable by the
secure tenant without the landlord authority having any say in the choice of lodger.
If the right to take in a lodger were to be extended, it should perhaps be asked
whether the right should be subject to the landlord’s consent, which, in accordance
with our normal principles, could not be unreasonably withheld.
 4.21 The argument in favour of a consent requirement would be that there might be
circumstances where the landlord felt that the occupier seeking to take in a lodger
would not make a rational or responsible decision, and that therefore the landlord
should have an overriding right to decline to consent to the occupier’s choice of
lodger, albeit the consent requirement could not be exercised unreasonably.
 4.22 We can see four arguments for not having a consent requirement.
 4.23 First, any decision to take a person into one’s home is not one that would be taken
lightly. Therefore the occupier seeking to take in a lodger would have made inquiry
as to whether that person would be someone who would live amicably in the
home.
 4.24 Secondly, the need to get the landlord’s consent adds an unnecessary degree of
bureaucracy to what should be a simple and straightforward process.
 4.25 Thirdly, as the lodger would usually be sharing living accommodation with his or
her immediate landlord (the occupier who granted the right to lodge), he or she
would fall outside the scope of our scheme.10 The lodger who shared with the
occupier/landlord could easily be removed from the premises, as the lodger’s
immediate landlord (the occupier) would be, for these purposes, a resident
landlord. The lodger would have no security of tenure and would fall outside the
scope of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.
 4.26 Fourthly, if the lodger caused any trouble which the occupier was unable or
unwilling to do anything about, the (head) landlord has substantial powers to take
possession proceedings for breach of the occupation agreement, for example on the
grounds of nuisance, against the occupier (and thus by extension the lodger). If
this resulted in an order for possession being made and executed against the
occupier, the possession order would also cover the lodger.
 4.27 We think that, on balance, the arguments against a consent requirement outweigh
those in favour.
 4.28 We provisionally propose that the right to take in a lodger should be
exercisable without a consent requirement, as at present.
10 For discussion of our proposals relating to such exclusions, see CP 162, paras 9.109 to
9.112 and 9.133 to 9.139.
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APPLICATION TO TYPE II AGREEMENTS
 4.29 We have considered whether or not the right should be extended to type II
agreements. Some of the arguments above apply as much to type II agreements as
to type I agreements. The lodger could be just as readily removed in a type II
agreement, where the type II occupier was sharing accommodation with the
lodger. Furthermore, the powers of the head landlord to remove the type II
occupier (and with him or her, the lodger) are more extensive.
 4.30 On the other hand, enhancing the personal autonomy of the occupier is a key
feature of the type I, intended primarily for use in the social sector. Allowing type I
occupiers the freedom to take in lodgers can be seen as part of that. The same is
not necessarily true of type II occupiers, particularly in the private sector. It is
arguable that, where the relationship between the head landlord and the type II
occupier is essentially a commercial transaction, it is reasonable for such a private
sector landlord to control the identity of others who may come to occupy their
property similarly on a commercial basis.
 4.31 In the context of the potential for anti social behaviour by lodgers, the situation is
also different in the private sector (and, thus, in relation to type II agreements).
Private landlords letting on type II agreements have adequate powers to evict
troublesome occupiers and therefore lodgers. The problem in the private sector is
more likely to be the unwillingness of a private landlord to use his or her powers.
 4.32 Without the compulsory term giving the occupier the right to take in a lodger,
which we propose in relation to the type I agreement, it would be open to a private
landlord to permit the occupier to take a lodger. In the absence of a specific term
providing otherwise, the landlord would have a veto – he or she could refuse to
allow the occupier to take a lodger on any grounds, which would not be subject to
the test of reasonableness.
 4.33 If the occupier was required to ask permission of the landlord, who was able to
exercise his or her veto, before taking in a lodger, it is possible that the landlord
would be more willing to control potential anti social behaviour. If asked, the
landlord may make enquiries about the identity of the proposed lodger and decline
permission if he or she had doubts.
 4.34 On the other hand, if consent were not required, once a lodger had been taken in
by the occupier, the landlord might have to take possession proceedings against
their occupier as being the only effective means to remove the unwelcome lodger.
And even if the occupier was willing to terminate the lodger’s agreement at the
request of the landlord, making such a request requires a more positive step on the
part of the landlord than merely declining consent, a step which a landlord may be
reluctant to take.
 4.35 We invite views on whether or not occupiers under a type II agreement
should also have the right to take in a lodger.
 4.36 If the answer to the question is yes, we also invite views whether the right
should be an absolute one, or one that can only be exercised with the
consent of the landlord.
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SHOULD LODGERS HAVE A WRITTEN AGREEMENT?
 4.37 Finally we consider whether lodgers should be entitled to have a written agreement
(including both those occupying under the right provisionally proposed at para 4.5
above and any other lodgers).
 4.38 It is the essence of a lodging agreement that the arrangement is informal. No
doubt it is important for the parties to clarify key issues, such as which rooms may
be shared, whether radios and televisions may be played at certain times, when the
lodger has access to the kitchen or the bathroom and so on. It is arguable,
however, that it would be at odds with the informality of the arrangement to
require a written agreement. Further, the bargain between an occupier and a
lodger is more likely to be made on a reasonably equal basis than one between a
landlord, whether in the private or the social sectors, and a type I or type II
occupier. In such circumstances, the sanctions we propose for failure by the
landlord to provide the occupier with a written occupation agreement would,
arguably, be inappropriate in the context of lodging agreements.11
 4.39 On the other hand, it is inevitable that there will be some disputes about whether a
person is a sub-occupier or a lodger. These might be easier to resolve if there were
a written lodging agreement, though the existence of such would not prevent
arguments that an agreement was a sham.12 It may also be the case that many
occupiers and lodgers would prefer to have a simple written agreement available.
 4.40 Our provisional view, however, is that these advantages are not sufficient to justify
the imposition of a requirement that the occupier should provide a lodger with a
written lodging agreement.
 4.41 We provisionally propose, therefore, that there be no requirement for the
provision of a written agreement between a lodger and his or her resident
landlord.
THE EFFECT OF A LODGER ON THE HEAD LANDLORD
 4.42 The lodger does not have a direct contractual relationship with the head landlord,
only with the occupier. The occupier is responsible to the head landlord for any
behaviour of the lodger which puts the occupier in breach of their agreement with
the landlord, just as they are for the behaviour of visitors or other household
members. The relevant default terms, such as those on anti-social behaviour and
damage to the property, will be drafted so as to make the occupier liable for taking
reasonable steps to control lodgers, visitors and other household members, and for
putting right any damage they cause.13 This should protect the head landlord’s
interest in being able to exert control over the behaviour of lodgers, even though
there is no direct contractual relationship.
11 CP 162 paras 6.122 to 6.128.
12 See above para 4.16.
13 See the definition of serious anti social behaviour offered in CP 162 at para 13.40, which
covers “the occupier or a person residing in or visiting the home”.
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 4.43 There is a separate issue of the effect of the lodging agreement on the head
landlord where the agreement between the occupier and the head landlord
terminates. Lodgers are inherently in a very insecure position, given that they are
excluded from our scheme. Under the current law they would all be licensees, so
their rights would not be effective against the head landlord on termination of the
occupier’s agreement.
 4.44 Our new definition of “lodger” might conceivably include a few people who would
be classified under the current law as sub-tenants, rather than licensees, which
would mean that the head landlord could be bound to accept them as tenants on
termination of the head tenancy.14
 4.45 We believe that it would be undesirable to reproduce this result in our new
scheme. As the landlord has no control over the introduction of lodgers, so the
landlord should not be bound by lodging agreements on termination of their
agreement with the occupier.15 The lodger should be treated like the occupier’s
other household members for this purpose, irrespective of whether under current
law they would count as a tenant or a licensee.
 4.46 We provisionally propose that, on termination of an agreement covered by
our new scheme, the head landlord should not be bound by any lodging
agreement entered into by the former occupier, irrespective of whether
that lodging agreement amounted to a tenancy or a licence.
14 This would be a very remote possibility given that in most cases the lodger does not have
that degree of exclusive possession that would result in their claiming to have a tenancy.
15 This will also avoid questions over whether the landlord is now no longer sharing with the
lodger, so that the former lodger ceases to be excluded from our new scheme. For cases
where agreements are terminated when there are sub-occupiers who are not lodgers, see





 5.1 In this Part we consider the position where an occupier wishes to give rights of
occupation to another, while preserving the occupier’s position with respect to the
head landlord under the agreement. By analogy with the concept of sub-tenancy,
we refer to these agreements as “sub-occupation agreements”. Under such
agreements, the occupier would be the landlord of the sub-occupier.
 5.2 We discuss the cases where sub-occupation agreements would themselves be
covered by our new scheme.1 We ask in what circumstances this should be
permitted, and whether there are circumstances where it should not be permitted.
We consider what the type and content of these sub-occupation agreements should
be. And we discuss the effect on head landlords of properly authorised sub-
occupation agreements.
 5.3 As with other questions addressed in this project, we seek to provide a framework
that is comprehensible to both landlords and occupiers, and strikes an appropriate
balance between their interests. We also wish to build on the framework we
proposed in CP 162.
THE CURRENT LAW
 5.4 At present, tenants, who wish to grant the right to occupy either all or part of their
property to someone else for a limited period,2 may be able to do so through the
process of sub-letting. The law of landlord and tenant permits tenants to sub-let
the whole of their premises, at the same time recognising that landlords may wish
to control sub-letting. Sub-letting is thus permitted unless prohibited by a term in
the tenancy agreement.
 5.5 In many situations, sub-letting may be permitted only after the consent of the
landlord has been obtained. Sub-letting in breach of such a covenant will be valid
as between the tenant and the sub-tenant. In other words, although the sub-
tenancy has been created without the permission of the head landlord, there is a
valid relationship of landlord and tenant between the tenant (who becomes the
immediate, or “mesne”, landlord) and the sub-tenant. However, the sub-tenancy
may not bind the head landlord. The breach of covenant by the tenant involved in
the sub-letting may then result in the sub-tenant becoming liable to proceedings
for forfeiture brought against the tenant (mesne landlord). Thus if the tenant (the
mesne landlord) disappears, the position of the sub-tenant, as against the head
landlord, becomes very precarious.
1 As opposed to the lodging cases discussed in Part IV above, where the sub-agreement is
excluded from our new scheme because the lodger shares living accommodation with the
occupier.
2 A purported letting covering the whole of the remaining period of the tenancy amounts to




 5.6 Special statutory provisions allow a sub-tenant to apply to become the head
landlord’s tenant in proceedings for relief against forfeiture when a head landlord
seeks to forfeit the lease of the sub-tenant’s immediate (mesne) landlord.3
 5.7 In addition, each of the current legislative regimes relating to housing makes
different provision on this issue.
 (1) The Rent Act 1977 contains no implied term against sub-letting.4 The
general landlord and tenant rules outlined above therefore apply to Rent
Act protected tenancies. However, a statutory tenancy which arises under
the Rent Act terminates as soon as the statutory tenant ceases to occupy it
as his or her residence. Thus, sub-letting the whole will usually terminate
the statutory tenancy. Sub-letting of part of the premises may be possible.
 (2) The Housing Act 1988 provisions relating to sub-letting are the same
whether the tenancy is fully assured or an assured shorthold tenancy, but
they differ according to whether the tenancy is fixed term or periodic. In
relation to a fixed term tenancy, the normal rules of landlord and tenant
law mentioned above apply. However, under section 15 it is an implied
term of a periodic assured tenancy that the tenant will not sub-let without
the consent of the landlord. The landlord is allowed to withhold consent
on any grounds, however unreasonable they may be.5 Sub-letting of the
whole premises will normally take the tenancy out of its assured tenancy
status, as the tenant will not be able to show that he or she is still using the
premises as their only or principal home.
 (3) Under the Housing Act 1985 the position is more complex. Section 93(2)
provides that, on sub-letting the whole property, not only does the tenancy
cease to be a secure tenancy (even if the tenant actually remains in the
property) but it also cannot again become a secure tenancy (for example,
on termination of the sub-letting).6 Sub-letting of part of the property is
permitted, subject to the tenant obtaining consent from the landlord,
consent which must not be unreasonably withheld.
 (4) Under the Housing Act 1996, an introductory tenant or licensee can sub-
let freely, subject to any express prohibitions, as that Act and the
secondary legislation thereunder contain no implied term on sub-letting.7
However, an introductory tenancy must meet the same “tenant condition”
as a secure tenancy.8 Therefore a sub-letting of the whole will abolish the
3 Law of Property Act 1925, s 146(4).
4 Special provision is made in the Rent Act 1977, s 23 for the tenant to retain protection
despite any sharing with, or provision of board to, the sub-tenant.
5 Subject to s 15(3).
6 The same principles apply, even if the secure tenant is living away from the dwelling and
thus in breach of the “tenant condition” – see the Housing Act 1985, s 95.
7 See Housing Act 1996, s 134.
8 Housing Act 1996, s 124(2).
52
tenant’s introductory status, as the tenant will no longer be occupying it as
his or her home.9
 5.8 We conclude that, in law reform terms, there is a clear need to simplify the
complexity of the current law as outlined above.
OUR APPROACH
 5.9 It is consistent with the emphasis on the agreement, which we spelled out in CP
162, that the agreement itself should define the circumstances in which an
occupier with an occupation agreement covered by our proposals should be able to
create a sub-occupation agreement of the premises.
 5.10 We provisionally propose that the issue of whether or not an occupier
should be able to enter a sub-occupation agreement of the premises should
be determined by a term in the original agreement.
TYPE I AGREEMENTS
 5.11 We consider first the extent to which occupiers are entitled to create sub-
occupation agreements of part of the premises; we then consider the position
where occupiers wish to create sub-occupation agreements of the whole of the
premises.
Sub-occupation agreements of part of the premises
 5.12 As noted above, the Housing Act 1985 currently provides that secure tenants
should have the right to sub-let part (but not the whole) of their premises.10 This is
not an absolute right but is subject to their obtaining the written consent of the
landlord, consent which must not be unreasonably withheld.11
 5.13 In the case of periodic assured tenancies for which no premium has been taken, it
is an implied term, which can be overridden by express terms, that the tenant
cannot sub-let the whole or part of the property without the landlord’s consent.12
Consent can be unreasonably withheld as section 19 of the Landlord and Tenant
Act 1927 does not apply.13
 5.14 In the case of other categories of tenants, the position is determined by the terms
of any tenancy agreement or lease under normal rules of landlord and tenant.
Thus sub-letting part of the premises is permitted where the agreement so
provides. Whether or not the consent of the landlord is required also depends on
the agreement; if it is, it must usually not be unreasonably withheld.
 5.15 It might be asked whether, if a right to take in lodgers is to be part of our proposed
scheme – as discussed in Part IV above – it is necessary for there to be separate
9 Housing Act 1996, s 125(5)(a).
10 Housing Act 1985, s 93(1)(b).
11 Housing Act 1985, s 94(2).
12 Housing Act 1988, s 15(1)(b).
13 Housing Act 1988, s 15(2).
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provision relating to the creation of sub-occupation agreements of part of the
premises.14
 5.16 The answer is that there will be situations in which a third party coming into the
dwelling does not share living accommodation with the landlord, so that they
would not fall within the proposed definition of lodger.15 They would therefore be
a sub-occupier rather than a lodger.16 The obvious example is where the size and
configuration of the premises are such that a sub-occupation agreement is possible
which does not involve sharing with the landlord (for example, where there is a
separable “granny” flat).
 5.17 In view of the fact that secure tenants already have a statutory right to sub-let part
of the premises, albeit subject to the consent of the landlord, we think that a
similar right should be retained in the scheme which we propose. In order to
sustain the principle of “landlord-neutrality” we think that such a right should
form a term in all type I occupation agreements.
 5.18 We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in the
type I agreement that the occupier may enter a sub-occupation agreement
of part of the premises, subject to the consent of the landlord, which may
not be unreasonably withheld. This right would not however be available
where the occupier would have to cease to occupy the property as a home
in order to grant the sub-occupation agreement.
Sub-occupation agreements of the whole of the premises
 5.19 This leads to the next issue: should there be a different principle for sub-
occupation agreements of the whole of the premises?
 5.20 We would anticipate that social landlords, whose primary purpose is the provision
of housing to satisfy housing need, might be unhappy if, having granted a right to
occupy a dwelling to a person or family in housing need, such person or family
then entered a contract with others, who did not have the same degree of housing
need, entitling them to come and live in the home.
 5.21 This argument could certainly be used to justify a landlord’s veto on sub-letting of
the whole property. This would reflect the effective prohibition that currently exists
in the context of secure and periodic assured tenancies.17 This argument could
14 Separate treatment was needed under the Housing Act 1985 because the right to take in
lodgers only applied to granting licences, so the provisions on sub-letting apply to tenancies.
In our new scheme the definition of “lodger” will not be tied to licences only.
15 See para 4.18 above.
16 Where the occupier was away temporarily, they would still count as occupying the property
as their principal home; thus the sub-occupier would be a lodger, as discussed in Part IV
above, and could be removed easily. In other circumstances the occupier might cease to use
the property as their main home, but still want to be able to come back to it and be prepared
to come back only to part of it. This might be because the occupier has a job abroad but
knows he or she will want to come back to the premises after a few years.
17 See para 5.7 above.
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indeed be used to justify an extension of the existing statutory prohibition to all
grants of rights of occupation by social landlords.
 5.22 Against this it may be suggested that, where an occupier can demonstrate that he
or she needs to leave their current home for a defined period – but can also
demonstrate that he or she will wish to regain possession at some future date – the
occupier should be able to make a temporary transfer of his rights of occupation
over the whole of the premises to another.18
 5.23 Further, if a right to enter a sub-occupation agreement of part of the premises is,
subject to consent, to be permitted, why should this principle not extend to a sub-
occupation agreement relating to the whole of the premises? Arguably, the
distinction between sub-occupation of part and sub-occupation of the whole is an
unnecessary element of complexity which we should be striving to avoid.
 5.24 While private landlords who have let on type I agreements may be less concerned
about meeting housing need, they will also wish to be able to control the identity
of the people living in their properties, not least so that they can be assured that
they are people who will be able to pay the rent.
 5.25 We would expect a well-drawn agreement to make express reference to the position
on sub-occupation of the whole. Thus we think our proposed agreements should
contain a term which deals with this question.
 5.26 Notwithstanding the points made in para 5.23 above, we have come to the
provisional view that the distinction between creating sub-occupation agreements
of part of the premises, and of the whole of the premises should be retained. We
therefore think that a default term, that there be a landlord’s veto on the granting
of a sub-occupation agreement of the whole of the premises, would be appropriate.
 5.27 To deal with the issue in para 5.24 above, a landlord, who chose to do so, could
replace the default term with a more generous one, allowing the occupier to make
a sub-occupation agreement subject to the landlord’s consent. The landlord could
indeed remove any requirement for consent. And even if a landlord adopted the
default term, the landlord could still, in any particular situation, choose not to
exercise their veto.
 5.28 We provisionally propose that it should be a default term in the model type
I agreement that there be a landlord’s veto on the granting of a sub-
occupation agreement which would involve the occupier moving out of the
whole of the premises.
 5.29 We dealt in Part II above with the legal position as between the (head) landlord,
the original occupier and the sub-occupier where an occupier has purported to
18 This issue will often be addressed by our proposals for creating sub-occupation agreements
of part of the accommodation, with the absent occupier retaining rights over the remaining
part: see para 5.18 above.
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grant a sub-occupation agreement, either in breach of the landlord’s veto or
without having obtained a necessary consent.19
TYPE II AGREEMENTS
 5.30 We anticipate that type II agreements will be used primarily by private landlords,
and only in special cases by social landlords. We have considered whether the right
to enter sub-occupation agreements of the whole or part of the premises should be
possible under a type II agreement.
 5.31 Under current housing law, private landlords and tenants have rather greater
flexibility to agree the basis for any such arrangement than is available to social
landlords. However, the present legal position is notorious for its lack of clarity.
 5.32 To assist in simplifying the law on this point, we think that the same principles
relating to sub-occupation agreements, which we have suggested should apply to
type I agreements, should also apply to type II agreements.
 5.33 We provisionally propose that the principles relating to sub-occupation
agreements under type I agreements should apply equally to type II
agreements.
THE TYPE AND CONTENT OF THE SUB-OCCUPATION AGREEMENT
 5.34 If occupiers are to be entitled to create sub-occupation agreements, three
consequential questions arise: what type of agreement it should be, what the terms
of the sub-occupation agreement should be, and what formalities should be
required.
The type of agreement
 5.35 The first point to note is that sub-occupation agreements will, by definition, be
created by private individuals. Therefore, under the principles set out in CP 162,
the default position would be that the sub-occupation agreement would fall in the
type II category.20
Periodic or fixed-term
 5.36 This still leaves open the question of whether the sub-occupation agreement would
be a periodic or a fixed-term type II agreement.
 5.37 Problems could arise if the sub-agreement purported to give greater security than
the original agreement. This could occur where an occupier under a periodic type
II agreement purported to create a fixed-term type II sub-occupation agreement.
19 See paras 2.45 to 2.67 above.
20 See CP 162, para 11.67.
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 5.38 The significance of these problems would depend on whether or not the head
landlord is bound by the sub-occupation agreement.21
 5.39 If they are not bound, then the head landlord will be able to seek to repossess the
premises by taking proceedings against the original occupier. Once the head
landlord had obtained an order for possession against him or her, any others on
the premises would be trespassers, who could be evicted as such. Thus the new
occupier will turn out to have less security than the sub-occupation agreement
suggested. The new occupier would have been misled about his or her level of
security. But their redress would be against the original occupier, not the head
landlord.
 5.40 If the landlord is bound by the sub-occupation agreement, and indeed is bound to
the terms of the sub-occupation agreement rather than to the original agreement,
then the landlord might end up taking on the new occupier under terms less
favourable to the landlord than those which had originally been contracted for with
the original occupier.22
 5.41 However, as the head landlord would only be bound by the sub-occupation
agreement if they had consented to its creation in the first place, arguably they
should live with the consequences of giving their consent.
 5.42 To avoid the problem of the sub-occupation agreement granting more contractual
security than the original occupier has, a number of options can be considered.
 5.43 The first is that our new scheme could prescribe that sub-occupiers should always
take on a type II periodic tenancy, as a matter of law and irrespective of what the
occupier and sub-occupier have agreed. This would protect landlords from
accidentally agreeing to too high a level of (contractual) security in the sub-
occupation agreement, which they might be saddled with if the original occupier
disappeared. However this might be too inflexible and fail to cater for a minority of
cases where all three parties were happy for the sub-occupier to have a greater
degree of contractual security.23 Further, it would be contrary to our general
approach that, where possible, the agreement itself should be an accessible and
accurate statement of the terms binding the parties.
 5.44 A second option would be to provide that, where the landlord was bound by a sub-
occupation agreement, the landlords’ obligations towards the sub-occupiers should
be determined by the terms of the original agreement rather than those of the sub-
occupation agreement. This would ensure that landlords could not be prejudiced
by the terms of the sub-agreement. They would only be concerned to vet the
21 Basically the landlord will not be bound where consent was required but not obtained: see
paras 2.45 to 2.67.
22 The terms of a fixed-term sub-occupation agreement could offer the sub-occupier greater
security, lower rent or a greater ability for the occupier to terminate the agreement than had
been agreed in the original agreement.
23 Formerly – under the principle of “nemo dat quod non habet” – a holder of an interest in
land could not grant a superior interest out of it. This remains the case as far as third parties
are concerned, but as between a licensee and their “sub-tenant” the sub-tenancy is now
effective as a tenancy following Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing [2000] 1 AC 406.
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potential sub-occupier, rather than also vetting the sub-agreement itself.24 However
this might unfairly result in the sub-occupier, who may or may not be aware of the
head agreement, ending up with a new agreement which is different from the
terms of their sub-agreement.
 5.45 We provisionally conclude that both these options are over-protective and
inflexible. Our preferred option, therefore, is that there should be a default term in
the original agreement which provides that, where the landlord consents to the
creation of a sub-occupation agreement, such sub-agreement should be a periodic
type II agreement. If the head landlord found they were bound to accept the sub-
occupier on the terms of the sub-agreement, they would be able to use the notice-
only procedure to terminate the agreement in the normal way. If they wished to be
more flexible and, for example, accept a sub-occupier on the basis of a fixed term
type II agreement, they would be free to do so.
 5.46 We provisionally propose that the model agreements contain a default
term which provides that any sub-occupation agreement should be a type
II periodic agreement.
The terms of the sub-occupation agreement
 5.47 A further question arises whether the head landlord should be able to prescribe the
terms which the original occupier was seeking to include in the sub-occupation
agreement. The relationship between the occupier and the sub-occupier should be
principally a matter for them. Initially, the landlord’s interest in the sub-occupier’s
agreement will be limited, as at that point there will be no direct contractual
relationship between them.
 5.48 The landlord will, of course, wish to ensure that the sub-occupier does not appear
to be the sort of person likely to cause nuisance or damage to the property, both of
which are matters which may directly affect the landlord. But the fact that no sub-
occupation agreement can be made without the landlord giving consent should
avoid many of these problems.
 5.49 If the landlord gives consent to the creation of the sub-occupation agreement, this
raises the possibility that, at some point in the future, the landlord will become
bound by the sub-agreement.25 We have asked ourselves whether, because of this
possibility, the landlord should, when giving consent, also be able to impose
conditions relating to the content of any sub-occupation agreement.
 5.50 In view of the fact that the default position we have proposed is that the sub-
occupier will have a type II periodic tenancy, in relation to which security of tenure
24 Eg a private landlord would look for evidence of ability to pay rent, whereas a social landlord
would look for possible prejudice to their allocation policy. Both would want to be satisfied
that the sub-occupier would not cause nuisance or damage to the property. These
considerations can be distinguished from questions of whether the sub-agreement is itself
acceptable in terms of length, security, level of rent or other terms. Again different factors
will be relevant in the private and social sectors; a private landlord may want the agreement
to charge more rent so as to protect the rent stream, whereas a social landlord may want to
avoid occupiers making a profit out of social housing.
25 See paras 5.59 to 5.66 below.
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is limited, it could be argued that it would not be proportionate for our scheme to
seek to prescribe that a landlord should be able to impose conditions as to the
content of any sub-occupation agreement.
 5.51 On the other hand it could be suggested that a landlord might actually be more
willing to grant consent if they were able to exercise some control over the content
of any sub-occupation agreement, or indeed simply wished to be given a copy of
any sub-occupation agreement.
 5.52 In order not to undermine the basic proposition that consent should not
unreasonably be withheld, it would be essential that any conditions that the
landlord might seek to impose on the content of a sub-occupation agreement
should, equally, be reasonable.
 5.53 If consent to the creation of a sub-occupation agreement was given, subject to
reasonable conditions being met, the further question arises as to what the
consequences should be of the occupier ignoring one or more of those conditions
when entering the sub-occupation agreement. Should this failure to adhere to the
conditions mean that the original consent was, as a consequence, to be deemed not
to have been given?
 5.54 We think that it would be unfair on the sub-occupier were the whole process of the
creation of the sub-occupation agreement to be invalidated by a failure on the part
of the occupier to adhere to one of the conditions. But we also think that, for
example, if the landlord had required any sub-occupation agreement to be a type
II periodic agreement, and the occupier sought to create a fixed-term sub-
occupation agreement, the landlord should not be stuck with this breach of
condition.
 5.55 We provisionally propose that landlords, on giving their consent to the
creation of a sub-occupation agreement should be able to impose
reasonable conditions as to the type or terms of the sub-agreement.
 5.56 We further provisionally propose that breach of these conditions should
not invalidate the consent, but that any sub-occupation agreement created
without compliance with such conditions should be deemed to be a type II
periodic agreement.
Formalities
 5.57 In cases where an occupier has the right to grant a right of sub-occupation, we
think that the normal rules relating to the provision of a written copy of the
agreement should apply.26
 5.58 We provisionally propose that, where a sub-occupation agreement has
been properly entered into, the same rules and sanctions relating to the
provision of a written copy of the agreement by the occupier to the sub-
occupier should apply as they apply to the original agreement.
26 See CP 162, paras 6.122 to 6.135.
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THE EFFECT ON HEAD LANDLORDS OF AUTHORISED SUB-OCCUPATION
AGREEMENTS
 5.59 It seems obvious that, where the sub-occupation agreement has been authorised by
the giving of consent by the landlord, or because the landlord has not required
consent to be given, the landlord should be bound by the consequences of these
decisions.27 It is an essential concomitant of this that if it is agreed that the landlord
can only withhold consent to a sub-agreement on the grounds that it is reasonable
so to do, then one of the factors in assessing that reasonableness must be whether
the landlord would have been willing to grant an occupation agreement to the sub-
occupier in place of the original occupier.28
 5.60 If the original occupier brings the original agreement to an end by issuing a notice
to quit, or a notice under a break clause or by surrendering the agreement, in such
a case the sub-occupier would broadly step into the shoes of the original occupier
from the date on which the notice or surrender took effect.29
 5.61 This does not mean that the head landlord comes into a contractual relationship
with the sub-occupier by virtue of the sub-occupation agreement as such. The
occupier remains the person with liabilities to the landlord, and, in particular, is
liable for the sub-occupier’s behaviour where it puts the occupier in breach of the
head agreement. This position is similar to the occupier’s liability for the behaviour
of visitors and other household members.30 However, once the agreement between
the head landlord and the occupier is terminated, the landlord may become bound
by the agreement with the sub-occupier in the following circumstances.
 5.62 If the landlord brings possession proceedings against the original occupier for
breach of the original agreement (say, for failure to pay the rent) and the court
orders possession to be given up and such order is executed, the sub-occupier will,
from the date of execution of the order for possession, become the occupier under
an agreement directly from the landlord.
 5.63 We have considered what type of agreement would then bind the original landlord
and the sub-occupier. It could be argued that the type of agreement should be the
same as under the original occupation agreement. But this could have the effect
that a sub-occupier with only a type II sub-occupation agreement could be
promoted to a type I agreement, if that was the status of the original agreement.
 5.64 On the other hand, it could be argued that the type of agreement created by the
original occupier with the sub-occupier should be the type which the landlord
takes over. After all that will have been the basis on which a landlord will have
given his consent.
27 In accordance with the general principles set out in para 2.47 the head landlord would not
be bound by a sub-occupation agreement where they had not given consent, and this
withholding of consent was reasonable.
28 See paras 2.27 to 2.44 above for our discussion of reasonableness in consent requirements.
29 We consider the question of the liability as between the landlord and the sub-occupier in a
little more detail at paras 5.59 to 5.74 below.
30 See para 4.42 above on the similar liability of occupiers for the behaviour of lodgers.
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 5.65 We provisionally propose that, as between the landlord and the sub-
occupier, the question of what type of agreement the landlord should be
bound by should be determined by the type of agreement created by the
original occupier with the sub-occupier.
 5.66 We further provisionally propose that if the landlord has given consent, or
has included a term in the agreement allowing sub-occupation agreements
to be made without consent (replacing the default term), then on the
termination of the original agreement:
 (1) The landlord should be bound by the sub-occupation agreement if
the original occupier terminated the agreement by giving notice to
quit or by exercising a break clause or surrendering. The sub-
occupier should step into the shoes of the original occupier but
only under the terms of the sub-agreement.
 (2) If the landlord brings proceedings for possession against the
original occupier or if the landlord used the abandonment
procedure, then the landlord should have to serve notice on the
sub-occupier (at the premises), who should be entitled to be joined
in the action. The sub-occupier should be entitled to seek an order
of the court converting the sub-occupier into a direct occupier of
the landlord, but, again, on the terms of the sub-agreement. The
court should do so unless it would have granted possession against
this person if they had already been the occupier.31
The resulting liabilities of landlords and sub-occupiers
 5.67 Where the head landlord (“L”) becomes bound to accept the sub-occupier (“S”)
on the terms of the sub-agreement, this will effectively operate as a change of
landlord in that sub-agreement. This leads to the question of the extent to which L
or S will be liable for breaches of the sub-occupation agreement, which occurred
before L became the new direct landlord.
 5.68 We take the view that, as the new direct landlord, L should not be liable to S for
any breaches of the sub-agreement by the previous landlord (the former occupier,
“O”) which occurred before L became the new direct landlord of S. Any remedies
for breach should be pursued by S against O.
31 The court might refuse to take this step, eg where there was clear evidence that the sub-
occupier was in breach of the sub-occupation agreement with the occupier.
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 5.69 Nor do we think that L should be able to take action against S for any breaches of
the former sub-agreement which S committed before the change of landlord.32
 5.70 We do not believe that this latter proposition should cause landlords excessive
hardship. L should have ensured that the terms of the sub-occupation agreement
contained provisions to protect L’s interests. These would provide that O should
be able to take proceedings for possession against S for breach of the sub-
occupation agreement and, where relevant, for damages. The original agreement
between L and O should also provide that any damages obtained by O for damage
to the premises should be passed to L. These proposals are in any event broadly
consistent with the general rules of privity of contract and the Landlord and
Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.
 5.71 If L took proceedings for possession against O, and it was clear that the primary
cause of the breach was actually the behaviour of S, then the court would not
require L to become the direct landlord of S.33
 5.72 We provisionally propose that the new direct landlord should not take the
benefit or burden of any breaches of the agreement which occurred before
the change of landlord.
 5.73 We thus provisionally propose that the liability of the new direct landlord
to the former sub-occupier should be limited to breaches of the agreement
occurring after the date on which the new direct landlord became the new
direct landlord. Any claims for breach of the sub-occupation agreement
occurring before that date should be pursued by the former sub-occupier
against the former occupier.
 5.74 We further provisionally propose that the liability of the former sub-
occupier to the new direct landlord should be limited to breaches of the
agreement occurring after the new direct landlord became the new direct
landlord. Where a breach of the sub-occupation agreement occurred
before the new direct landlord became the new direct landlord, the former
sub-occupier should remain liable to the former occupier.
32 This is broadly similar to what the position would currently be under Landlord and Tenant
(Covenants) Act 1995, s 23 if the mesne landlord’s interest had been assigned, in that a new
mesne landlord would not obtain any benefits or liabilities in relation to any time falling
before the assignment. However, under s 23(3) the new mesne landlord would be entitled to
use a right of re-entry in respect of the sub-tenant’s previous breaches. We are not
reproducing an equivalent of forfeiture or rights of re-entry in our agreements. We set out
below why we think, in the circumstances of a head landlord under one of our agreements
taking on a sub-occupier, the head landlord should not be able to take action against the
sub-occupier for the sub-occupier’s previous breaches.






 6.1 In this Part we consider the general question of the extent to which occupiers
should be able to transfer the totality of their occupation rights to another. We also
discuss more specific issues arising from
 (1) the right to exchange,
 (2) transfers to those with a potential right of succession, and
 (3) certain powers of the courts to order transfer.
 6.2 We also discuss a number of related matters, including
 (1) the effects of the transfer of the right to occupy to another,
 (2) the relationship between sub-occupation agreements and transfers, and
 (3) transfers of the residual periods of long leases.
TRANSFERS
The current position
 6.3 The total transfer of the property interest held by an existing tenant/leaseholder to
another is currently achieved by the process of assignment. As with the law on sub-
letting, the law on assignment is a complex mix of contract law, real property law
and statute law. Broadly, whether a tenant/leaseholder has the right to assign to
another will depend on the terms of the lease/tenancy agreement.
 6.4 In the case of secure and introductory tenancies there is a more straightforward
approach. The Housing Act 1985 and the Housing Act 1996 respectively provide
that secure and introductory tenancies are completely incapable of assignment1
except in prescribed circumstances.2 A consequence of these provisions is that
there can be no argument about the effect of a purported assignment; it is of no
effect. The absolute nature of these provisions is – to an extent – counter-balanced
by the statutory “right to mutual exchange”3 which we discuss below.
1 Housing Act 1985, s 91(1); Housing Act 1996, s 134(1).
2 Housing Act 1985, s 91(3); Housing Act 1996, s 134(2).
3 Housing Act 1985, s 92.
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Our approach
 6.5 As with our proposals on the creation of sub-occupation agreements, we think that
the rules regulating the ability (or otherwise) of an occupier to transfer the whole
of his or her rights of occupation to another should be set out in the agreement.
 6.6 We provisionally propose that any restrictions on the ability of occupiers to
transfer the whole of their rights of occupation should be by way of a term
in the occupation agreement.
 6.7 The process of assignment is essential for long leaseholds of over twenty-one years,
not covered by our scheme.4 Restrictions on the ability of the leaseholder to
transfer his or her title to property would seriously undermine the leasehold
market in those areas of the country where leasehold is commonly found.5
 6.8 However we are not convinced that, in the context of the occupation agreements
covered by our new scheme, an untrammelled ability permanently to transfer
occupation rights to others who are total strangers to the original contract is
appropriate. Indeed, to provide otherwise would seriously undermine the ability,
particularly of social landlords, to allocate their properties to those most in need of
social housing.
 6.9 If an occupier wishes to give up his or her rights to occupy a property, this should
be done through the process of issuing a tenant’s notice to the landlord,
surrendering the right back to the landlord, or, if the worst comes to the worst,
abandoning the premises.6
 6.10 We provisionally propose that occupation agreements should contain, as a
default term, a provision stating that there is a landlord’s veto against the
transfer of the right to occupy by the occupier to a third party.
 6.11 Because we propose this as a default term, landlords will be able expressly to grant
more generous freedoms to their occupiers if they so wish.
Transfer of Rent Act statutory tenancies
 6.12 We note here that Rent Act 1977, Schedule I, Part II, paragraphs 13 and 14
provide for a process of “transfer” of statutory tenancies by agreement between the
outgoing tenant, the incoming tenant and the landlord. We have no knowledge of
how frequently these provisions are used in practice, but we think that they would
need to be preserved for Rent Act tenants under the scheme we propose.
 6.13 We provisionally propose that the rights of Rent Act statutory tenants to
agree with their landlord to transfer their statutory tenancy should be
preserved.
4 CP 162, paras 9.18 to 9.20.
5 The nature of these markets may change as the provisions of the Commonhold and
Leasehold Reform Act 2002 come into effect; but they will not alter the basic assumptions
made in the text.
6 These issues are discussed in CP 162, paras 10.49 to 10.69.
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SPECIAL CASES
 6.14 This general approach may need to be subject to a number of exceptions, which
we now consider. They are
 (1) the right to exchange,
 (2) the right to transfer an agreement to a potential successor before death,
and
 (3) the requirement to transfer an agreement to another person under a court
order in certain family proceedings.
A right to transfer by mutual exchange
Type I agreements
 6.15 The right of secure tenants to exchange their tenancies was an important part of
the “tenants’ charter” to which the Housing Act 1980 gave effect. It is now
contained in Housing Act 1985, section 92. It should be stressed that the right is
not an unconditional one. It can only be exercised with the consent of the
landlords involved. Special provisions on consent are found in Housing Act 1985,
Schedule 3.7
 6.16 Housing Corporation guidance says registered social landlords should make up for
the lack of this statutory right in assured tenancies by including equivalent
contractual provisions in their tenancy agreements.
 6.17 The right retains its policy importance in helping to promote mobility across the
country. It is “mutual” in that the exchange must be with another social tenant
who wants to exchange his or her property with that of the transferor, or there
must be a complete ring of tenants moving around a circle. This means that the
interests of social landlords in meeting housing need will not be prejudiced as no
new tenants, not in housing need, can come in to social housing because of the
right. It is a right which many council tenants currently make use of. We have
concluded that it is a right which should be reproduced in our new scheme.
 6.18 As one of the objects of our proposals is to create a level playing field across the
social rented sector, we think this right could properly be extended to all grants of
the right to occupy made by social landlords under type I agreements. Most of the
current problems caused by attempts to exchange between secure and assured
tenants of social landlords will be removed by our proposal for a unified type I
agreement covering both sectors.8
 6.19 We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in any type I
agreement granted by a social landlord that the occupier should have the
7 We discuss the question of consent in this particular context paras 6.29 to 6.37 below.
8 In practical terms, the differences, which will persist unless Government policy changes (CP
162, paras 1.91 to 1.93), between local authority occupiers with the right to buy and
registered social landlord occupiers who do not have the right to buy, may provide a
significant disincentive to transfers between the two categories.
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right to exchange his or her right of occupation with another occupier
granted a type I agreement by a social landlord. The right to exchange
would be subject to consent being given by the landlords affected.
 6.20 The question then arises whether this right should be extended to occupiers under
type I agreements which have been created by private landlords. We have stated
that we want to make the new agreements as landlord-neutral as possible. A
private landlord offering type I agreements could be seen as having voluntarily
opted in to providing a high degree of security for their occupiers.
 6.21 On the other hand, it is arguable that while the right to mutual exchange is
properly a feature of the public/social rented sector, it would impose an unfair and
unnecessary burden on private landlords. In any event, it might be suggested that
the imposition of a right to exchange would be regarded as a significant extra
burden by any private landlords who might thereby be deterred from entering type
I agreements, which otherwise they might have considered.
 6.22 Furthermore, private landlords will not usually allocate their homes on the basis of
an assessment of housing need. If private landlords are included in the right of
exchange, this could lead to social landlords having to accept as occupiers, via the
exchange process, those who would not otherwise qualify for social housing on the
basis of housing need.
 6.23 Nevertheless, if we are correct in our assumption that use of type I agreements by
private landlords would be rare, and that where this happened, the landlords might
well be motivated by similar considerations that apply to the provision of social
housing (for example, philanthropic organisations which did not want to register
with the Housing Corporation), this might lead to the conclusion that there would
have been some assessment of need. Thus, in the few cases where occupiers sought
to use the right of mutual exchange to move from private to social landlords, the
policies of social landlords would not be seriously compromised.
 6.24 Equally it is now commonly accepted, that the policy behind social housing should
not be purely about need, as sustainable mixed communities should be encouraged
instead of “ghettoisation” of social landlords’ estates. This might also indicate that
to include occupiers of private landlords within the scope of the right to exchange
would not seriously prejudice a social landlord’s allocations policy.
 6.25 If it was felt that to impose a compulsory term giving the occupier the right to
mutual exchange on private landlords would be unacceptable, we wonder whether,
as an alternative, there might be a default term in type I agreements created by
private landlords providing for the possibility of the occupier having the right to
exchange.
 6.26 We invite views on the following questions:
 (1) Should private landlords be required to make any provision for a
right of mutual exchange in any type I agreement they may enter
into?
 (2) If the answer is yes, should this be by way of a compulsory term, or
a default term?
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 (3) Would private landlords who might otherwise consider using type I
agreements be deterred from doing so by the existence of a right of
mutual exchange?
 (4) Would the interests of social landlords be prejudiced if mutual
exchanges led to their receiving type I agreement occupiers from
private landlords who had never been through the allocations
procedure of any social landlord?
Type II agreements
 6.27 The right of mutual exchange does not currently apply to introductory or assured
shorthold tenants. Given their short-term nature we do not think that such a right
would appropriately apply to type II agreements
 6.28 We provisionally propose that such a clause should not be a compulsory
term in any type II agreement.
Consent to exchanges
 6.29 Turning to the issue of consent, the current provisions are set out in great detail in
Housing Act 1985, section 92 and Schedule 3. Unusually, there is no general
discretion to refuse the application, which could be the subject of challenge if
unreasonably withheld. Rather, these provisions are couched in a much more
positive fashion. Consent can only be withheld on specific grounds listed in
Schedule 3. If consent is withheld on other grounds it is to be treated as given.9
This puts the tenant in a stronger and clearer position than in most other
situations where consent is sought.
 6.30 As there is no specific requirement of reasonableness, this might suggest that
consent could be withheld on a Schedule 3 ground, even where it was
unreasonable to do so. Nevertheless, it appears that Landlord and Tenant Act
1927, section 19 would imply a requirement that any refusal of consent must be
reasonable into the provisions. Any refusal would also be subject to normal
administrative law challenge for unreasonableness. Secure tenancies are not
affected by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988, because of section 5(3) of that Act.
 6.31 There is a strict time-limit of 42 days from the tenant’s application (though there
are no provisions requiring the application to have been in writing or in a
particular form) for the landlord to be able to rely on any of the grounds for
withholding consent.10 Oddly, there is no provision deeming a failure to reply to be
either a refusal or a consent.
9 Housing Act 1985, s 92(3). The grounds include the fact that the landlord is taking
repossession action or that the estate management grounds would be available if the
exchange took place. They also include, in grounds 3 and 4, provision for refusal if the
property would be substantially too large, or unreasonably small (or otherwise unsuitable),
for the needs of the assignee.
10 Section 92(4).
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 6.32 Finally there are strict provisions on conditional consent.11 The only condition
which can be validly imposed is one that before consent is granted the tenant
should first remedy any breach of their agreement.
 6.33 One of the specific problems with the combined effect of subsections 92(3) to (6)
is the lack of clarity as to the position where a landlord does not respond to a
request within 42 days. After the time has expired, they cannot rely on any of the
grounds for refusal. But as they have not actively replied withholding consent on
any other non-permitted grounds, they cannot be deemed to have given consent
under section 92(3). They may still be able to give consent subject to a condition
under section 92(5), and there is no time limit on how long they take to do that.
 6.34 We would like to see a much clearer time-table applied to the whole process, with a
set of rules which is determinative of the position at the end of that time limit.
 6.35 We provisionally propose that the right to exchange should be subject to
the landlord’s consent.
 6.36 We invite views as to whether the new scheme should reproduce the
current requirements as to the landlord’s consent to mutual exchange in
Housing Act 1985, section 92 and Schedule 3, or whether instead a simpler,
more clearly time-limited procedure should be adopted.
 6.37 We ask whether, in the alternative, the same criteria of general
reasonableness should be adopted as we are suggesting in other cases
where consent is required, based on Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, section
19 and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988.
Chains of exchanges
 6.38 It has been suggested to us that a problem with the current mutual exchange
provisions is that they do not cater for “chains” of potential transfers unless the
chains connect round in a complete loop, with the last person taking on the
tenancy of the first. Thus if A exchanges with B, B exchanges with C, and C
exchanges with D, it is essential that D moves into A’s home. This conflicts with
the wishes of some social landlords to be able to innovate with current ideas about
“choice-based lettings”.
 6.39 It may be preferable to develop the current scheme so that not only would an
occupier’s right crystallise, as now, where the chain formed a complete circle of
exchanging occupiers, but also where the chain started with a landlord who was
prepared to accept the creation of a “void” and ended with a landlord who was
prepared to allocate a “void”. In the latter case, A could exchange with B, B could
exchange with C, C could exchange with D, but D would not be required to
complete the circle by moving into A’s home. D could move into quite different
premises; and A’s home would be available for letting to someone new. The
landlord’s consent would remain the deciding factor, but it would involve new
criteria for determining the reasonableness of the decisions of the landlords at
either end of the chain.
11 Section 92(5) to (6).
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 6.40 We understand that social landlords involved in exchange schemes also want to be
able to facilitate chains of moves which may involve private landlords who have
been approved for the purpose by all the participating social landlords. Further
changes to the current system could be made to add this flexibility. It might be
easier to achieve this through landlords’ allocation policies than by an extension of
the right to exchange. If all the landlords are willing to allow the moves, these can
be done without the exercise of rights by the occupiers, but rather by using a series
of surrenders connected to grants of new tenancies of the next property in the
chain.
 6.41 We invite views as to whether the current requirement for the existence of
a complete chain of exchanges should be retained, or whether it should be
able to be waived by the landlords concerned.
Transfers to potential successors
 6.42 In Part VII, below, we discuss the question of the circumstances in which a person
should be able to take over the rights of occupation of an occupier who has died.
We provisionally propose that there should be, as there is now, a statutory scheme
allowing certain people closely connected to the occupier to succeed to the
agreement on the death of the occupier. Here we consider the prior question of
whether an occupier should be able to transfer his or her rights to a potential
successor while still alive.
 6.43 Under the present law, secure and introductory tenants, though denied any general
right of assignment, are permitted to assign to a potential successor.12 This seems a
very sensible provision. It does not prejudice the landlord as they would have
exactly the same people as tenants as they would have had after the operation of
the right of succession after the original tenant died; but it allows tenants to set
their affairs in order before they die. It is particularly useful in situations where
someone is considering going into residential care and wants to ensure that their
potential successors are protected against the risk of loss of the home.
 6.44 It should be noted, however, that the ability to assign is not an unqualified one.
Under Housing Act 1985, sections 91 and 92, assignment to a potential successor
is only a possibility and can be prohibited by express terms of the tenancy. Four
possible situations can be envisaged.
 (1) There is no express term prohibiting assignment; thus the common law
applies so the tenant is able to assign to a potential successor without
consent.
 (2) There is an express term prohibiting such assignment absolutely; in such a
case any assignment in breach of that term is effective to transfer the
tenancy to the assignee, but will render the assignee (and assignor) liable
to action for breach of the covenant and in particular to repossession
(whether by forfeiture or for breach of the agreement).13
12 Housing Act 1985 s 91(3)(c); Housing Act 1996, s 134(2)(b).
13 Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Higgins [1983] 1 WLR 1091.
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 (3) There is an express term prohibiting assignment without the consent of
the landlord, which may not be unreasonably withheld.
 (4) There is an express term prohibiting assignment without the consent of
the landlord, which may be withheld on any basis.
 6.45 If an assignment goes ahead in circumstances (3) or (4), without the consent of the
landlord, the assignee and assignor will also be liable to proceedings for forfeiture
or for possession. However, the court in deciding whether to make a forfeiture or
possession order, it will have to consider the reasonableness of so doing. One of the
factors will be the age of the tenant and accordingly the likelihood that the
prospective assignee will succeed in due course anyway.
 6.46 In our view the present provisions allow for an unnecessarily complex range of
options. We think a simpler approach would be to establish a general rule that
transfer to a potential successor should be possible, subject to the landlord’s
consent.
 6.47 We provisionally propose that type I agreements should contain a
compulsory term allowing for the occupier to transfer his or her rights to
a potential successor, subject to the landlord’s consent.
 6.48 The nature of the current market for type II agreements is more short-term and
less secure than for type I agreements. There is therefore less likelihood that those
occupying under type II agreements will have the same sense of attachment to
home and location as those under a type I agreement. For this reason, we do not
think that it is appropriate for there normally to be a right to succeed to a type II
agreement, particularly not to a periodic type II agreement. Thus there would be
no right to assign to a potential type II successor.
 6.49 Different considerations apply where a fixed-term type II agreement has been
created. Here we will be provisionally proposing that such an interest should be
capable of being left by will or on intestacy. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that the person entitled under the will or on intestacy should have the
right to succeed to the agreement prior to the death of the occupier.
 6.50 Nevertheless, we would not want to prevent a landlord and occupier agreeing this
if they so wished.14 We think that the best way to achieve this is to propose a
default term that, in the case of type II agreements, there should be a landlord’s
veto over the ability of an occupier to transfer his right to a potential successor,
prior to his or her death. This will not prevent the landlord from agreeing to this in
any particular case.
 6.51 We provisionally propose that there should be a default term in the type II
agreement giving the landlord a veto over the assignment of the
agreement.
14 A similar outcome could be achieved by an occupier exercising his or her right to have joint
occupiers brought into the agreement, then serving a tenant’s notice, terminating his or her
interest.
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Transfers to joint successors
 6.52 We have suggested above that there should be circumstances in which a new joint
occupier may, subject to the consent of the landlord, be brought into the
agreement.15 In the context of the present discussion, we think it would often be
useful for the occupier to be able to pass the agreement to more than one person.
This is not possible in the present state of the law.
 6.53 In particular this can be an issue in cases where an elderly parent is the secure
tenant,16 but is having to consider moving into residential care, leaving behind their
adult child who may have been acting as their carer. Currently the only option
available to the parent is to assign to their potential successor.17 The problem with
this is that the parent has to give up the tenancy completely to their child at a time
when it is not clear whether they will be coming back out of residential care. If
transmission could be to joint occupiers then the parent could transmit the
agreement to the child/carer, jointly with themselves.
 6.54 The current position can also lead to problems where there is a period of
uncertainty while a choice is made by the potential successors, and in default by
the landlord or the court, as to which of several potential successors should take up
the position.
 6.55 These difficulties could be eased by permitting transfer to joint occupiers. Indeed,
if there is to be a right to apply to join an agreement then it would seem odd not to
allow a joint agreement from the start.18
 6.56 We provisionally propose that it should be possible for the transfer to a
potential successor to lead (subject to any terms in the contract) to the
transfer to joint successors.
Transfer by order of family courts
 6.57 The family courts can currently order the transfer of a tenancy from one family
member to another as part of their powers of dealing with the family’s affairs. We
believe that it is important that the family courts retain these powers.
Current family legislation
 6.58 There are two principal sets of family law provisions under which a court may
currently order a transfer of a tenancy between family members.
 (1) Provisions aimed at property generally.
 (2) Provisions aimed at tenancies specifically.
15 See paragraphs 3.29 to 3.50.
16 Or in cases of assured tenants to whom registered social landlords have contracted to grant
improved succession rights in accordance with Housing Corporation guidance.
17 We suggest in paras 7.67 to 7.68 below that we should adopt a version of the Scottish list of
qualifying successors, to include non-family-member carers.
18 Discussed at paras 3.29 to 3.50 above.
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GENERAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS
 6.59 In the case of spouses, a court can make a property adjustment order (on divorce,
nullity and judicial separation) under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 24.19
Such orders only apply to “property” in the strict sense, so they would apply to
contractual tenancies but not to (Rent Act) statutory tenancies or licences.20 The
order is not effective until the spouse complies by assigning the tenancy.
 6.60 The Children Act 1989 contains similar powers to make property transfer orders.21
These are available between parents of children, irrespective of their marital status,
but are only for the benefit of the children. The court can make orders for
settlement or transfer, to or for the benefit of a child, of “property” belonging to
either parent. This will therefore cover tenancies where they are treated as
property, as under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 24.
 6.61 The fact that a court orders an assignment under these provisions does not remove
the requirement that, if the tenancy requires the landlord’s consent before an
assignment can occur, the landlord’s consent to these court-ordered assignments is
also required. By contrast, consent is not required when a court makes an order
under the Family Law Act 1996.22 This leads to confusion as to whether the
landlord’s consent is needed for these various orders to take effect. We believe our
scheme should, if possible, result in greater transparency on this point.
 6.62 The powers of the courts under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the
Children Act 1989 to order transfers of property interests are based on there being
property interests which can be transferred. These rules sit awkwardly with the
underlying principles of the scheme we are proposing, which moves away from a
reliance on the creation of a property interest as the basis of the occupation
agreement.
 6.63 This raises the question whether the Acts of 1973 and 1989 should be amended to
ensure that they cover all occupation agreements that come within the scope of our
proposed scheme, or whether those with occupation agreements under our scheme
should simply rely on the provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 (discussed
below).
 6.64 We can understand that amending the Acts of 1973 and 1989 might lead to
unintended and even unacceptable consequences which we have not anticipated.
We therefore make no provisional proposals on the issue. However we would be
pleased to learn the views, particularly of family law practitioners, on this issue.
 6.65 We invite views on whether Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 24, and
Children Act 1989, Schedule 1 paragraph 1(2)(d) to (e) should be amended
so that they apply to all occupation agreements falling within the scope of
19 Similar provisions, for transfer of property on foreign divorces, are currently in the
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 Part III, particularly s 17(1).
20 See Hale v Hale [1975] 1 WLR 931 and Thompson v Thompson [1975] 2 WLR 868 –
tenancies count as property if they are legal interests capable of assignment.
21 Schedule 1, para 1(2)(d) to (e).
22 See para 6.67 below.
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our new scheme, irrespective of whether they would otherwise be regarded
as creating a property interest.
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON TENANCIES
 6.66 The Family Law Act 1996, section 53 and Schedule 7, paragraph 723 makes
provision for the court to vest protected, assured (including assured shorthold),
secure or introductory tenancies in non-tenant partners of tenants. Schedule 7,
paragraph 8 makes separate but similar provision for Rent Act 1977 statutory
tenancies.24 There is no equivalent of this provision in the Children Act 1989, and
so these powers of transfer cannot be used between parents of a child where the
parents are not married or cohabiting.
 6.67 It is worth noting the following.
 (1) This provision covers “tenancies” defined in the relevant housing
legislation rather than by strict principles of landlord and tenant law. This
is consistent with our fundamental approach of not relying on property
law to define the nature of the agreements covered by our new scheme.
 (2) This provision is available to heterosexual (but not homosexual)
cohabitees and also to spouses even outside of the context of divorce and
separation proceedings.25
 (3) It does not rely on any action by the tenant, as the vesting is effected by
the court order.
 (4) In recognition of the potentially significant impact on the landlord who
may be faced with a new tenant, the Family Law Act 1996 requires the
courts on considering making such orders to have regard to the suitability
of the parties as tenants, and to give the landlord an opportunity of being
heard.26
 6.68 The Family Law Act also makes explicit provision for both binding the new tenant
into the benefits and burdens of the agreement and releasing the old tenant from
them.
 6.69 As the thrust of our provisional proposals is to move away from treating
agreements covered by our new scheme as property and to see them as contracts
governed by a special statutory scheme, and as the Family Law Act 1996, Schedule
23 Formerly in the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983, Sched 1, which consolidated earlier
legislation and only applied on divorce, nullity and judicial separation.
24 Separate provision is not made for statutory tenancies arising under the Housing Acts 1985
and 1988, presumably because they are treated as actual tenancies whereas Rent Act
statutory tenancies are not – see para 8.11 below.
25 This was as a result of Law Commission recommendations in Family Law, Domestic
Violence and Occupation of the Family Home (1992) Law Com No 207.
26 Schedule 7, paras 5(c) and 14(1). In practice a court is unlikely to make an order
transferring an assured shorthold tenancy or introductory tenancy in the teeth of opposition
from the landlord. Equally they are unlikely where the order would lead to repossession on
some other ground, eg the estate management ground.
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7 already takes this approach, it therefore appears that that Act would need only
minimal adjustment to cater for our new scheme.
 6.70 We provisionally propose that the Family Law Act 1996, Schedule 7 should
be amended to refer to any agreement covered by our new scheme.
 6.71 We provisionally propose that the model agreements under our new
scheme should contain a compulsory term allowing agreements to be
transferred by order of the court made under the Family Law Act 1996,
Schedule 7.
EFFECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY TO ANOTHER
 6.72 The law of landlord and tenant also deals with the effects of an assignment on the
rights and liabilities of the assignor, assignee and landlord where a tenant has
assigned the tenancy to another. As with the law on sub-letting, the law on the
effects of assignment is a complex mix of contract law, real property law and
statute law, much of which is ignored in practice. We believe the law should be
simplified, so that transfers can be effected with a minimum of formality and result
in the previous occupier having no ongoing liability for any future breaches of the
agreement.
Consent
 6.73 We have suggested, above, that there should be a default term in any occupation
agreement that the landlord should have a veto over any proposed transfer. If,
despite this, the landlord agrees that a transfer can take place, this consent should
be binding on the landlord, and the transferee should, in general, step into the
shoes of the transferor.
 6.74 We provisionally propose that a transfer should not take effect until after
any necessary consent has been given by the landlord.
Method of transfer
 6.75 Under the current law, a tenancy can only be assigned by deed, even where the
original tenancy did not have to be granted by deed.27 If no deed is used, a contract
to assign a tenancy may be enforceable in equity, but only if it complies with the
requirements of Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, section 2
by being in writing, signed by both parties and containing all the terms of the
contract.28
 6.76 These restrictions have a valuable role in leasehold conveyancing. They appear
unnecessary in relation to occupation agreements of the sort covered by our new
scheme. We recommended in CP 16229 that agreements should be binding
27 Law of Property Act 1925, s 54(2) allows the creation, but not the assignment, by parol of
certain short leases. See Crago v Julian [1992] 1 WLR 372 on whether Law of Property Act
1925, s 53(1)(a) can enable assignment by writing without a deed.
28 Under s 2(5)(a) there is an exemption for short leases from the requirement for writing, but
it only applies to contracts for their creation rather than for their assignment.
29 CP 162, paras 6.63 to 6.71.
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between landlord and occupier without having to comply with land law rules on
requirements for deeds or signatures. Similarly we believe that there should be
minimal requirements in our new scheme for a transfer to take effect.
 6.77 We provisionally propose that any transfer should take effect from the
moment at which the intention of the transferor and transferee is
confirmed either in writing, or by the transferor giving up occupation to
the transferee, or by the first instalment of rent which is paid to the
landlord by the transferee and not by the transferor.
Formalities
 6.78 The resultant effect of the transfer is that an agreement now exists between the
landlord and the transferee, in place of the agreement between the landlord and
the transferor. It is central to our proposals that the occupier should have a written
statement of the terms of the agreement.
 6.79 It would be possible to regard the process of transfer merely as a variation of the
original agreement, which should be treated on the same basis as any other
variation of the agreement.30 This would mean that the transferee would be entitled
to ask for a written copy of the agreement should he or she so wish.
 6.80 However, we think that it would be better to ensure that the landlord should have
to provide sooner rather than later the transferee with a copy of the agreement.
The transferee should have a full statement of the terms of the agreement, rather
than relying on what information the transferor might have passed on. This would
ensure that any misunderstandings were identified and resolved as soon as
possible. Thus we think that it is preferable to regard the process of transfer as
creating a new occupation agreement.
 6.81 We provisionally propose that the landlord should be required to serve on
the transferee a written copy of the agreement, amended to show the
change of occupier, within two weeks of the transfer. The same sanctions
for failure to comply should be available as would be apply for failure to
give a copy of the written agreement to the original occupier at the start of
the agreement.
The position of the parties after a transfer
 6.82 Once a transfer has been properly completed, questions remain about the effect of
the transfer of the liabilities of the transferee, the transferor and the landlord.
The current position
 6.83 At present, in the case of leases rather than licences, these issues are addressed
either through landlord and tenant law’s twin doctrines of privity of estate and
30 For our proposals on what should happen following a variation of the agreement, see CP
162 paras 6.140 to 6.158.
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privity of contract, or, in respect of post-1995 tenancies,31 by the Landlord and
Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.
 6.84 In general, the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor, becoming liable under
the lease as well as being entitled to the benefit of it.32 The assignor retains the
benefit and burden in respect of any breaches which occurred before the
assignment. The assignee only takes on the benefit and burden in respect of
breaches which occur after the assignment.33
 6.85 The doctrine of privity of contract still applies to pre-1996 tenancies. This means
that the tenant who originally entered the lease (the assignor) remains liable – even
though the assignee also becomes liable under privity of estate – on the covenants
in the lease even after an assignment, or any further assignments, until the lease is
terminated. While this is subject to a predictable end date in fixed term tenancies,
it is entirely open-ended in the case of periodic tenancies.
 6.86 By contrast, in relation to post-1995 tenancies, Landlord and Tenant (Covenants)
Act 1995, section 5(2) releases the assignor from ongoing liability for breaches by
assignees. This change did not receive much attention amongst housing
practitioners, where many had already been working on the basis that assignors
had no ongoing liabilities.34
 6.87 Section 25 provides that the parties cannot contract out of the Act. However,
section 16 allows for the use of “authorised guarantee agreements” (AGAs). In the
circumstances in which a landlord can insist upon an AGA as a condition of
consenting to the assignment, the assignor gives the landlord a guarantee for the
31 Those created on or after 1st January 1996, under s 1(3), referred to by the Act as “new”
tenancies.
32 In a “new” tenancy this is the effect of Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, s 3(2),
which applies to any covenants “whether or not the covenant has reference to the subject
matter of the tenancy” under s 2(1)(a). It also applies to agreements for leases and equitable
assignments under s 28(1), but under s 3(6) it does not apply to covenants which are
expressed to be personal or which should have been registered. In a legal lease which is not a
“new” tenancy, on the legal assignment of the tenant’s interest, the benefit and burden will
pass only in respect of those covenants which “touch and concern the land”, under the rule
in Spencer’s Case (1583) 5 Co Rep 16a; 77 ER 72. Whilst in commercial leases this led to the
precautionary practice by landlords of imposing, as a condition of their consent, a
requirement that the assignee should enter direct covenants with the landlord, it was
generally ignored in social tenancies. Many social landlords would grant a fresh tenancy to
the purported assignee, sometimes as a way to avoid the formalities required for effective
assignment, or through not appreciating the effect of assignment, but with the effect of
binding the new tenant to all the covenants. However, some would be reluctant to do this
where it would mean the assignee would avoid taking on the assignor’s status as a successor
(see the Appendix for an account of the current law relating to statutory succession).
33 In a post-1995 tenancy this is because of Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, ss 23
and 24. In a pre-1996 tenancy the position is more complex – see C Harpum, Megarry &
Wade: The Law of Real Property, (6th ed 2000) at 15–008 to 15–063.
34 See Stuart Bridge, “Assignment Under Attack” Conv [2000] 474, pointing out that in
Burton v Camden LBC [2000] 2 WLR 427 the court could have used the doctrine of privity
of contract to hold that the departing tenant would still be liable for rent (so that the
remaining tenant’s entitlement to housing benefit would not increase).
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performance of the covenants by the immediate assignee.35 The AGA is limited in
that under section 16(4) it cannot be made to cover breaches by any subsequent
assignees.36 Also the guarantor has the right, where the guarantor has had to make
a payment under the guarantee because of the assignee’s default, to an “overriding
lease” under section 19 which is for three days more than the tenancy. This
effectively gives the guarantor the ability to protect their interests through
becoming the landlord of the defaulting assignee and thereby becoming entitled to
forfeit the lease and evict the assignee.
 6.88 The other potential problem is as to the effect on the assignee where, before the
assignment, the assignor was in breach of the terms of the lease, or the landlord
had served notice on or issued possession proceedings against the assignor. If the
tenancy is assigned, then the landlord can still sue the assignor for any debt, but
loses the ability to use the threat of eviction against the assignor or the assignee for
that breach. However, it is not clear what the effect is where a tenancy is assigned
after possession proceedings have begun or where there is a suspended possession
order. It seems that a tenant/assignor can use the assignment effectively to avoid
repossession. Where the assignee is a member of the household of the assignor,
who will continue to allow the former tenant to live there as a member of their
household, this may have the effect of undermining the effect of the possession
order.
 6.89 Usually this will not cause problems because a landlord can reasonably refuse
consent to the assignment where there is an unremedied breach, such as
outstanding rent arrears, or where possession proceedings have started. If the
tenant/assignor assigns unlawfully the landlord can separately seek an order for
possession for the breach constituted by the unlawful assignment. If the landlord
fails to check properly before giving consent, or fails to use the breach to refuse
consent to the assignment, then the assignee cannot be evicted for the default of
the old tenant.
 6.90 The landlord could of course grant consent subject to the condition that the
breach was remedied before the assignment, or subject to the assignee agreeing to
35 Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, s 22 added subsections (1A) to (1E) to
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, s 19. The effect is that a post-1995 lease can specify that it
will be taken to be reasonable for the landlord to refuse consent to an assignment in the
absence of an authorised guarantee agreement. However, by s 19(1E)(a), this does not apply
to residential tenancies, so the court would look at reasonableness in the individual
circumstances.
36 Whether subject to an authorised guarantee agreement or not, the former tenant is also
protected by ss 17 and 18. These provide that the former tenant will not be liable unless
given notice of the new tenant’s breach within six months, and that the former tenant will
not be liable for any increase in rent or other payments which was voluntary on the part of
the landlord.
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pay an appropriate sum.37
 6.91 Where the consent of the landlord is not required, then the landlord will be unable
to retain the ability to threaten eviction. This can cause problems where a landlord
has forgotten to include a prohibition against assignment in the tenancy and no
statutory prohibition is implied. This may occur in the context of fixed term
assured shorthold, or fully assured, tenancies, because Housing Act 1988, section
15 does not imply any prohibition on assignment into fixed term assured
tenancies.38 In relation to secure tenancies, some landlords wrongly believe the
Housing Act 1985 always implies prohibitions on any assignment without consent;
again they may omit to include an express prohibition, in which case assignments
can be freely made to potential successors.
 6.92 These complications do not arise where the transfer of the interest is the result not
of an assignment, but by the operation of a statutory provision. The principal
examples of statutory transfer are the procedure for a change of statutory tenant by
agreement under Rent Act 1977, Schedule 1, paragraph 13, and the vesting
powers of the courts under Family Law Act 1996, Schedule 7. Under these a
person is deemed to be the new tenant in place of the former tenant. The Family
Law Act 1996, Schedule 7, paragraph 7(2) specifically provides that any liabilities
or obligations of the former tenant falling due to be discharged or performed after
the order shall not be enforceable against the former tenant.
 6.93 The doctrine of privity of estate does not apply to licences, as they do not create an
interest in land. Licences will not normally be transferred to new licensees, except
by novation of contractual licences where the original contract is terminated and a
new one entered into by the new parties. The problems of the effects of transfer do
not normally therefore crop up in licences, which are not anyway protected under
the Rent Act 1977 or assured under the Housing Act 1988. However, secure and
introductory licences, with exclusive possession, can exist under Housing Acts
1985 and 1996.39 The right to assign by way of mutual exchange would appear to
apply to secure licences under Housing Act 1985, section 92. However, there is no
case-law as to the operation or effect of such an assignment.
Our approach
 6.94 We believe it is essential to simplify this complex body of law, to render it more
suitable to the residential occupation agreements, and to bring it more into line
with common housing law practice.
37 The commonest position is where the landlord wants to be able to continue to use the threat
of eviction to back up a demand for arrears. The landlord may be able to persuade the
assignee to accept a term in the tenancy binding the assignee to pay an amount equal to the
arrears of the assignor. However, this must be done as a condition of the assignment and
cannot be imposed later or there will be no consideration – see Mrs Rakey Jones v Notting
Hill Housing Trust (unreported, 20 January 1999). In relation to councils, the Local
Government Ombudsman has for some time warned such practices may amount to
maladministration, as demanding a premium, or effectively selling the tenancy – see
investigation 90/B/1668 into Wellingborough Borough Council, 5 December 1991.
38 See para 2.15 above.
39 See Westminster v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288.
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 6.95 We have already suggested above that there should be a default term in the
agreement imposing a landlord’s veto on assignment. This will ensure landlords do
not ignore the issue. None of our proposals suggests that any occupier should have
a right to transfer without the landlord’s consent.40
 6.96 We think that where a transfer has occurred with the consent of the landlord, there
should be a distinct statutory provision, modelled on the provisions of the Family
Law Act 1996, Schedule 7, providing that the effect of a transfer of an occupation
agreement which falls within the scope of our scheme should be that the
occupation rights are vested in the transferee, who should take the place of the
transferor in the agreement. It would not matter whether the occupation
agreement constituted a tenancy41 or a licence.42
 6.97 Transferees should therefore not be liable for any breach of the agreement by a
former occupier/transferor. Rather, landlords should be expected to protect their
interests when considering whether or not to give their consent to a transfer.43
 6.98 In situations where the occupation agreement was, in law and fact, a tenancy, the
effect of the transfer should be that the tenancy was thereby transferred to the
transferee. Thus, should the landlord assign their interest to another landlord at
any future date, the rights of the transferee as a tenant would be preserved.44
 6.99 These proposals would replace, for the purpose of occupation agreements that are
classified in law as tenancies, the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant
(Covenants) Act 1995, sections 17 to 20, which deal with the rights of former
tenants following assignment.
 6.100 We provisionally propose that the effect of a transfer to which the landlord
has given consent should be to vest the rights and liabilities under the
occupation agreement in the transferee. Thus the original occupier would
be replaced by the new occupier as the party to the agreement with the
landlord. The transfer should not of itself confer on the transferee any
rights or liabilities relating to any time before the transfer took place. The
former occupier should cease to have rights and liabilities for any events
occurring after the transfer.
40 See paras 6.19 and 6.35, 6.47 and 6.51, and 6.65 and 6.70 to 6.71 below for the position on
mutual exchange, potential successors and family court orders, respectively.
41 It should be made clear that any transfer of an occupation agreement should be governed by
these principles, not by the rules found in the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.
42 In practice, many licences – including licences of supported accommodation, or those
granted to lodgers – fall outside the scope of our scheme in any event.
43 A particular difficulty might arise where it was proposed that the transfer should be to joint
occupiers, and one of the transferees was to be a former occupier under the original
agreement. In this situation, if such a person had rent arrears, the position of the head
landlord should be protected by their refusal of consent to the transfer, rather than by taking
possession proceedings after the transfer has taken effect.




 6.101 We mentioned above that the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, section
16 allows for use of “authorised guarantee agreements” (AGAs). These enable the
landlord to insist that, as a condition of consenting to the assignment,45 the
assignor gives the landlord a guarantee for the performance of the covenants by the
immediate assignee. The ability of the landlord to so insist does not, however,
apply in the case of residential tenancies, where the question remains solely one of
reasonableness in the particular case.46
 6.102 We accept that these are of considerable importance in the assignment of
commercial leases or other leasehold interests. We are not however convinced that
they are appropriate for use in the context of the transfer of residential occupation
agreements.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUB-OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS AND
TRANSFERS
 6.103 Under the law of landlord and tenant, one of the conditions for the creation of a
lease is that there must always be a reversion. This means a period of time during
which the landlord can resume possession of the property. Where a tenant
attempts to create a sub-lease of the whole of the remaining term of a fixed term
lease, so that there is no reversionary period left, this is deemed by operation of law
to amount to an assignment of the original lease.47 We accept the logic of the
argument that sub-leases should be shorter than the leases out of which they are
granted, and that the mesne landlord should retain a reversion. We have
considered whether this principle should be applied to occupation agreements
created under our new scheme.
 6.104 We think that the reality is that the circumstances of our occupation agreements
under our proposed scheme are really rather different from those in which business
and other long leases are created.
 6.105 First, the bulk of occupation agreements are periodic agreements, not fixed-term
agreements. It is difficult to apply the requirement that there should be a reversion
where a periodic sub-occupation agreement is carved out of a periodic occupation
agreement.
 6.106 Secondly, and by contrast, in the leasehold market, periodic leases are rare. Where
a lessee with a periodic lease lawfully grants a fixed term sub-lease which expires
later than the end of the next period of the periodic head lease, it is not regarded as
odd that such grant is not deemed to be an assignment. This inconsistency would
become much clearer where occupiers under periodic agreements granted fixed
term sub-agreements. The logic of the current rule is partly based on what is the
soonest date on which each lease could be determined, but in the residential
45 See note 34 above.
46 Ibid, s 19(1E)(a).
47 See eg Parc Battersea Ltd v Hutchinson [1999] 22 EG 149, and C Harpum, Megarry and
Wade: The Law of Real Property, (6th ed 2000) at 14–110 and 14–111.
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market periodic agreements cannot normally be determined by the landlord at the
end of the next period.48
 6.107 Thirdly, the implications of a distinction between a sub-tenancy and an assignment
of a tenancy are not straightforward. In particular the liabilities of the sub-tenant
are quite different from those of the assignee. It can be expected that those creating
sub-leases or assignments of commercial or other leases will obtain legal advice.
This cannot be assumed in the case of residential occupation agreements. Even
where there is a fixed term agreement, it appears undesirable to make such an
important distinction turn on whether provision was made for the sub-occupation
agreement to end a few days before the head agreement.
 6.108 Fourthly, following Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust,49 licensees can
grant a sub-lease, at least for the purposes of the relationship between them and
their sub-tenant, even though that interest is greater than their own. Our new
scheme is also focused on the relationship between the landlord and the occupier.
It will make any sub-occupation agreement effective as between occupier and sub-
occupier, irrespective of the legal classification of the interest of the occupier in the
premises.
 6.109 Fifthly, in the residential long lease market there is usually no requirement for the
landlord’s consent for any sub-letting or assignment. In the rented sector of the
housing market, and as proposed for our scheme, the landlord’s consent is
normally required. The landlord does not have the same need to be able to resume
possession of the premises at the end of a sub-occupation as they would have at the
end of a sub-lease.
 6.110 More pragmatically, the sub-occupier under a sub-occupation agreement will, so
long as the original occupier remains undisturbed, regard the original occupier as
his or her landlord. He or she would not regard the head landlord as such unless
the immediate (mesne) landlord for some reason dropped out of the picture. By
contrast, where the head landlord has given consent to the transfer of the whole
agreement to another, the transferee would normally regard the head landlord as
his or her landlord, the transferor having effectively dropped out of the picture.
 6.111 We think that our scheme should reflect this practical expectation.
 6.112 We provisionally propose that where a sub-occupation agreement has been
lawfully created out of a head agreement which is also covered by our new
scheme, and the landlord (where consent is needed), the occupier and the
sub-occupier have all intended to create a sub-agreement rather than a
transfer, then the sub-occupation agreement should take effect as such and
should not be deemed to be a transfer even if it is for the whole of the
remaining term of the head agreement.
48 The current notice under Housing Act 1988, s 21 and the notice-only notice under our new
type II periodic agreements, are of set lengths which are longer than the usual weekly,
fortnightly or monthly period. Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 5 requires four weeks
notice to quit in unprotected tenancies.
49 [2000] 1 AC 406. See para 5.43, note 23 above.
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TRANSFERS OF THE RESIDUAL PERIODS OF LONG LEASES
 6.113 By contrast, where the head lease is a long lease or other lease which is not covered
by our new scheme any transfer of the residual period of such a lease, even if the
period is for less than 21 years, should be remain outside the scope of our
proposed scheme and be governed by the ordinary rules of landlord and tenant
law.
 6.114 In this context, we are aware that in some parts of the country, particularly in
London, there is an active, if niche, market in the sale of what have been described
as short-term leasehold reversions. These arise where a leasehold title to a
property, originally the subject of, say, a 99 year lease, now has only a small
number of years – fewer than 21 – left to run and the leaseholder or head landlord
wishes to dispose of this remaining period for a capital sum.
 6.115 Some might regard such tenancies as fixed-term occupation agreements for a
period of less than 21 years, and thus within our proposed scheme. We think that
this would not be the appropriate way to characterise such arrangements. They
have been created out of a long-term leasehold tenancy which clearly falls outside
the scope of our proposed scheme. The fact that they have been purchased by the
outlay of a single capital sum shows that they still retain the character of
“leasehold”. They already fall within their own legislative scheme which
determines, among other things, what happens at the end of the term.
 6.116 The assignment of a long lease should not come within our new scheme, even
where there is less than 21 years left to run on the long lease. The law on long
leases should continue to apply in such cases.
 6.117 Any question of whether such a fixed-term agreement constituted a sub-tenancy or
an assignment should be determined by normal rules of landlord and tenant law.
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PART VII 
THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH OF AN
OCCUPIER
INTRODUCTION
 7.1 This part deals with three distinct matters.
 (1) First the impact of the death of an occupier on the agreement which
conferred the right to occupy.
 (2) Secondly, whether a right of succession – a central feature of the current
law – should be retained in the scheme we propose.
 (3) Thirdly, the effects of succession on the past and future rights and
liabilities under the agreement.
THE EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF THE OCCUPIER ON THE AGREEMENT
The current law
 7.2 The current law draws a distinction between agreements which create licences and
those which create tenancies. Licences do not create any interest in land, but only
rights personal to the licensee. Thus a licence will normally terminate on the death
of the licensee.
 7.3 By contrast, under current landlord and tenant law, when a landlord and tenant
enter an agreement to lease land, whether for a fixed-term or on a periodic basis,
they create a property interest in the land. Unless the lease provides otherwise, the
property interest will automatically continue in being on the death of the tenant,
by being passed under a will or on intestacy to the persons entitled to succeed.
Even where there are no heirs, the property will pass to the Crown as bona
vacantia. Thus, on the death of a tenant, the obligations of the tenancy continue
unless the tenancy is formally brought to an end by the former tenant’s successors
(for example, by notice to quit or surrender) or by the landlord.
 7.4 This can be awkward for all concerned. The landlord is unable to regain
possession without terminating the lease, but is not to know whether the deceased
tenant left a will or who may have been named as executors in it. The estate may
eventually find it is liable for ongoing rent for a property which was not necessarily
being used. It is particularly a problem on intestacy, where the administrators do
not take the interest until the grant of administration by the court. There may
therefore be a delay in any action by the estate. If the landlord wishes to end the
tenancy in the meantime, they will not succeed unless they discover that they are
required to serve notice to quit on the Public Trustee.1
1 Under Administration of Estates Act 1925, s 9(1), as substituted by Law of Property
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994, s 14(1).
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Joint tenancies
 7.5 Under the present law of landlord and tenant, joint tenancies attract the principle
of the “right of survivorship”. The effect of this is that the surviving joint tenant,
who was already jointly and severally liable under and entitled to the benefit of the
tenancy, simply continues as the sole tenant. This principle does not apply to
licences.
Our approach
 7.6 In considering our approach to the reform of this aspect of the law, we consider
first the impact of the death of an occupier on a joint occupation agreement; then
we look at what should happen in relation to a periodic agreement; finally we
consider what should happen in relation to a fixed-term agreement.
Joint occupation agreements: the principle of survivorship
 7.7 In our discussion of joint occupation agreements in Part III above, we proposed
that the principle of joint and several liability should be the default position in
relation to the liability of joint occupiers to their landlord. The other principal
feature of joint tenancy, noted in passing in Part III, is the principle of
survivorship. This provides that, on the death of one joint tenant, the remaining
tenant(s) automatically take over the tenancy.
 7.8 We see no reason why this principle of survivorship should not be adapted to all
joint occupation agreements made under our scheme, so that on the death of a
joint occupier, the remaining joint occupier(s) automatically take over the
agreement.
 7.9 We provisionally propose that on the death of a joint occupier, the
remaining occupier(s) should take over the occupation agreement.
 7.10 Under the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, a joint tenant is regarded as just another
qualified person in the list of people with the statutory right to succeed to the
tenancy.2 We take the view that a joint occupier is in a different position from any
other potential successor. They were already an occupier under the agreement.
They had taken on joint responsibility under the agreement. The landlord had
agreed to take them on as an occupier.3 Joint tenancies are currently commonly
used as a way of ensuring that a person will take over the tenancy on the death of
2 Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, Sched 3, para 2(1)(b). This means that a joint tenant will not
take over the tenancy unless it was their only or principal home at the time of the death.
They may also cease to be a tenant if there is a surviving spouse or cohabitee who opposes
them and the landlord decides the tenancy should go to the spouse or cohabitee under
Sched 3, paras 6 and 9.
3 Or a court had ruled that it was not reasonable for the landlord to refuse to take on the
person as a new joint occupier – see above para 3.47 and 3.48.
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the other tenant.4 Our view is that the special position of the joint occupier should
be preserved and kept distinct from the discussion of the right of succession.5
 7.11 We provisionally propose that survivorship by joint occupiers should take
priority over the right of succession under other statutory rules. The
statutory succession rules should only take effect on the death of a sole
occupier, including the death of the last of any joint occupiers.
MORE THAN ONE SURVIVOR
 7.12 We have considered whether there should be any exceptions to this principle. For
example, if there were a large number of joint occupiers, there might be the
potential for a large number of exercises of the right of survivorship, which would
thereby deny the ability of the landlord to regain possession of his or her property.
Insofar as this might be regarded as a problem, we think the dangers of this
happening could be overstated.
 (1) In the case of a periodic type II agreement, the landlord would be able to
use the notice-only ground for seeking possession against all the joint
occupier.
 (2) In the case of a fixed-term type II agreement, the point at which the
landlord could regain possession would be postponed until the fixed-term
had expired, but that is what the landlord had agreed to in the first place.
 (3) In the case of a type I agreement, particularly where the landlord was a
social landlord seeking to meet housing needs, the postponement of the
ability of the landlord to regain possession of a dwelling might reduce its
ability to meet those needs. However, the landlord would only have
entered into a joint agreement on the basis that the principle of
survivorship would apply. Thus the argument that the landlord should
bear the consequences of that decision seems strong.
 7.13 In addition, we have in CP 162 proposed ways in which the landlord might seek
possession of premises on an “estate management” basis.6 Although discretionary,
and only granted where the court thought it reasonable, and on the provision of
suitable alternative accommodation, nevertheless ways would be open to the
landlord to regain possession against surviving joint occupiers, if they no longer
had the degree of housing need that would justify their being allocated a unit of
social housing.
 7.14 In a case where a joint occupier was brought into the agreement at a later stage,
under the proposals set out in paragraphs 3.29 to 3.58, the same principles would
apply. This might happen, for example, where the survivor of one joint occupation
agreement takes another partner. They might apply to the landlord to have the
4 See the guidance that local authorities should use joint tenancies for this purpose:
Department of the Environment, Local Authority Joint Tenancies Circular 7/96 (May 1996),
referred to above at para 3.33.
5 See paras 7.42 to 7.112 below.
6 CP 162, paras 7.77 to 7.83.
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new partner joined as a joint occupier. If the landlord consents to this application,
they should live with the consequences of that decision.
 7.15 We provisionally propose that the principle of survivorship should apply
irrespective of the number of joint occupiers living in the premises at the
date of the death of the occupier.
Termination of the agreement
Periodic agreements
 7.16 We suspect that most people would think that, on the death of the occupier (who
was not a joint occupier) under a periodic occupation agreement,7 the legal
relationship between the deceased occupier and the landlord would be at an end.
The fact that there are rights of succession to tenancies, which we discuss below,
might well cause people to think that, without them, the death of the occupier
brings the agreement to an end. We think that the law should broadly reflect this
understanding.
 7.17 The termination of the agreement would take place automatically and without the
need for a court order. If the property is empty the landlord would be able to take
possession immediately. If there are non-successors occupying the property they
would become trespassers. The landlord would have the choice either of obtaining
an order for possession against them as such,8 while demanding damages for
trespass (mesne profits), or of giving some or all of them a type II periodic
agreement while deciding how to proceed.9
 7.18 We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in type I
and periodic type II agreements that, if the agreement does not pass to a
joint occupier or to another person under the statutory rules on
succession, the agreement should terminate automatically and without the
need for a court order.
 7.19 This proposition does, however, raise the question of what should be the date on
which the agreement should cease.10 A compulsory term in the agreement covering
the principle that the agreement ends on death could be framed in such a way as to
leave the exact timing of the termination of the agreement to be determined in a
related default term. Thereby, rather than a rigid rule, the parties could substitute
their own agreed provisions on the timing, subject to the test of fairness under the
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. The default term could
provide that the agreement terminates as from the date of death of the occupier.
But this could be varied by the parties.
7 We discuss what should happen on the death of an occupier under a fixed-term agreement,
see paras 7.31 to 7.41 below.
8 Though not by the summary procedures currently available only where the trespasser
entered as a trespasser.
9 Compare the discussion, at paras 2.45 to 2.67 above, of the landlord’s position where
unlawful sub-occupiers hold over after termination of the head agreement.
10 We deal with the separate question of what the effect of the succession should be on the
rights and liabilities under the agreement from para 7.113 to 7.131 below.
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 7.20 Alternatively the default term could provide that the agreement terminated at a
later date. One possibility would be four weeks after the date of the death, or after
the landlord first becomes aware of the death, or after the date of the first missed
rent payment following the death. The four week period would reflect the four
week period which the occupier is required to give when giving notice to quit the
agreement.11
 7.21 We are anxious that, in relation to residential occupation agreements, our new
scheme should not reproduce the technical requirements of the current law,
whereby if the landlord does not terminate a tenancy, the personal representatives
or administrators of the deceased’s estate have to serve formal notice to quit on the
landlord to bring the agreement to an end, even if the landlord is fully aware of the
death.
 7.22 Equally we can see that in some circumstances, particularly where rent is paid at
long intervals or by housing benefit, the landlord may not realise the occupier has
died for some time if nobody lets them know of the death. The issue becomes one
of who should bear the responsibility for ensuring landlords are made aware of the
death of an occupier: the families of the deceased occupier, or the landlord
themselves.
 7.23 Implicit in our consumer approach to residential occupation agreements is the
proposition that the landlord (or their agent) should take active responsibility for
the management of the accommodation. This might lead to the view that it was up
to the landlord or their agent to check that the occupier is still alive. This is
particularly so where the rent ceases to be paid, as the landlord should be checking
why payments are missed.
 7.24 On the other hand it could be argued that it is unrealistic to suggest that landlords
keep their occupiers under continuous surveillance, and that rather it should be the
responsibility of the deceased occupier’s family or other heirs to notify the landlord
that a former occupier has died.
 7.25 We are inclined to the view that the default term should provide that termination
of the agreement should take place on the date of the death of the occupier. If
there are other people living at the premises who are not occupiers under the
agreement, then the landlord will be entitled to damages, equivalent to the rent,
from them for trespass. The problem of lost income would only arise where
nobody else was left in the premises at the time of the death.
 7.26 If the date of termination is the subject of a default term, the landlord will be able
to vary that term so as to place more responsibility on the tenant’s family/estate,
though this would be subject to the test of fairness in the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations. This would allow the landlord to take into
account particular reasons why the landlord might not easily discover that the
death has occurred, for example where rent is only paid at long intervals.
 7.27 If the agreement does not terminate immediately on death, there will be a need for
the liabilities and rights that have arisen under the agreement to pass to the
11 CP 162, para 10.49.
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deceased occupier’s estate. We discuss this further at paragraphs 7.127 to 7.131
below. Here we note that the possible complications this can cause are another
argument in favour of termination of the agreement immediately on death.
 7.28 We provisionally propose that there should be a default term which
specifies the moment, after death of the occupier, at which the agreement
terminates.
 7.29 We invite views as to whether that default term should provide that the
agreement terminates immediately on death, or at the point at which the
landlord does or should reasonably have become aware of the death.
 7.30 We invite views as to whether such provisions would cause problems where
housing benefit is paid direct to the landlord, and whether any such
problems should be dealt with by changes to the housing benefit system
rather than to the law on relations between landlords and occupiers.
Fixed-term agreements
 7.31 While the above principles may suit periodic agreements, we are concerned that
they may be inappropriate for fixed term agreements. We have been anxious to
promote the idea that in relation to the type II agreement, landlords could provide
more than the bare minimum of rights to the occupier by the use of fixed-terms.
Although, in practice it is likely that these agreements will, in the main, be
relatively short-term, our scheme does admit the possibility of agreements for a
fixed-term of up to 21 years being possible.
 7.32 In many cases of short fixed terms at full rent, the provision for automatic
termination on death may be appropriate, and a default version of the compulsory
term in other agreements would be useful as the starting point.12
 7.33 Automatic termination on death is likely to be particularly inappropriate where a
large premium has been paid for a relatively long fixed term, and the agreement
allows the occupier to transfer it to new occupiers, so that the agreement is a
saleable asset more like a long residential lease. In these cases, we think that
landlords and occupiers should be able to agree that the agreement should be
capable of being passed on to their heirs.
 7.34 Under the present law this would be achieved under general succession law either
by being passed on by will as part of the deceased occupier’s estate or failing that
through operation of the intestacy rules. It should be noted that the intestacy rules
only operate in favour of those who can trace a relationship to the deceased by
marriage, blood or adoption; they are drawn considerably more narrowly than
those who are entitled to exercise the statutory right of succession.
 7.35 The statutory rules on succession, discussed below, while creating an entitlement
for those within the rules, are also a limitation on the freedom of the occupier to
pass on their statutorily protected interest to whomsoever they choose. The
12 The termination under the default term would therefore similarly be automatic, without the
need for a court order, and would render any non-successors liable to eviction as trespassers.
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succession rules are justified because the occupier is seeking to let others take
advantage of a statutory status which gives protection against the landlord. In the
context of fixed term agreements, however, an occupier might well wish to pass the
residue of their fixed term on to someone who did not fall within the scope of the
statutory succession scheme.
 7.36 We are of the view that, while the statutory succession rules should be applicable
to fixed term agreements, it should be possible for the occupier and the landlord to
agree that the occupier should have the freedom to pass the remainder of the term
on to anyone of their choice on death. Thus we do not see why the occupier’s will
should not be allowed to override the statutory succession rules.13 If the occupier
dies having made no will, the rights would pass to a statutory successor.
 7.37 An alternative but less flexible rule would be that the landlord and occupier should
be able to provide that the agreement passes under the will or intestacy only if
there are no statutory successors.
 7.38 In such cases we believe it is reasonable to expect the occupiers and landlords to
obtain appropriate professional advice, so that they are clear as to what they are
agreeing about the priority between the will and the statutory succession rules.
 7.39 We provisionally propose that fixed term type II agreements should
contain a default term providing that the agreement terminates on the
death of the occupier. The statute should provide that the parties can
exclude the statutory rules on succession, but only where they have
replaced this default term with a term allowing for the remaining period
of the agreement to pass to another under the occupier’s will.
Fixed term licences
 7.40 While these principles can clearly apply to fixed term occupation agreements that
can properly be classified as tenancies, there is the possibility, albeit one which we
think is largely theoretical, of creating a substantial fixed-term licence. This raises
the question whether such fixed-term licences could be passed on by will or on
intestacy. On normal principles of land law, this would not be possible as licences
are not property interests capable of being so transmitted. On that basis, only the
statutory rights of succession, set out below, could apply to fixed-term licences.
 7.41 We provisionally propose that fixed term occupation agreements that are
licences not tenancies should only be capable of being transferred, on the
death of the occupier, under the statutory right of succession.
A STATUTORY RIGHT OF SUCCESSION
 7.42 Most people invest a great deal of their personal life histories in their homes,
particularly where they have lived in one place for a long time. The home is not
just a place where one exists; it is the centre of a life. It is where families are raised,
and from where social circles are developed. The home is, for many people, the
13 The free choice of beneficiaries in the will would be subject to possible challenge under the
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.
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core of their existence. Policy makers and legislators have sought to reflect this
social reality by building a “right of succession” into the schemes of statutory
protection for tenants.
 7.43 In developing our proposals for reform we have asked ourselves whether a right of
succession should be retained. We have concluded that because a right of
succession has been part of the law regulating the rented sector for such a long
time, it should be retained in the scheme. This would be achieved by a statutory
provision which – as under the present law – prescribes the situations in which a
right to succeed to a residential occupation agreement would exist.
 7.44 As will be seen, the present law is framed in the context of each of the groups of
tenancies to which existing protective legislation applies. In the case of secure
tenancies and Scottish secure tenancies these rules apply to licences as well. It is a
key feature of our proposals that they should apply to all agreements granting the
right to occupy. We do not think that the lease-licence distinction needs to be
introduced in the context of the right to succeed. To do this would be to introduce
just the kind of complexity we are seeking to avoid.
 7.45 We provisionally propose that a statutory right of succession should be
part of the proposed new scheme for the regulation of all the occupation
agreements falling within the scope of our proposed scheme.
 7.46 We have discussed above14 our proposals in relation to fixed-term agreements,
which we have proposed should be capable of being left by will. We have also
considered the application of the principle of survivorship.15 Save for these two
cases, and in the light of our discussion about the impact of the death of the
occupier on the agreement, we have come to the view that the only means for
transferring rights under an occupation agreement on the death of the occupier
should be through the right of succession.
 7.47 We further provisionally propose that, save for special arrangements made
in relation to fixed-term agreements, and cases where the principle of
survivorship applies, the only means whereby the benefit of an occupation
agreement can be passed on following the death of the occupier should be
though the right of succession.
The present position
 7.48 The current law on the right to succeed is analysed in detail in the Appendix to
this Paper. It will be clear from this analysis that, while the principle of the right to
succeed is well established, the way in which it operates in different contexts varies
widely. In our view this is another area of the law which would benefit from
substantial simplification.
14 See paras 7.31 to 7.39 above.
15 See paras 7.7 to 7.15 above.
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 7.49 At the heart of the various statutory regimes governing succession is the concept of
the qualifying successor (in Scotland, the qualifying person). But all four Acts
provide very different ways to achieve their objective:
 (1) there can be two successions under Rent Act 1977, and the Scottish Act,
but only one under Housing Act 1985 and Housing Act 1988;
 (2) non-spouse members of the tenant’s family can succeed under Rent Act
1977, Housing Act 1985 and the Scottish Act, but not under Housing Act
1988;
 (3) the phrase “member of the tenant’s family” is defined by reference to a list
in Housing Act 1985, but left to the courts under Rent Act 1977 and the
Scottish Act;
 (4) the courts have held that same sex partners can succeed as a member of
the family under Rent Act 1977 and the statute includes them in the
Scottish Act, but they are excluded under the Housing Act 1985 and the
Housing Act 1988;
 (5) under the Rent Act 1977 members of the tenant’s family qualify to
succeed if they have resided with the tenant for a period of two years.
Under Housing Act 1985 the qualifying period is one year;
 (6) there are different means of resolving differences where there is more than
one qualifying successor, and they cannot agree amongst themselves who
should succeed; and
 (7) there are different rules in each Act on when a transfer counts as a use of
succession rights.
Our provisional proposals
 7.50 Our proposals are based on an amalgam of the present rules. The key issues are as
follows.
 (1) Who should have the right to succeed?
 (2) How many successions should be permitted?
 (3) What counts as a use of succession rights?
 (4) When can the status of successor be lost?
 (5) To what should successors succeed?
 (6) Should there be separate treatment for fixed-term tenancies?
 (7) Should joint succession be possible?
 (8) How should disagreements about who should succeed be resolved?
 7.51 In thinking about how to answer these questions, we acknowledge that the right to
succeed highlights a significant tension underlying the law relating to renting
homes. Those who can afford to buy a property interest in their home – whether
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freehold or leasehold – have something of considerable value that they can leave to
their heirs and successors. Indeed, many tenants have been given the opportunity
to acquire just such an interest, either through the right to buy, (local authority
tenants) or the right to acquire, (housing association tenants) or by exercising the
right of first refusal (Rent Act protected tenants).
 7.52 If, however, the right to succeed to rights to occupy were to be extended
indefinitely, this would change the fundamental nature of the rental market, in
ways which would arguably have a harmful effect on the operation of the rental
housing market. It may be important for this sector of the housing market that
landlords are able to regain possession of their dwellings from time to time. In the
particular case of social landlords, too extensive rights to succeed might limit their
ability to provide accommodation to those most in housing need.
 7.53 While the present legal position is undoubtedly confusing and complex, it does
attempt to achieve a balance between allowing individuals to retain a sense of
security that comes from the right to occupy their homes and allowing landlords
flexibility to use their housing stock as efficiently as possible. We conclude that any
proposals we make should reflect this compromise.
 7.54 With these observations in mind we turn to our proposals for answering the
questions set out above.
Who should have the right to succeed?
 7.55 Under the present law, all existing regimes extend the right to succeed to the
surviving spouse (including for these purposes cohabitants, and in Scotland same-
sex couples) who was living in the premises as his or her only or principal home at
the time of death. Most of the existing schemes extend the right to other members
of the family, though this is defined in different ways. The Scottish Act extends the
right to carers.
Spouses
 7.56 In view both of the existing state of the law, and the social reality which underlies
the law, we think that a spouse must have the right to succeed. We think that this
should embrace those who live together as husband and wife.
 7.57 In the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing
Association Ltd 16 and the terms of the Scottish Act, we think the principle should
also extend to same-sex couples who co-habit.
16 [2001] 1 AC 27.
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 7.58 Further, we think that the same principles should apply to couples in which one or
both partners has undergone gender re-assignment.17
 7.59 We provisionally propose that a surviving spouse should have the right to
succeed. “Spouse” should be defined to include the survivor of couples
who have lived together as husband and wife, or of same sex couples who
have co-habited. We provisionally propose that these principles should
apply whether or not either partner has undergone gender re-assignment.
Any spouse should have been living in the premises as his or her only or
principal home at the time of the death.
Members of the family
 7.60 There is a sharp distinction in the ways in which potential entitlements by
members of the family are defined. The most detailed is the list approach adopted
in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001. The most open-ended is that contained in the
Rent Act 1977.
 7.61 In view of our intention that the rights and obligations of occupiers should be
capable of being set out in the occupation agreement, we are attracted by the
approach adopted in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001. The details of the list
might need amendment to suit the situation in England and Wales.
 7.62 We further provisionally propose that a list of those potentially entitled to
succeed should be set out in the legislation, which would then be capable of
being set out in the agreement.
 7.63 We invite views on the categories that should be included in the list.
A period of residence?
 7.64 All the Acts have some residence qualification. The person with the right to
succeed must, at the very least, be occupying the premises at the time of the death
as his or her only or principal residence; in some cases there must be occupation12
months prior to the death; in others 24 months.
 7.65 We provisionally propose that a member of the family who wishes to
exercise a right to succeed should have resided in the premises as his or
her only or principal home before the occupier died.
17 There is a precedent in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, Sched 3, para 2(1)(a)(ii) which
refers to a person “living with the tenant as husband and wife or in a relationship which has
the characteristics of the relationship between husband and wife except that the persons are
of the same sex”. The Lord Chancellor’s Department announced on 21st June 2002 that it
would reconvene the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, which
previously reported to Parliament in July 2000. Since then the European Court of Human
Rights has ruled in favour of recognition of the relationships of transsexuals in Goodwin v
UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18 ECHR. Previously the European Court of Justice, in P v S and
Cornwall County Council [1996] IRLR 347, had recognised transgender discrimination as sex
discrimination in employment in European Community law, which led to the adoption of
the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999 SI 1999 No 1102. It
therefore seems appropriate now to assume that references to co-habiting relationships
should include transgendered people, subject to whether any different approach is
recommended by the Interdepartmental Working Group.
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 7.66 We invite views on what the period of occupation should be.
Carers
 7.67 Only the Scottish Act makes specific provision for carers to be considered as a
category of qualifying person (successor). The reason for this development is that
there will be cases where a carer has lived with the occupier so long they have
effectively become a member of the family. While such a provision is not currently
part of the law in England and Wales, it may be an issue on which consultees have
views.
 7.68 We invite views on the question whether the right to succeed should be
specifically extended to carers, on a basis similar to that set out in the
Housing (Scotland) Act 2001.
Rent Act tenants
 7.69 In order for existing tenancies to be mapped onto our proposed new scheme, as we
have proposed in CP 162, it will be essential that the existing rights of Rent Act
protected tenants are preserved.18
 7.70 We provisionally propose that the rights of succession currently available
to Rent Act protected tenants are preserved for that group.
How many successions should be permitted?
 7.71 As we have already seen, Rent Act tenants and Scottish secure tenants have two
rights of succession; secure tenants and assured tenants have one. We have just
proposed that the position of Rent Act tenants must be protected; we have already
set out our proposals relating to the rights of joint occupiers to succeed by
operation of the principle of survivorship.19
 7.72 Leaving those two cases on one side, there remains a stark contrast between the
approach in the Housing Acts 1985 and 1988 – both of which provide for a single
right to succeed – and the Scottish Act which provides for two.
 7.73 It could be argued that the law in Scotland should not be of direct concern to the
Law Commission reviewing the law of England and Wales. But we think it
18 We believe that this will largely be achieved if consultees agree with our provisional proposals
as to the right of succession generally. There would be only two points on which we would
see any need for special provision. The first would be that we are provisionally proposing that
a detailed list of family members should be adopted, rather than the open-ended use of
“family” in the Rent Act 1977 (see para 7.62 above). Secondly, in CP 162 at para 14.43 we
provisionally proposed that the new scheme should make provision for existing Rent Act
1977 tenants to be converted to type I agreements, but with additional rights reflecting the
right to a fair rent; and in this paper at para 8.114 where we recommend preservation of the
right of first refusal under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. Under the current law only a
spouse or cohabitant will retain Rent Act 1977 status on succession; all other successors will
obtain an assured tenancy: Housing Act 1988, s 39 and Sched 4 (amending Rent Act 1977
for deaths occurring after 15th January 1989).Therefore special provision will need to be
made to the effect that only spouses and cohabitants will retain the right to a fair rent on
succession.
19 See paras 7.7 to 7.15 above.
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unrealistic to ignore such recent developments in Scotland. Consultees will
inevitably draw them to our attention, if we do not take them into account.
 7.74 Having considered the matter carefully, and bearing in mind the need to achieve
the balanced approach suggested above, we have concluded that it may be most
sensible to adopt an alternative approach on this matter. In some cases there would
be two rights of succession, in others only one.20
Two rights of succession – spouses
 7.75 Spouses will not, of course, need to use any statutory right of succession, if they
are a joint occupier under the occupation agreement. They will then succeed
automatically by operation of the principle of survivorship.
 7.76 Where spouses are not joint occupiers, we still think that the position of spouses21
is of sufficient importance to justify their having an automatic right of succession.
In many cases, on the death of the second spouse, the agreement will come to an
end in any event. However we consider that other members of the family should
also have at least one opportunity to succeed to the right to occupy, even if a
spouse had already succeeded.
 7.77 Members of the family would include not only members of the family of the
original deceased occupier, but also members of the family of the deceased spouse.
Where a surviving (successor) spouse had him or herself acquired a new spouse,
the new spouse should be regarded as a member of the family and therefore also
entitled to succeed. However, following the second succession, there would be no
further right of succession irrespective of whether the second successor was a new
spouse or another member of the family.
 7.78 We provisionally propose that a surviving spouse should have the
automatic right to succeed to a deceased occupier who was not him or
herself a successor.
 7.79 We further provisionally propose that, after succession by a spouse, there
should be a further right to succeed by another member of the family of
either the original deceased occupier or the successor occupier. The
spouse of the successor occupier would be included in this category.
 Single right to succession
 7.80 In other cases, where there is no surviving spouse, there should only be a single
right of succession available to a qualifying member of the family of the deceased
or such others (for instance, carers) as may be prescribed.
20 This proposal is similar to the effect of the Rent Act 1977, as amended by the Housing Act
1988, in cases where the first death occurred before January 15 1989 and the second death
occurred on or after that date.
21 Defined in the way provisionally proposed in para 7.59 above.
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 7.81 Where a non-successor occupier dies without a spouse, we provisionally propose
that there should be a single right to succeed by a qualifying other member of the
family of the deceased occupier.
What counts as a use of succession rights?
 7.82 If there are to be limits on the number of successions then there must be rules to
determine whether the succession rights have been used up. The current Acts all
regard operation of the principle of survivorship and succession under the
statutory scheme as counting as using up a right of succession.
 7.83 The implication of our proposals on the application of the principle of survivorship
is that acquiring the right to occupy through the operation of survivorship should
not count as a use of the statutory right of succession.22 Similarly, where a fixed-
term agreement was passed by will, this too would not count as the use of a
statutory right of succession.
 7.84 We think it would be simpler if only successions arising from the statutory rules
counted as the use of the statutory right of succession. However, we also wish to
ensure that the landlord who wanted to grant more generous contractual
succession rights could do so without accidentally triggering fresh statutory rights.
 7.85 We provisionally propose that where a person succeeds to an occupation
agreement through the operation of the principle of survivorship, this
should not count as the use of the statutory right of succession.
 7.86 We similarly propose that where a person succeeds by will or on intestacy
to a fixed-term occupation agreement, this should not count as the use of
the statutory right of succession.
 7.87 We further propose that the exercise of any analogous contractual rights of
succession should be regarded as the use of the statutory right of
succession.
When can the status of successor be lost?
 7.88 Once a person has succeeded, the next question is whether this status can be lost,
so that the whole chain of succession starts again.
 7.89 Our view is that once a person became an occupier by succession, that status lasts
so long as the person continued to occupy the same premises, whether from the
same or a different landlord. The same would apply if the occupier moved to new
premises as the result of exercising the right of mutual exchange.
 7.90 If the agreement with the new occupier was terminated either by the landlord
obtaining an order for possession which is executed, or by the occupier terminating
the agreement, and subsequently that person enters a wholly new occupation
agreement, either with the same or a different landlord, they should no longer be
22 In many cases this will not make a difference. Where a spouse who has succeeded under the
principle of survivorship has not remarried, there will only be a single statutory right of
succession to any relevant member of the family.
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regarded as a successor, but as an occupier from whom a right to succeed can be
acquired.
 7.91 If, on the death of a successor, there is no further right of succession, but the
landlord inadvertently grants an occupation agreement to a new occupier on the
mistaken view that that person was entitled as a successor, this mistake should not
invalidate the agreement. It should be regarded as a new agreement, and the
occupier should not be treated as a successor.
 7.92 If there was any evidence that such an arrangement had been entered into as the
result of fraud or misrepresentation by the new occupier, the landlord would be
able to seek possession against the new occupier on the basis of that fraud or
misrepresentation.23 (This would only be necessary where the new occupier had
been granted a type I agreement or a fixed term type II agreement.)
 7.93 We provisionally propose that, so long as the successor remains in the
same premises under the same or a different landlord, or acquires an
occupation agreement by exercise of the right of mutual exchange, that
person should retain the status of successor.
 7.94 We further provisionally propose that if that occupation agreement were
terminated, and a wholly new agreement relating to different premises was
made, whether by the same or a different landlord, the occupier should
enter this agreement not as a successor.
 7.95 We propose that where a landlord grants an agreement to another under
the mistaken belief that the occupier was entitled to succeed, this should
not invalidate the agreement, but rather the agreement should be deemed
to be fully valid.
 7.96 Where there is evidence that the occupier had sought to mislead the
landlord as to his or her status as successor, this should be the basis for
possession proceedings in the normal way.
To what should successors succeed?
 7.97 We think that the general principle should be that a successor should succeed to
the agreement held by the deceased occupier.24
 7.98 The terms and conditions of the agreement should be the same as those of the
original agreement. Variations may of course be made at the time of the
succession, or at any other time, if they are agreed between the parties or are
permitted by a term in the agreement. In any event the agreement will need to be
varied to take account of the identity of the new occupier.
23 See CP 162, para 7.75.
24 This principle cannot apply quite so simply to Rent Act tenants – spouse successors would
get a type I agreement, plus the entitlement to have their rents “fair-rented”; non spouse
successors would get a type I agreement without the fair rent protection, which is the
current position.
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 7.99 We provisionally propose that a person who succeeds under the statutory
right of succession should succeed to the same agreement. (The only
exception would be that a non-spouse successor of a former Rent Act
tenant would not succeed to the right to a fair rent.) Save as to the identity
of the occupier, the terms of the agreement will not change unless a
variation is agreed or permitted by the agreement.
 7.100 It will be necessary to make clear that any rent arrears of the deceased occupier are
not passed onto the successor (though they may be recovered from the estate of
the deceased). Further, the existence of any such arrears would not represent a
breach of the terms of the occupation agreement by the successor. Thus possession
proceedings for rent arrears which were the sole responsibility of the deceased
occupier could not be instituted against a successor to the rights to occupy.25
Should there be separate treatment of fixed-term agreements?
 7.101 We have already proposed above that fixed-term agreements should be treated
separately. 26
Should joint succession be possible?
 7.102 Currently the rules on succession provide that only one person can succeed to a
secure, introductory, protected or assured tenancy.27 In some cases the occupiers
and the landlord would all prefer the tenancy to pass to two or more potential
successors jointly, but they have to go through the procedure of choosing one
person to succeed who then has to surrender so that there can be a regrant to the
joint tenants. Allowing joint succession to occupation agreements would allow
more sensible decisions to be made more easily. This would also be consistent with
our approach to adding joint occupiers to the occupation agreement.28 We see the
force of these arguments.
 7.103 We provisionally propose that it should be possible for joint occupiers who
have the right to succeed, to have the rights of occupation under the
agreement transferred to them jointly.
 7.104 Where this happened, both joint occupiers would be regarded as occupiers by
succession. Where one died, the remaining occupier would be entitled to remain
by operation of the principle of survivorship. On the death of the second joint
occupier, there would only be a further right of succession if the second joint
occupier was a spouse of the first joint occupier, and there was a member of the
family who was entitled to succeed under the rules proposed above.
25 Of course, where the successor was a joint occupier, who was jointly liable for the rent under
the original agreement, he or she could be the subject of proceedings for possession if any
such arrears were not paid off.
26 See paras 7.31 to 7.41 above.
27 Housing Act 1985, s 89(2); Housing Act 1996, s 133(2); Rent Act 1977, Sched 1, para 3 (as
amended by Housing Act 1988, s 39 and Sched 4) and Housing Act 1988, s 17(5).
28 Discussed at paras 3.29 to 3.58 above.
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How should disagreements about who should succeed be resolved?
 7.105 In any case where more than one person might be entitled to succeed, and where
those potentially entitled cannot resolve the matter between themselves, the
current law offers differing solutions. The Rent Act provides the issue should go to
the county court. The Housing Act 1985 and the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001
provides for the matter to be resolved by the landlord.
 7.106 In most situations we do not think that having to resort to the court would be
proportionate to the matter to be resolved. Rather we think that it is more sensible
for the landlord to resolve the matter as it will be the landlord who will have the
greatest interest in the identity of his or her occupiers.
 7.107 We provisionally propose that where there was more than one potential
successor, they should seek to resolve any dispute between themselves.
However, where there has been a failure to resolve the matter, it should be
resolved by the landlord.
 7.108 However it has been suggested to us that there may be circumstances where access
to a court might be required.
 7.109 We invite views as to whether there are special cases where the matter
should be resolved by a court.
An alternative approach?
 7.110 As we acknowledged at the start of this section of the Paper, our proposals are
based on the current approach. They thus provide an absolute right of succession,
but one which is strictly limited in its application, both in terms of the number of
successions and the class of people entitled to succeed. We did consider more
radical approaches in an attempt to simplify the law still further. The essence of
these was to relax the limits on numbers of successions and/or the class of potential
successors, but then to compensate for that with a more restricted right to
succession. There are a number of ways in which such a system might work. As an
illustration, it would be possible to consider an approach with the following
elements:
 (1) There would be no statutory right to succeed attaching to any particular
class of person.
 (2) Instead, the succession system would automatically apply to any person
who happened to be living in the premises at the time of the occupiers
death.
 (3) There would be no limit to the number of potential successions, thus
avoiding all questions as to whether a succession right had been used up.
 (4) The landlord would be required to take on as occupiers under the
agreement any person who fell within the definition of “spouse”.
 (5) In any other case, the landlord would be entitled to take proceedings for
possession against any other person where this could be justified on the
grounds of good estate management. For example, the social landlord
could seek possession against the millionaire son of the deceased, on the
ground that he was not in the degree of housing need that would justify his
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retention of the home. Possession would only be granted where the court
thought this was reasonable.
 7.111 While attracted by aspects of this sort of approach, we provisionally reject it.
Although attractive in its simplicity, it is open to objections. We recognise that the
value attached by occupiers to the right of succession is associated with its absolute
nature. If succession was merely a presumption which could be defeated by a social
landlord’s allocation priorities, much of its value to occupiers would be lost.
Further, it relies on landlords having a widely drawn right to obtain possession on
“estate management” grounds. In CP 162, we left this question open, and have yet
to come to concluded view on the matter.29 Finally, the use of an “estate
management” ground for possession against a non-spouse occupier could itself
generate considerable argument.
 7.112 We nevertheless invite views on whether an alternative approach based on
a more limited right of succession, but one which was not limited in the
number of successions, and/or was open to a wider group of potential
successors, is to be preferred.
EFFECTS OF SUCCESSION ON PAST AND FUTURE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
UNDER THE AGREEMENT
 7.113 Where an occupation agreement passes to a new occupier30 the landlord should be
under the same duties relating to the provision of revised versions of the written
agreement as they would be where a transfer was made while the occupier is alive.31
 7.114 The only question will be what the starting date should be from which the
landlord’s duty arises, and in relation to which sanctions may be imposed. The
issues are similar to those raised in considering the point at which agreements
should terminate after the death of an occupier.32 In this case it seems right that
the duty should only start from the point at which the landlord is satisfied, or
should reasonably be satisfied, that the succession has taken place.
 7.115 We provisionally propose that, where the agreement does not terminate
following the death of the occupier, the landlord should be required to
serve an amended copy of the agreement on the new occupier. The same
rent and criminal penalties and time limits for non-compliance should
apply as do on the creation of a new agreement. The time limit for this
should run from the date on which the landlord is satisfied, or should
reasonably be satisfied, that the former occupier has died and a successor
has been entitled to take over the agreement without the agreement
terminating.
29 CP 162, para 7.82.
30 Other than personal representatives in the limited cases where the parties agree to allow
devolution of fixed terms by will– see para 7.39 above.
31 See paras 6.78 to 6.81 above.
32 See para 7.18 above.
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 7.116 Where the parties have chosen to allow a fixed term agreement to be passed by will
or intestacy, the law relevant to wills and intestacy will govern past and future
rights and liabilities under the agreement. We do not consider those rules further
here, as they are of long standing and are outside the scope of housing law.
 7.117 In all other cases the agreement will pass to survivors in a joint agreement, or
statutory successors in a sole agreement, or will terminate on (or shortly after) the
death of the occupier.
 7.118 In these cases the occupier’s estate will have no ongoing liabilities or rights in
respect of anything that happens after the occupier dies, or the agreement
terminates without being passed on.
 7.119 This leaves the question of what should happen to any liabilities and rights in
respect of events happening before the occupier dies, or the agreement
terminates.33 The commonest examples would be if the occupier was in rent
arrears at the time of their death, or if the occupier had suffered disrepair for which
they could claim compensation from the landlord. We outline below how the
liabilities and rights would fall between the deceased occupier’s estate and any new
occupiers under the agreement.
Survivorship in joint agreements
 7.120 In relation to survivors under a joint occupation agreement, the principles of joint
and several liability and survivorship can answer the question. Thus, where one
joint occupier dies, the remaining occupier or occupiers continue as before. They
had joint and several liability with the deceased while he or she was alive. They will
therefore continue to be liable for any arrears or other liabilities accrued by the
occupier while alive.
 7.121 The deceased occupier’s estate will also be liable jointly to the landlord. The estate
can also make, or be subject to, claims for contributions in relation to the
survivors, on the normal principles for those sharing joint and several liability. The
estate will continue to be entitled to the benefit of the agreement in relation to the
time before the death, and so could for instance sue for compensation for disrepair
suffered by the deceased (but would not be able to obtain an order for repairs to
be done after death).
Statutory succession
 7.122 In cases where there is a statutory succession,34 the effect of the succession should
be equivalent to that of a transfer by a person who is still alive, as discussed in
paragraphs 6.62 to 6.102 above. The difference is that the estate of the deceased
takes the place of the former occupier.
 7.123 Under the current law, tenants who succeed to a tenancy are often unsure whether
that means they also inherit the former tenant’s arrears. Under our scheme we
33 Other than where a fixed term passes on will or intestacy.
34 Including those where the contract gives more generous rights of succession (but does not
allow for passing by will or intestacy) than the minimum laid down in the statute.
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wish it to be clear that the statutory successor does not inherit the arrears as such.
They therefore cannot be evicted for the deceased’s arrears. There is no
requirement for consent to a succession, so there is no opportunity, as there may
be in a transfer, for the landlord to require a fresh term in the agreement obliging
the new occupier to pay the old occupier’s arrears.
 7.124 In many cases the statutory successor will also be the sole beneficiary under the
deceased’s will or intestacy, and sometimes will also be the personal representative
too. If so, then the estate will, as usual, be liable to pay off the arrears, and this may
be before paying out to the successor as beneficiary. However, if there are not
adequate funds in the estate to pay the arrears, then the case will fall to be dealt
with under the general law on insolvent estates. The beneficiary cannot be saddled
with a net liability as such.
 7.125 The successor will not however owe the arrears to the landlord in their capacity as
successor.
 7.126 We provisionally propose that, in cases of succession under our scheme,
the deceased occupier’s estate should retain all the deceased occupier’s
rights and liabilities relating to the period before the succession, and the
statutory successor, as such, should neither benefit from nor be burdened
by them. The statutory successor, and not the estate, should take all the
rights and liabilities under the agreement in relation to the period after
the succession.
Termination of the agreement on death
 7.127 Where the agreement terminates on death the effect would be similar to any other
termination, but again the estate will take the place of the former occupier. If there
were legal obligations that the deceased occupier had not met prior to the death,
these obligations should pass to the occupier’s estate. For example, if the occupier
had failed to pay the rent for any period prior to the death, such rent should be
paid. If the occupier had done damage to the premises in contravention of the
occupation agreement, compensation for these actions should be rendered. But
there should be no continuation of those obligations in relation to periods after the
occupier’s death.
 7.128 Similarly, the occupier’s estate should have the benefit of any claim arising against
the landlord for breach of the landlord’s obligations during the period of the
occupier’s occupation. Thus, for example, damages for breach of repairing
obligations could be paid to the estate. Any refund of rent paid in advance would
also be made to the estate. But the estate should not continue to have any rights in
respect of the agreement in relation to periods after the occupier’s death.
 7.129 This position will apply if the agreement terminates immediately on death.
However, we asked above at paragraph 7.29 whether consultees believe the
termination should be delayed to some later point, to give the landlord an
opportunity of finding out about the death. In that case the estate would have to
take on any additional rights and liabilities that might arise under the agreement
from the time of the death until the agreement terminated.
 7.130 In either event, there will come a point at which the agreement will automatically
terminate. This will achieve the result which we suggested above, at paragraph
7.29, that there should be termination in such circumstances, without the need for
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personal representatives to serve an occupier’s notice or for landlords to serve
notice on the Public Trustee.
 7.131 We provisionally propose that on the date of the death of the occupier, or
the date on which the agreement is terminated, if later, the rights and
liabilities of the deceased occupier for events occurring before that date
should be taken over by the deceased’s estate. The estate should not be
liable for any rights and liabilities arising after that date.
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PART VIII 
OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS AND THIRD
PARTIES: TRANSFERS OF LANDLORD’S
RIGHTS AND OTHER MATTERS
INTRODUCTION
 8.1 One of the principal features of the scheme we have proposed is that all occupation
agreements within its scope should be treated in the same way, irrespective of
whether – under ordinary principles of law – they would be classified as leases or
licences.1
 8.2 Insofar as rights currently exist which apply solely to tenants and not to licensees,
we proposed that such rights be expanded to apply to all occupation agreements
within our scheme. Thus we suggested
 (1) that licensees covered by our new scheme should be capable of being
subject to the same terms as tenants in relation to eviction and minimum
rights, such as fitness for human habitation;2
 (2) that licensees, even if they do not have exclusive possession, should benefit
from an appropriately modified version of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
under which their landlords would not be allowed to harass them, and
should be burdened by an appropriately modified version of the duty to
behave in a tenant-like manner;3 and
 (3) that, as we have discussed in the preceding parts of this paper, our new
scheme should similarly regulate dealings with joint occupiers, sub-
occupiers and other members of an occupier’s household or family,
irrespective of whether the agreement constituted a lease or a licence.
 8.3 In this Part we consider how the proposals for our new scheme should apply in
relation to others, not parties to the occupation agreement. The discussion falls
into four principal sections.
 (1) First we ask whether principles of land law, in particular the law of
landlord and tenant, should be used to determine issues affecting third
parties.
 (2) Secondly, we consider certain consequences of the outcome of that
discussion on cases where landlords assign their interests in properties
which are subject to occupation agreements to others.
1 Agreements which would fall outside the scope of our scheme are discussed in CP 162, Part
IX.
2 See CP 162, paras 9.21 to 9.42 and 6.108 to 6.109.
3 See CP 162, para 6.108.
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 (3) Thirdly we discuss the scope of the legal responsibilities of a person who
has acquired title to the premises in question in circumstances where they
become the new landlord.
 (4) Finally we consider a number of special circumstances in which occupiers
may have rights to restrict the freedom of their landlords to dispose of
their property interests.
THE NEED TO USE PRINCIPLES OF LAND LAW?
 8.4 We made it clear, in CP 162, that our scheme should apply to all occupation
agreements, irrespective of whether they would be classified in law as a lease or a
licence. However at paragraph 9.23 we also said that “we stress that we are not
proposing to abolish the lease-licence distinction. It will retain its significance for
distinguishing between types of agreement which create interests in land, which are
therefore binding on third parties, and those which do not.”
 8.5 The key issue to be considered in this section is the extent to which the distinction
should be retained. We need to determine the basis on which third parties should
be bound by the rights and obligations which arise under occupation agreements
created by our scheme.
 8.6 The issue may be illustrated by considering the case where a landlord wishes to sell
their interest in a property to another. Historically landlords have been left largely
free to deal with their property interests without any such dealing directly affecting
tenants. They can usually do what they want without their tenants’ consent.4
 8.7 Where the landlord either cannot obtain vacant possession prior to sale, or chooses
not to do so, the buyer takes the property subject to any tenancies. The buyer
simply becomes the new landlord under the original tenancy.
 8.8 Where property is only occupied under a licence, the position is different. A
licence does not create an interest in the property. It is a personal right, created
between the licensor and the licensee, which cannot be enforced against any other
person. The licensee’s legal relationship, if it continues at all after the sale, remains
one with the original licensor but is not with the new owner of the licensor’s
interest.
 8.9 The question for consideration, therefore, is whether this should remain the law, or
whether the law should be changed. Should the buyer be deemed to have taken
over all occupation agreements, so that in all cases they step into the shoes of the
original landlord? Or should the buyer only be bound, by the application of
existing rules of land law, by those interests that are characterised as property
interests? Should the buyer only be bound by those interests which are registered
or otherwise protected under the law relating to the registration of title to land?
4 A lease could in theory include a prohibition against the landlord assigning, but in practice
never does. Nor is “attornment” (recognition by the tenant of the new landlord) now
necessary since Law of Property Act 1925, s 151(1).
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Housing law and land law
 8.10 Historically, housing law has been used to adapt rules of land law, in particular of
landlord and tenant law, for social policy purposes. For example, housing law
prescribed a vast array of circumstances in which possession could be sought, and
the procedures which have to be undergone before a possession order could be
obtained from a court.
 8.11 Many of these statutory rules have applied equally to licences as well as tenancies.5
While the Rent Act 1977 and its predecessors used the concept of “statutory
tenancies”, this was held judicially not to amount to an actual tenancy. Statutory
tenancies do not create a leasehold estate in the land, but merely a “status of
irremovability”.6 Much housing law has not been dependent on the lease/licence
distinction, but rather on the operation of specific statutory rules operating outside
or in parallel with land law.
The policy of land law
 8.12 Set against this, the policy of land law has been to ensure that, so far as possible,
notice of interests attaching to land is registered at HM Land Registry and thus
clear to those purchasing interests in property.7 Thus the policy behind the
development of land law has been to limit the number of types of estates and
interests in land, and with the development of land registration, to ensure the land
register is as comprehensive as possible. Much of the policy behind the Land
Registration Act 2002 was to move yet further towards a comprehensive register, in
particular to aid electronic conveyancing, but generally to make the system of land
registration more effective for those dealing in property.
 8.13 It has always been accepted that some interests in land will not – for practical
reasons – appear on the register. But the aim has been to restrict their number as
far as possible. The scheme of land registration accepts that there should be
certain categories of “overriding interest”, which have binding effect but which do
not have to be registered in the Land Registry. Again, however, the policy is to
reduce and simplify the number of overriding interests that can exist. The general
approach is that overriding interests should be limited to those that are necessary,
and can reasonably be discovered by inspection of the property. A suggestion for
the creation of a new category of “general burdens”8 which could be protected
without being registered was rejected.
 8.14 The purpose of these policies is to ensure that the conveyancing market should
operate as smoothly as possible. Conveyancers should not be unnecessarily
burdened by the need to inspect premises, in order to check on matters not
5 Rent Act 1977, s 19 dealt with the concept of the “restricted contract” which applied to
contractual licences as well as tenancies. Protection from Eviction Act 1977, ss 1(1), 3(2b),
3A and 5(1A); Housing Act 1985, s 79(3); and Housing Act 1996, s 126 all apply to licences
as well as tenancies.
6 See R E Megarry, The Rent Acts (11th ed 1988) at pp 251 to 255.
7 The same broad principle underpins transactions in land that still fall outside the scope of
registered land conveyancing.
8 See note 14 below.
106
recorded on the register. These policies are reflected in Land Registration Act
1925, section 5. This provides that the owner holds “free from all other estates and
interests whatsoever”, other than those protected under the Act.9
Licences
 8.15 Licences present a dual challenge to the land registration system.
 (1) They are often created informally, and are therefore hard for a scheme of
registration to “capture”.10
 (2) More fundamentally, they do not create interests in land which can be the
subject of registration. It follows that if licences covered by our scheme
were to be treated as binding on successors in title to the landlord, without
their being registered, this would involve making a significant change to
the scope of the land registration scheme.
Statutory exceptions to the land registration scheme
 8.16 There are statutory provisions which have the effect of creating special exceptions
to the land registration scheme, but they have been very limited in number. Three
examples may be noted.
Matrimonial home rights
 8.17 The land registration system has in the past been amended to give protection to
socially important statutory rights not normally recognised by land law, notably in
the case of matrimonial home rights.11
The Mobile Homes Act
 8.18 The Mobile Homes Act 1983, section 3(1) provides that “An agreement to which
this Act applies shall be binding on and ensure for the benefit of any successor in
title of the owner and any person claiming through or under the owner or any such
successor.” This is supplemented by the definition in section 5(1) of “owner” as
“the person who, by virtue of an estate or interest held by him, is entitled to
possession of the site or would be so entitled but for the rights of any persons to
station mobile homes on land forming part of the site”. In other words agreements
relating to mobile homes bind the land despite not creating leasehold estates in
9 The same wording is used in s 20 on registration of dispositions. Similarly under Land
Registration Act 2002, s 11(4) the effect of registration of the freehold will be that the
registered owner’s “estate is vested in the proprietor subject only to the following interests”,
and under s 29 registration of dispositions for valuable consideration has the effect of
postponing any unprotected interests.
10 Although we require a written agreement to be given in leases and licences covered by our
new scheme, we do not propose that the agreement should be rendered invalid for failure to
comply with that requirement. We hope that very few agreements will not be put in writing,
but it is possible that a higher proportion of licences, than of tenancies, will fail to comply
with the requirement for writing.
11 Now under Family Law Act 1996, s 31 – see S Bright “Of Estates and Interests: A Tale of
Ownership and Property Rights” in S Bright and J Dewar (eds) Land Law: Themes and
Perspectives (1998) p 529.
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that land. They do so simply on the basis that the statute requires that they
should.12
The Rent Acts
 8.19 Statutory tenancies arising under the Rent Acts appear to have received special
treatment, though despite many years of case-law, there is no clear answer to the
question why, in land law terms, a Rent Act 1977 statutory tenancy is treated as
binding on a new landlord, when it is not treated as a “tenancy” in the sense of
creating a leasehold estate in land. Little of the extensive writing on the Rent Acts
deals directly with this question.13
The exceptions and the Land Registration Act 2002
 8.20 It remains the case that Mobile Homes Act licences and Rent Act 1977 statutory
tenancies will survive as burdens on land even after the coming into force of the
Land Registration Act 2002. However, apart from the Mobile Homes Act, neither
the Rent Act 1977 nor any other housing legislation specifically provides that the
landlord’s successors in title will be bound by agreements covered by the
legislation.14
Comment
 8.21 The existence of these exceptions might lead to the suggestion that further
exceptional cases – including occupation agreements under our scheme – might be
created, and that, given our general policy of not distinguishing between leases and
licences, all licenses should be deemed to be tenancies.
 8.22 There could be some advantage to this bold approach, going beyond questions
relating to conveyancing. For example under the current law, if a neighbouring
landowner commits the tort of nuisance in relation to property which is subject to
an occupation agreement, only persons with a legal estate or interest in the affected
land will be able to sue.15 The parties therefore have to look to land law principles
to work out whether the occupier is a tenant, who can sue for nuisance, or a
12 See now Charlton v Howard [2002] EWCA Civ 1086; [2002] All ER (D) 367.
13 A footnote in a Law Commission report published in 1987 (Third Report on Land
Registration (1987) Law Com No 158, p 12, fn 71) outlined the history of this oddity. It
pointed out that the binding nature of Rent Act statutory tenancies cannot derive from any
protection by actual occupation under Land Registration Act 1925, s 70(1)(g), because the
Rent Acts do not always require “actual occupation”. Instead it was suggested that they
survive as statutory “burdens”, which operate outside the Land Registration Acts because
they are not “interests” or “estates”, so the purchaser does not take free of them under the
relevant provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925. It was further suggested that the
statutory burden is imposed because the Rent Act 1977 limits the grounds on which
possession can be obtained. The restriction on the ability of the landlord to seek possession
is a burden which binds a new landlord.
14 The only reference is in definition sections which refer to “landlord” as including successors
in title. However, this does not directly answer the question of which arrangements covered
by any Act were intended to bind successors – such gaps are not unusual in housing
legislation. The other obvious one is that no housing legislation includes specific provision
against contracting out of security, so the courts have effectively supplied it in the
jurisprudence on “shams”.
15 See, eg Khorasandijan v Bush [1993] QB 727; Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655.
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licensee, who cannot and will have to ask the landlord to do so instead.16 Similarly,
if a stranger trespasses on the land, an occupier who is a tenant will be able to take
action, whereas a licensee will not.17
 8.23 In addition, it might be argued that successors in title to the original landlord
should be required to take on the rights and obligations of the original landlord,
irrespective of whether the agreement constituted a lease or a licence. Reliance on
the distinction, in the important context of deciding which occupation agreements
survive a change of ownership of the landlord’s interest, could lead to uncertainty.
This might affect not only any new owner, but also the occupiers who would not
be clear what their legal position was. Removing reliance on the distinction would,
from the housing perspective, avoid treating occupiers, under an occupation
agreement that creates only a licence, differently from occupiers characterised as
tenants.
 8.24 However, the clear aim of the Land Registration Act 2002 is to ensure a reduction
in the number of exceptions. The Mobile Homes Act and Rent Act exceptions
remain because they are few in number and are the result of historical accident.
 8.25 We have therefore provisionally concluded that the addition of another statutory
exception to the land registration scheme for licences covered by our new scheme
would be unacceptable. It would represent a move in the wrong direction and be a
perpetuation of the anomalies of the past.
Overriding interests
 8.26 An alternative approach to the protection of the rights of licensees might be to look
again at the scope of overriding interests under the Land Registration scheme.
 8.27 One way of protecting licensees might be by deeming their licences to be legal
leases, though solely for the purposes of binding successors in title. They would
thus qualify as overriding interests under Land Registration Act 1925, section
70(1)(k). However, we fear this proposal, which would involve breaking down
barriers between property interests and personal rights, might raise more questions
than it answered and could be a disproportionate response to a relatively modest
problem.
 8.28 Another initially attractive idea might be to deem such licenses to be rights which
could be protected as overriding interests by actual occupation under Land
Registration Act 1925, section 70(1)(g). However, problems might then arise as
the requirements for occupation in that subsection are very different from those in
16 Under the current law a tenant and a licensee could both have the same status as secure
under Housing Act 1985 or introductory under Housing Act 1996, but would not have the
same rights in respect of nuisance from neighbouring land.
17 Currently tenants, but not licensees, may use claims in trespass to take action against a
landlord who has illegally evicted them and is occupying the property. If the next stage of
this project is authorised, we are likely to be asked to consider how to modernise and
simplify the law relating to illegal eviction and harassment. We will consider this issue further
there.
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our scheme.18 Not all licences covered by our new scheme would be protected
under section 70(1)(g), whereas all legal leases would fall under section 70(1)(k).
The objective of parity of treatment for all occupation agreements would still not
be achieved as there would remain differences in treatment as between leases and
licences.
 8.29 We therefore think that trying to redefine “overriding interest” to include all
licences under our scheme would not be an effective way to protect all licensees.
The impact on licences
 8.30 How significant would it be if it were to prove impossible to assimilate the
treatment of tenancies and licences? The practical effects, we consider, would be
comparatively limited.
 8.31 First, the scheme already excludes many situations in which licences may
commonly be used, including
 (1) non-contractual arrangements,
 (2) agreements for use of premises other than as a home,
 (3) agreements to share living accommodation with the landlord, and
 (4) certain categories of supported accommodation.
 8.32 Secondly, most landlords who contemplate selling their interests, particularly
private landlords, will wish to bring any occupation agreement to an end prior to
the sale so that they can sell with vacant possession. If the agreements are type II
periodic agreements, then this will be easily achieved through use of the notice-
only possession procedure. A social landlord will normally be selling to an
organisation with similar objectives who would in any event issue new licences to
existing licensees.
 8.33 Thirdly, most occupation agreements will be classified in law as tenancies. Only a
comparatively small number of licences are likely to fall within our scheme.19
These may include the following.
 (1) Accommodation which is tied to employment. Such arrangements may
constitute licences even where exclusive possession is given.20
 (2) Accommodation where the nature of the provision is not that of a tenancy.
This may arise where accommodation is provided by a charity, as an act of
charity.
18 Also the Land Registration Act 2002 will no longer protect those who receive rents rather
than occupying, so there would be problems if a licensee had entered a sub-agreement for
the whole property.
19 See CP 162, Part IX for discussion of the bases for exclusion from and inclusion in our new
scheme.
20 See Westminster v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288 on licences with exclusive possession.
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 (3) Accommodation where the occupier has at least one room which is not
shared with any other contracting occupier or the landlord, but where the
landlord exercises such a degree of control over that room that the
occupier does not have exclusive possession of it.
Licencees in multiple occupation of accommodation
 8.34 A situation in which there is a genuine licence falling within the scope of our
scheme is where rooms are shared by a number of people, each of whom have an
individual agreement with the landlord. Such agreements do not grant exclusive
possession, because of the element of sharing with the other occupiers.
Arrangements with groups of students or other groups of young people often fall
into this category.
 8.35 This was the situation considered in AG Securities v Vaughan.21 It was held that a
genuine “non-exclusive occupation agreement” arises where there is not a joint
tenancy of the whole house, nor separate tenancies of individual rooms with
exclusive possession within the house, nor one tenant of the whole who then sub-
lets to the others. Instead each occupier has a separate agreement direct with the
landlord, whereby the occupiers can be moved around from room to room, and
certain facilities were shared in common.
 8.36 In such circumstances, a real issue will arise if the landlord chooses to transfer his
interest. If the landlord were to use a periodic type II agreements in such
circumstances, it is likely that he or she would in practice terminate the agreement
so as to obtain vacant possession before any sale. Any difficulties are therefore
likely to be confined to fixed term type II agreements. Our understanding is that
these are relatively common in the student market where landlords want to keep
their properties occupied for a full academic year, or for the duration of a course.
Problems could, therefore, arise where the landlord’s title to the property is
transferred to another during the period of the agreement.22
Conclusion
 8.37 We conclude that relatively few occupation agreements will create licences. We
have reached the provisional view that we should not propose the creation of a new
statutory exception, deeming such licences to be tenancies; or, more modestly, by
deeming such licences to be “overriding interests”. There are two reasons why we
have reached this view.
 8.38 First, there is no reason why licensees could not be protected to a considerable
degree by the terms of their occupation agreement. It would be possible to propose
a default term that the landlord guarantees that on an assignment of their
21 AG Securities v Vaughan, Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417.
22 Currently many landlords outside the student market are still, apparently as a matter of
habit, granting six month fixed terms in assured shorthold tenancies, even though the
requirement to do so was ended by Housing Act 1996, s 96. We would expect our new
scheme to lead to this habit being replaced by decisions on use of fixed terms which are
based on the demand in the market and the need to guarantee the income stream.
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reversion, the assignee would enter into a new occupation agreement.23 Thus
licensees could have grounds for action in contract against their original landlord24
if they are forced to leave the premises because the landlord’s interest has fallen
into other hands.
 8.39 Second, as argued above, the policy of land law has been to reduce the number of
exceptional cases, not increase them.
 8.40 Where the landlord’s title passes in ways other than on sale, such as on death, on
insolvency, or on repossession by a mortgagee, we think the same approach should
be adopted to determine the scope of the landlord’s property interests that are thus
transferred.
 8.41 Application of the current law would broadly mean that occupiers who could be
classified as tenants would have a new landlord – the landlord to whom the
landlord’s rights have been assigned – whereas occupiers who were classified as
licensees would, as against the new landlord, become trespassers who would have
to leave. Their only redress would be the possibility of an action for breach of
contract against their former landlords.
 8.42 We provisionally propose that, in determining whether occupation
agreements are binding on successors to the original landlord, existing
principles of landlord and tenant law should continue to apply to
determine whether such agreements constitute a lease or a licence.
Rent Act 1977 statutory tenancies
 8.43 This still leaves the question of how, if the matter is left to land law, existing Rent
Act 1977 statutory tenancies will bind purchasers of the landlord’s interest if those
tenancies are converted to type I agreements on the coming into force of our new
scheme. It is essential that Rent Act tenancies, virtually all of which will by now be
statutory tenancies,25 should continue to bind successors in title to their landlords.
However, it is obviously undesirable that the basis for this should continue to be
23 Under the present law, there are also criminal offences (Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s
1) of illegal eviction and harassment, and enhanced rights to damages for unlawful eviction,
based on the value of the property, rather than the loss to the occupier (under Housing Act
1988, ss 27 and 28). Each of these applies to a “residential occupier” (as defined Protection
from Eviction Act 1977, in s 1(1)) who can be a tenant or a licensee. They each apply where
the eviction was “unlawful”, but without further defining what is unlawful for these
purposes. In the next stage of this project we hope to consider how to modernise and
simplify the law relating to illegal eviction and harassment. It would be possible, though we
cannot prejudge the issue now, to define unlawful eviction so as to include cases where the
landlord terminates the right to occupy, in breach of the agreement, by passing on their
interest in the property without ensuring that the new owner of that interest would grant
new agreements to existing licensees covered by our scheme. There could therefore be a
strong incentive on landlords to ensure that, where they cannot terminate the agreement in
advance, the person who takes on their interest issues fresh agreements.
24 We continue here our practice from CP 162 of using the word “landlord” to include
“licensor”.
25 Because all surviving Rent Act tenancies are likely to have registered rents, and under Rent
Act 1977, s 49(4) a statutory notice of increase of rent will convert the tenancy into a
statutory tenancy.
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obscure, rather than an express, and preferably consistent, part of the new
legislation.26
 8.44 This could be achieved by deeming Rent Act statutory tenants, on conversion to
type I agreements, to acquire a tenancy. This would not give them any special
status above other type I agreements which are tenancies, but would ensure that
they were treated in the same way in relation to successors to the landlord’s title. It
would also give a clear basis for saying they have rights “against the world”.27 This
could be justified as correcting the anomaly that currently there is no clear basis
for such rights.
 8.45 The alternative would be to adapt the Mobile Homes Act model and provide
expressly in the statute that, only in relation to former Rent Act 1977 statutory
tenancies, such tenancies should be binding on the landlord’s successors in title
notwithstanding that they do not amount to leases. This would preserve the status
quo, but beg questions about why the same approach was not being taken in other
situations.
 8.46 We provisionally propose that statutory tenancies under the Rent Act 1977
should, on conversion to type I agreements, take effect as a property
interest.
Other third party matters
 8.47 Although the discussion above has focussed primarily on the use of principles of
land law to determine the extent to which a new landlord becomes bound by a
pre-existing occupation agreement, the discussion leads to the conclusion that the
same principles of land law should also be used to determine other matters
affecting third parties, where the distinction between the lease and the licence
remains of importance.
 8.48 We provisionally propose that our new scheme should not interfere with
land law on the determination of questions such as whether the occupier
has the rights of a leaseholder in relation to third parties such as
trespassers or neighbouring landowners who commit the tort of nuisance.
APPLICATION OF THE LAND LAW APPROACH TO LANDLORDS’ SUCCESSORS IN
TITLE
 8.49 We now discuss further the implications of the adoption of the land law approach.
Registration of title
 8.50 At present, only leases for a fixed term of over twenty-one years must be
registered.28 Our scheme will not apply to such leases.29 Licences are not
registrable, even in the rare event of being for long fixed terms. Therefore at
26 See para 8.19 and note 14 above.
27 See Jessamine Investment Co v Schwartz [1978] QB 264.
28 Land Registration Act 1925 s 8(1).
29 See CP 162, para 9.18.
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present there are no land registration requirements for agreements covered by our
new scheme.
 8.51 However, when Land Registration Act 2002, section 4(1)(c) comes into force all
fixed term leases of over seven years will have to be registered. Under section 33(b)
leases of over three years (and up to seven) will be registrable voluntarily. There is
a power in section 118 for the Lord Chancellor to reduce the boundary for
compulsory registration from seven years.
 8.52 While periodic agreements will remain outside the scope of land registration, some
fixed-term agreements covered by our new scheme, provided they are classified in
law as leases, will be registrable. Most agreements for a fixed period of over seven
years would be classified as a tenancy, rather than a licence. It may be that there
could be more room for argument in relation to three year fixed term occupation
agreements. We fully expect that the effects on residential occupation agreements
will be taken into account in any decision to make any reduction in the time period
which will trigger compulsory registration requirements. We therefore conclude
that this possibility should not pose a significant problem for the operation of our
scheme.
 8.53 Legal leases which are too short to require registration in their own right are
nevertheless protected as overriding interests under Land Registration Act 1925,
section 70(1)(k).30 Licences are not covered by section 70(1)(k). Given that they
are personal and cannot affect successors in title to the landlord, they are not
capable of qualifying as overriding interests under section 70(1)(g) as rights
capable of protection by “actual occupation of the land”.31 The law on registration
will therefore not affect the basic proposition that the landlords’ successors in title
will only be bound by those of our new agreements which count as leases rather
than licences.
Informal leases
 8.54 We have also considered whether our proposed requirements for writing32 might
lead to landlords neglecting the formalities for the creation of leases. This could
lead to problems when the landlord’s interest subsequently passes, if the successor
in title claims the informal leases are not binding.
30 Equivalent provisions will operate in Land Registration Act 2002, Sched 1, para 1 and Sched
3, para 1.
31 There has in the past been argument, mainly promoted by Lord Denning, starting with
Errington v Errington and Woods [1952] 1 KB 290, that some contractual licences are
interests in land which can bind purchasers of unregistered land, and could be overriding
interests protected by actual occupation under Land Registration Act 1925, s 70(1)(g) in
registered land. It is now mostly accepted that the tide of opinion has moved back to
orthodoxy and a line of cases considered on full argument, although obiter, by the Court of
Appeal in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold and Another [1989] Ch 1 is now commonly taken as
authority ending the “heresy” that contractual occupation licences could confer interests in
land capable of binding third parties and being overriding interests protected by actual
occupation. See for example C Harpum, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (6th ed
2000) at 17–019, and Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law (3rd ed 2000), pp 1127 to 1130.
32 Which are not necessarily enough to create a lease – see CP 162, paras 6.63 to 6.71.
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 8.55 In many situations the occupier will obtain a legal lease by operation of law on
taking possession, notwithstanding the failure to complete the proper formalities
for the creation of a tenancy.33 The agreement will thus still operate as a lease for
the purposes of binding third parties in unregistered land and counting as an
overriding interest in registered land. However, the implied legal lease obtained on
taking possession is a periodic lease, even if what had been agreed but not
adequately formalised was a fixed term.34
 8.56 In cases where this does not happen, the rights of a person with an equitable lease
will nonetheless have those rights protected as overriding interest where they are in
actual occupation of the property.35 We therefore do not believe that leases which
fail to satisfy the formal legal requirements for a legal interest will cause a
significant problem.
 8.57 We suggest below, at paragraphs 8.74 to 8.104, that while land law should deal
with the question of what agreements are binding on the successor, the question of
the extent of the rights and obligations to which the successor in title is bound
should be left to the agreement under our scheme.
Mortgages
 8.58 Mortgagees are generally not bound by licences entered into by mortgagors,
whether the licence pre-dates or post-dates the mortgage, and whether the
mortgagee knew and approved of it or not.
 8.59 First mortgages usually pre-date the creation of any tenancy, as they will have been
used to buy the property before it was let. In practice the mortgage deed is likely to
require the consent of the mortgagee for any subsequent letting. If a tenancy is
granted in breach of such a requirement it will not bind the mortgagee on
repossessing against the mortgagor-landlord. This can be a significant social
problem, particularly at times when repossession rates rise, because so many
private landlords with prior mortgages do not seek consent for their lettings and
their tenants do not find out until it is too late.
 8.60 The problem is that it is hard to envisage effective sanctions against borrowers.
The tenant will theoretically be able to claim damages for breach of the covenant
for quiet enjoyment (and occupiers under our scheme will be able to claim for
breach of the equivalent term). However, in mortgage repossessions the equity in
the house commonly goes to the lender and the borrower is not worth suing as
they are by definition in financial difficulties. It is also hard to see how a mortgage
33 See generally, C Harpum, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (6th ed 2000), 14–
039 and CP 162, para 6.67.
34 See Susan Bright’s commentary on Long v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1999] Ch
197 at [1998] 62 Conv 229, which points out that tenancy agreements signed in advance of
the tenancy without using a deed, would be periodic irrespective of the terms of the
agreement, and would therefore have failed to qualify as shortholds under the Housing Act
1988 until that Act was amended by the Housing Act 1996.
35 Land Registration Act 1925, s 70(1)(g), to be replaced, when brought into force, by Land
Registration Act 2002, Sched 1, para 2 and Sched 2, para 2.
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system could work if lenders risked being bound by tenancies to which they had
not given consent.
 8.61 In some cases where the creation of a tenancy pre-dates a mortgage then the
tenancy will have priority, whether the mortgagee knew about it or not. In practice
this would normally only be the case on second mortgages. We can understand
that mortgagees would not want to have to check for the existence of licences as
well as tenancies before granting second mortgages, and that they would not want
to see any increase, even a small one, in the risk of being bound by them. We do
not in fact believe there would be much more risk. In practice the same checks will
have to be made as to whether anyone (other than the mortgagor) is paying to live
there. It will be easier to check whether there is an agreement covered by our
scheme than it is to check whether there is a tenancy or a licence. We do not
believe a sensible mortgagee would feel they could lend safely on the strength of a
belief that someone covered by our new scheme was a licensee rather than a
tenant. Any problems would therefore be confined to cases where the mortgagor
has concealed the existence of the occupation agreement.
 8.62 In other cases, particularly “buy-to-let” schemes, the mortgage will pre-date the
occupation agreement, but the mortgagee will have given consent to the letting.
On repossessing against the mortgagor, the mortgagee will be bound by the
agreement only if it counts as a tenancy and not as a licence. Assuming that the
mortgagee will only have consented to the granting of a type II agreement, it will
be possible to regain vacant possession of the premises speedily. In this case it is
difficult to see, in housing law terms, why a mortgagee should not be similarly
bound if they have consented to a type II agreement which happens to constitute
one of the few kinds of licence which will be covered by our new scheme.
 8.63 However, we can see that any mechanism for imposing the protection of such
licensees onto mortgagees would be open to the same objections as those relating
to other successors to the landlord’s title, discussed above. In any event the
difference in the level of protection is marginal. They would have had at least
fourteen days warning of any repossession hearing.36 Indeed, repossession against
licensees may well be slower than against tenants. If the licensees claim in fact to
be tenants, then a court hearing will be needed to determine the issue, and will
have to cover the complex distinctions between the two. If the mortgagee assumes
the occupiers are tenants, and therefore binding, it will be able to take accelerated
possession proceedings on the notice-only basis, with no need for listing of a court
hearing. Accordingly we do not believe that the discrepancy of treatment between
licensees and tenants will cause disproportionate hardship.
Landlords’ superior landlords
 8.64 Here we consider the situation where a lessee (“the mesne landlord”) under a long
lease, not covered by our new scheme, enters an occupation agreement which is
covered by our scheme (for instance, if A grants a 99 year lease to B and then B
36 Under CPR, Pt 55, r 10 such warning must be given to anyone at the premises. It is to be
hoped that Building Societies would voluntarily give more warning in these cases, or perhaps
face costs penalties, given that they would have given consent to the licence and should
know it is covered by our new scheme.
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agrees to allow C into occupation as a periodic tenant, the agreement between A
and B is not covered by our scheme, whereas that between B and C is).37 The key
issue is whether the head landlord will become bound by the agreement on
termination of the head lease. We believe that this issue should be determined
solely by the rules of general landlord and tenant law. We do not believe our
scheme should reproduce current rules in housing legislation which add to the
circumstances in which the sub-occupier is imposed on the head landlord.
The current law
 8.65 Currently there are situations where landlord and tenant law may impose a sub-
tenant, but not a sub-licensee, on the head landlord (that is, C, the sub-tenant,
becomes a tenant directly of A). The general principle is that on termination of the
head lease all interests granted out of it fall as well. There are two exceptions to
this general rule. Both exceptions only apply to leases, and not to licences, but
both apply irrespective of whether the sub-letting was lawful or unlawful. The first
is where the head lease is surrendered or merged.38 The other is where the court
imposes a tenancy between the head landlord and sub-tenant on the sub-tenants’
application for relief against forfeiture of the head lease.39 Whatever the logic of
these provisions, it is beyond the scope of this project to suggest changes to this
area of law.
 8.66 In addition, housing legislation may impose a sub-tenant on the head landlord in
other circumstances where landlord and tenant law would not do so.40 These
provisions are notoriously complex and of limited application in practice. They
both apply only to lawful sub-lettings. The Housing Act 1988, section 18 is the
clearer of the two. It operates to burden a head landlord (A) with an assured sub-
tenancy (for C) on the termination of the head tenancy (to B), irrespective of how
the head tenancy came to an end and irrespective of whether the head tenancy is
governed by any other statutory or common law rules.
Our approach
 8.67 We have asked whether our new scheme should reproduce provisions similar to
those of existing housing legislation, to supplement the number of situations in
which landlord and tenant law would require head landlords to take over occupiers
under agreements covered by our new scheme.
37 There is a further issue as to what happens if the lessee-landlord assigns a head lease which
is not covered by our new scheme. However, there does not appear to be any significant
difference between this and the position where a landlord who is a freeholder disposes of the
freehold. We deal with this above/below at paras 8.74 to 8.87.
38 See Law of Property Act 1925, ss 139 and 150. In Pennell v Payne [1995] QB 192 and
Barrett v Morgan [2000] 2 AC 264 the courts over-ruled previous case-law suggesting that
tenants’ notices to quit, or landlords’ notices to quit which were served in collusion with the
tenant, would have the same effect as surrender.
39 See Law of Property Act 1925, ss 146(2) and 146(4), and Escalus Properties Ltd v Robinson
[1996] QB 231. Under s 146(4) the court has a wide discretion in relation to the resulting
tenancy, but that tenancy cannot be for a term longer than the sub-tenancy was.
40 See Housing Act 1988, s 18 and Rent Act 1977 s 137.
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 8.68 In favour, it may be argued that it would ensure the continuation of the agreement
despite any fault of the mesne landlord, and that it could protect agreements from
premature termination without introducing distinctions as to whether they
counted as leases or licences.
 8.69 The problem with this approach is that the logic of protecting the innocent
occupier would apply much more often in cases where the landlord is in breach of
mortgage conditions, but in such circumstances the innocent (albeit unlawful)
occupiers remain vulnerable.
 8.70 We are also concerned that head landlords, whose primary interest is in
commercial leases, not residential, do not become enmeshed in rules relating to
residential lettings which they might reasonably assume do not apply to them.41
Many of those landlords would be familiar with the general rules of landlord and
tenant law which would apply to their head lease, under which they would not
expect to be bound by their tenant’s licences. They might thus agree to a
residential sub-licence agreement in ignorance of the fact that licences are covered
by our new scheme.
 8.71 Another reason for suggesting that the head landlord should take over occupiers
under agreements created by mesne landlords is to avoid sham arrangements
designed to avoid the force of our scheme. It is probable such anti avoidance
considerations were the motivation behind Rent Act 1977, section 137 and
Housing Act 1988, section 18. However, since the creation of the assured
shorthold tenancy, which we propose should be embraced by our type II
agreement, sham arrangements seem largely to have died out.
 8.72 We have therefore concluded that there is now no need for our new scheme to
make special provisions to ensure that head landlords, under leases not covered by
our scheme, are bound by occupation agreements created by mesne landlords, in
cases where they would not be so bound by the general law of landlord and tenant.
 8.73 We provisionally propose that our scheme should not make any special
provision, above that imposed by general landlord and tenant law, for head
landlords, whose leases fall outside our scheme, to be bound by occupation
agreements covered by our scheme which are created by mesne landlords.
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEW LANDLORD: THE EFFECTS OF
ASSIGNMENT OF THE LANDLORD’S REVERSION
 8.74 Where the successor in title is bound by a pre-existing occupation agreement, the
next question is what should be the extent of the new landlord’s rights and duties.42
41 Such arrangements are actively promoted as a way to regenerate city centres by the national
“Living Over The Shop” scheme. See: http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/specialist/
flatsovershops.htm.
42 Two of the relevant Housing Acts define “landlord” as including anyone deriving title under
the landlord. See Housing Act 1988, s 45(1) and Rent Act 1977, s 152(1). There is no




 8.75 Currently under contract law the benefit of a contract can be assigned to third
parties, or made available to them through the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
Act 1999. However, third parties cannot be bound by the burden of a contract by
purely contractual means. Furthermore, the parties to the original contract will
remain bound by the terms of the contract unless the law otherwise provides, even
though they may have assigned their rights under the contract to another.
 8.76 In order to pass both the benefit and burden of the lease to a new landlord, land
law principles operate. Under these principles, the doctrine of “privity of estate”
applies to pre-1996 tenancies. 43 The principal difficulty with the doctrine of privity
of estate is that is relates only to covenants which “touch and concern the land”.
 8.77 The Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 applies, primarily, to tenancies
created on or after 1st January 1996.44 It has three primary objectives.
 (1) First, it provides that on lawful assignment of the lease, a tenant is released
from those covenants in the tenancy that apply to the tenant.45
 (2) Secondly, both the benefit and burden of covenants are passed to the new
landlord (the assignee), irrespective of whether or not they touch and
concern the land.46
 (3) Thirdly, on assignment of the reversion, the original landlord, the assignor,
is not released from their obligations under the tenancy, unless they go
through a prescribed procedure. 47
 8.78 In addition to these primary objectives, the Act also deals with other issues that
can arise. These include questions of apportionment of liability as between
assignor and assignee;48 the effect of covenants with third parties, for instance
management companies;49 and joint liability.50
43 As modified by the Law of Property Act 1925, ss 141 and 142.
44 The initial impetus of the Act was provided by the Law Commission Report, Landlord and
Tenant Law: Privity of Contract and Estate (1988) Law Com No 174.
45 Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, s 5.
46 Ibid, s 3. Section 28 defines “covenant” for these purposes. In addition rights of re-entry are
also transferred to the new landlord: s 4.
47  Ibid, s 6. This involves giving notice to the tenant within four weeks either before or after the
assignment has taken place. If the tenant fails to respond within four weeks from the giving
of the notice, the consent of the tenant to the release is deemed to have been given. If the
tenant objects, the landlord may take the matter to the county court. The court will release
them from their obligation if the court thinks it reasonable to do so. The tenant may also
withdraw his or her notice of objection; this also constitutes consent: s. 8. If a landlord fails
to go through this procedure at the time of the original assignment, they may do so on any
subsequent assignment: s 7.
48  Ibid, ss 9 and 10.
49  Ibid, s 12.
50  Ibid, ss 13 and 14.
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 8.79 There are also provisions dealing with the position of a former tenant after an
assignment.51
Our approach
 8.80 We have considered whether it would be preferable for our scheme to impose its
own requirements on the rights and obligations of the parties following an
assignment, rather than relying on the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act
1995.
 8.81 Our view is that the broad policy which underpins the Act is sensible. Tenants are
released from their obligations to the original landlord, from the time of the
assignment. Former landlords, however, are not released unless the tenant
consents.
 8.82 We perceive three particular difficulties for the direct application of the Act in the
context of residential occupation agreements.
 (1) First, the statute is a complex one, which requires considerable legal
expertise to understand. Clearly, it was drafted with assignments of
business leases or long leasehold interests in mind, where it could be
expected that the relevant parties would be seeking and obtaining
appropriate professional advice and assistance.
 (2) Secondly, it was not made retrospective. Thus, apart from a small number
of provisions that apply to all tenancies,52 it only applies to tenancies
created since 1996.
 (3) Third, the provisions dealing with the position of former tenants are,
arguably, not required, given the proposals we have made on this matter,
above in Part VI, paras 6.94–6.100.
 8.83 We suggest that in relation to the first of these issues, assignments of the landlord’s
interest will rarely occur without legal advice. Although the legislation is complex,
it is reasonable to assume that parties to assignments will be advised on it.
 8.84 The second difficulty can be met, we suggest, by proposing that, on the coming
into effect of our scheme, the process of converting existing tenancies into
occupation agreements should be deemed to be the creation of a “new tenancy”
within the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenant) Act 1995.
 8.85 The third issue will be considered in the light of responses to the relevant
proposals in Part VI.
 8.86 We provisionally propose that the process of converting an existing
tenancy into an occupation agreement within our scheme should be
deemed to be the creation of a “new tenancy” for the purposes of the
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.
51  Ibid, ss 16 to 20.
52  Ibid, ss 17 to 20.
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 8.87 We further provisionally propose that, save for sections 16 to 20, the
provisions of the Act of 1995 which deal with the rights and obligations of
assignors and assignees should apply to transfers of occupation
agreements, classified in law as tenancies, within the scope of our scheme.
Other matters
Notices of disrepair
 8.88 A specific difficulty relates to notices of disrepair required by Landlord and Tenant
Act 1985, section 11.53 Arguably an occupier should only have to give notice of
disrepair once, so that a new landlord would be fixed with any notice given to the
old landlord. The new landlord would thus become liable under the provisions of
section 11 from the date of acquisition of the interest in the property. Otherwise it
would be hard on an occupier who did not know of the change of landlord and as
a result lost out.
 8.89 Although our terms of reference do not specifically extend to repairing covenants,
we think that there should be a compulsory term in the new agreements that
provides that notice of disrepair given to the old landlord would be effective as if
given to the new landlord.
 8.90 We provisionally propose that any notice of disrepair given to a landlord
should be effective as notice to a new landlord, though the new landlord’s
liability should only start to run from the date of acquisition of their
interest in the property.
Deposits
 8.91 Problems can also arise with deposits held by the former landlord. It is beyond the
scope of our project to deal with the regulation of deposits.54 We can see the force
of the argument that the law should provide that any deposits held by the former
landlord should be transferred to the new landlord who will take over their
administration.
New landlord’s duty to give details to the occupier
 8.92 In CP162 we provisionally proposed, that the “core” terms in any occupation
agreement should include specific requirements for landlords to provide occupiers
with information about the landlord’s identity (and those of any agents) and a
place of business as an address for service.55 The landlord’s successor in title will
certainly be bound by agreements with tenants, if not licensees, and will become
53 Similar problems arise in the context of the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 and the Defective
Premises Act 1972.
54 Currently the subject of a Government pilot scheme run by the Independent Housing
Ombudsman for holding and regulating return of deposits – see CP 162, para 1.85. Such
systems are commonly associated with housing tribunals in Commonwealth jurisdictions –
see CP 162, paras 4.70 to 4.73.
55 See CP 162, paras 6.79 to 6.82. This would reproduce the effect of Landlord and Tenant Act
1985, s 1.
121
their new landlord. We think the new landlord must give the occupier the same
information and a name and address for service, as the original landlord gave.
 8.93 The question arises what the extent of this requirement should be. There are three
options.
 (1) The new landlord could be required only to provide written notification of
their name, address and status.
 (2) The new landlord could be required to provide a new agreement with the
core term changed.
 (3) The notification of the new name and address could be treated in the
same way as a variation of the agreement. The new landlord would be
required to provide written notification only of the changed element, but
the occupier would then have the right to require the new landlord to
provide a revised copy of the whole agreement.
 8.94 The first option is clearly the least burdensome. The risk with the second is that is
may fuel misunderstandings by occupiers, who will not be familiar with
distinctions between tenants and licensees, as they may think the landlord is not
obliged to keep them as occupiers. The advantage of the second option is that it
would help to ensure that the new landlord quickly became aware that they needed
to obtain a copy of the agreement from the former landlord. Currently new
landlords may not have copies of the original paperwork and may be unaware that
they are bound by it or ignorant of the detail of their responsibilities. The third
option provides a compromise between the other two options.
 8.95 We provisionally propose that the new landlord should have to serve
written notice on the occupiers of a name and address for service for
themselves and any agents (matching the requirements of the core term in
the original agreement).
 8.96 We provisionally propose that on receipt of this notification the occupier
should be entitled to require the new landlord to supply a revised copy of
the agreement, as happens on a variation of the agreement.
 8.97 If the new landlord does not comply with these requirements there should be some
sanction. Under the current law there are criminal sanctions.56 There is a time limit
for compliance – when the rent is next due or two months from the assignment,
which ever is the sooner.
 8.98 In CP 162 we provisionally proposed that rent sanctions should apply where
original landlords did not give their names and addresses in the core term of the
agreement.
 8.99 We also suggested that there was a stronger argument in this area than others for
retaining criminal sanctions, but asked whether such sanctions would really
constitute a useful spur to compliance, given prosecutions are so rarely taken.
56 A summary offence, punishable by fine, under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, s 3(3).
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 8.100 We believe the same principles should apply to the new landlord. They should face
the same rent sanction if they fail to give notice. They should also face a criminal
sanction if consultees feel that criminal sanctions should be retained despite the
lack of prosecutions. We would be interested in whether consultees feel it would be
worth reproducing the current time limit. We feel it would be simpler if the time
limit was the same as for the original agreement, so that there would only be a
period of grace of two weeks before the rent sanction bites and two months before
any criminal sanction. These would run from date of the assignment instead of
from the original agreement.
 8.101 We provisionally propose that if the new landlord fails to give the
prescribed information to the occupier within two weeks of the
assignment, the new landlord should be liable to an equivalent rent
sanction as applies in the case of the original agreements. He or she should
be deemed to owe the occupier the equivalent of one day’s rent for each
day’s delay, starting with the date of the assignment, up to the date of
notification or two months from the assignment, whichever is the shorter.
 8.102 We seek consultees’ views as to whether an ongoing sanction is required
for cases where new landlords still fail to provide notification, despite the
loss of rent. Do consultees feel that it would be useful and appropriate to
create, in addition, a continuing criminal offence of failure to provide
notification by the end of the first two months after the assignment?
 8.103 Further encouragement of compliance is currently found in Landlord and Tenant
Act 1985, sections 3(3A) to (3B)57 which provides that a former landlord remains
liable for the new landlord’s breaches until notice is given to the tenant of the
change of landlord. As the former landlord remains liable jointly with the landlord
for any post-assignment breaches of the agreement until the notification is given to
the tenant, it is in the former landlord’s interest that the new landlord complies.
This would appear to be a sensible provision to reproduce in our new scheme.
 8.104 We provisionally propose that a compulsory term in occupation
agreements should require the original landlord, on disposing of their
interest to a new landlord, to give the occupier notice of the new landlord’s
identity and address for service, or ensure that the new landlord does so.
The term should render the former landlord liable for any breaches by the
new landlord until either the former or new landlord gives the occupier
the required notice.
WHERE OCCUPIERS CAN STOP A LANDLORD DEALING WITH THE LANDLORD’S
INTEREST
 8.105 Finally we consider whether our new scheme should contain any rights for
occupiers to restrain landlords from selling or otherwise disposing of the landlord’s
interest.
57 Inserted by Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, s 50 from 1st February 1988.
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 8.106 Generally the position under the current law is that neither a licensee nor a tenant
is given powers to prevent a disposal by the landlord.58 In the case of a licensee this
is because the license is only a personal right. In the case of a tenant it is because
the landlord’s purchaser will simply step into the shoes of the old landlord and the
tenancy will continue as before. However, there are important statutory exceptions
to this principle which differ as between social landlords and private landlords.
Social landlords
The right to buy and the right to acquire
 8.107 Secure tenants of local authorities usually have a “right to buy”. Many assured
tenants of registered social landlords have the “right to acquire”. These are
exercisable as soon as the tenant qualifies and do not depend on waiting for the
landlord to propose disposing of their interest. Neither right applies to licensees,
even those deemed to be secure tenancies under the Housing Act 1985. Such
rights will be preserved separately for those who would qualify for them if our new
scheme had not been introduced.
Consultation rights
 8.108 In addition, various consultation and balloting rights are available for secure
tenants and licensees of social landlords when their landlord proposes selling the
reversion. The main legislative provision is Housing Act 1985, section 106A and
Schedule 3A which imposes consultation requirements for “large scale voluntary
transfers” under section 32 of that Act. Although there is no express requirement
for a ballot, in practice one must be held because the Secretary of State may not
give consent if a majority of the relevant tenants are against the disposal, and a
ballot is the best evidence of this. There are similar provisions for consultation on
other types of disposal,59 and on issues of housing management generally.60
 8.109 When local authorities dispose of their properties to registered social landlords,
there is currently an effect on the tenancies, because they change from secure to
assured. Under our proposals occupiers would all have type I agreements, so that
the occupier’s status will not change with a change of landlord. However, there will
58 Although leases could in theory include covenants against assignment, in practice they
virtually never do.
59 For “housing action trusts” there are rules on balloting in Housing Act 1988, s 61(3) on
establishment of the trust, and in s 84 on notifying, and receiving representations from,
secure and introductory tenants and licensees about a trust’s proposals to transfer the
properties to landlords other than local authorities. There were formerly voting rules for the
now defunct “tenants’ choice” under that Act. There are non-statutory rules for consultation
of secure tenants and licensees before the Secretary of State approves a redevelopment
scheme under which Housing Act 1985, Sched 2, ground 10A can be used for evictions so
that the land can be disposed of with vacant possession.
60 Local authorities must consult secure and introductory tenants and licensees on changes in
housing management under Housing Act 1985, s 105 and Housing Act 1996, s 137. The
Housing Corporation’s Regulatory Code and guidance, as set out in The way forward: Our
approach to regulation (2002), at para 2.5 requires registered social landlords to consult
with their tenants in ways similar to those for secure tenants. However, there is no specific
reference to consulting tenants on a sale of the properties by the registered social landlord.
Such sales are comparatively rare, but less so as registered social landlords have been
engaging in mergers with each other.
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still be a need for consultation. One reason is that it is publicly owned or funded
land which is being disposed of. Also there are general requirements for
consultation of social tenants61 which we do not think should be disturbed.
 8.110 At present, the participation rights of registered social landlord assured tenants are
contractual, or in guidance, rather than statutory. Our approach to incorporating
statutory provisions into the contract may help with this.
 8.111 We provisionally propose that current rights for occupiers of social
landlords to consultation and participation, including those on disposals of
the landlord’s interest, should be retained in our new scheme for those
occupiers by being incorporated as a compulsory term in the occupation
agreement.
Private sector landlords
Landlord and Tenant Act 1987
 8.112 Under Part I of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987,62 where landlords propose to
dispose of their interest, certain of their leaseholders, mainly those under long
leases, will have the right of first refusal. Other than long leaseholders, this right
currently only applies to Rent Act 1977 tenants. It does not apply to Housing Act
1988 assured tenants.63 While the policy reasons why this right does not apply to
tenants of social landlords are clear, as many have the right to acquire, with private
landlords there is no apparent logic to the distinction between the rights of
protected and assured tenants. However to cure this anomaly involves policy issues
which put the matter outside the scope of our project.
 8.113 Nonetheless, the right of first refusal is clearly an important right which should not
be taken away from existing Rent Act 1977 tenants. It should therefore be
preserved like the right to a “fair rent”.
 8.114 We provisionally propose that Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, section 3(1)
should be amended so as to continue to apply the right of first refusal to
those type I agreement occupiers who were formerly Rent Act 1977
protected tenants.
61 Housing Act 1985, s 105, and the “tenant participation compacts” required for “best value”
under Local Government Act 1999, Part I. The Housing Corporation expects registered
social landlords to consult their tenants similarly.
62 As amended particularly by Housing Act 1996 and Leasehold and Commonhold Reform
Act 2002.
63 Qualifying tenants are defined (without inclusion of licensees) by s 3 as excluding assured
tenancies (whether shorthold or not), and protected shorthold tenancies under Housing Act
1980, s 52 (along with business tenancies, tied accommodation and assured agricultural
occupancies). Under s 58(1) various public sector landlords, including local authorities and
registered social landlords, are exempt from the right of first refusal. Therefore the right will
not apply to Housing Act 1985 secure tenants, nor introductory tenants under Housing Act
1996. By a process of elimination this leaves Rent Act 1977 protected tenancies.
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PART IX 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONAL PROPOSALS
AND CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
In this Part, we list our provisional proposals and conclusions, and set out the
other issues on which we seek consultees views. More generally, we invite comment
on any of the matters raised in this paper and any other suggestions that consultees
may wish to put forward. For the purposes of analysing the responses, it would be




 1. We ask for information about the regulatory impact of our provisional proposals in
this paper (paragraph 1.35).
PART II: OBTAINING CONSENT
The structure of consent requirements
 2. We provisionally propose that three standard possibilities should be recognised:
 (1) no requirement for consent;
 (2) a requirement that the landlord gives consent, which can only be withheld
on reasonable grounds; and
 (3) a landlord’s veto.
These will be contained in the occupation agreement as appropriate (paragraph
2.24).
 3. We further provisionally propose that the relevant term in the agreement should
provide that any request for consent should be made in writing and that proof of
service, for example by recorded delivery, should be obtained (paragraph 2.25).
Withholding consent: reasonableness in consent requirements
 4. We provisionally propose that what is meant by “reasonable” should not, in
general, be statutorily defined (paragraph 2.32).
 5. We invite views on whether the discretion of the court to determine reasonableness
in this context should be statutorily structured, and if so what factors should be
taken into account (paragraph 2.33).
Failure by the landlord to respond
 6. We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in the agreement
that where a person whose consent to a transaction is required fails to respond
within a given period to a request for consent, this should be regarded as an
unreasonable refusal of consent, so that the requisite consent should be deemed to
have been given (paragraph 2.38).
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 7. We invite views on what that appropriate period should be (paragraph 2.39).
Provision of reasons for refusal
 8. We provisionally propose that where landlords think they have reasonable grounds
to refuse consent, they should be required to inform the occupier of the reasons
why consent was refused (paragraph 2.41).
 9. We invite views on whether the landlord should be required to provide a written
statement of reasons and, if so, whether this should be a universal requirement to
apply in all cases or one that only arises where the occupier asks for it (paragraph
2.42).
 10. We invite views on the sanction that should be applied to the landlord who fails to
provide a written statement of reasons, following a request – properly made – so to
do (paragraph 2.44).
Effect of transactions where necessary consents have not been obtained
 11. We provisionally propose that the occupation agreement should make clear that
any transaction carried out by the occupier, which was either contrary to the
landlord’s veto or subject to consent which has been reasonably withheld, will
expose the occupier to the possibility of possession proceedings for breach of the
occupation agreement, and will not bind the landlord (paragraph 2.48).
When should receipt of rent count as creation of a new agreement by the
landlord?
 12. We provisionally propose that after a prescribed maximum period during which
the landlord should be able to take such payments without starting possession
proceedings, a fresh agreement, covered by our new scheme, should be taken to
have been created if, after termination of the original agreement, the landlord
accepts payments from an unlawful occupier in return for delaying, or not taking,
possession action against them as trespassers (paragraph 2.64).
 13. We invite views on whether there should be a prescribed maximum period of time
during which the landlord should be able to take such payments, without starting
possession proceedings, and without being taken to have created a new agreement.
Alternatively should it be left as a matter of fact to be determined by the court
whether the landlord has agreed to refrain from or delay possession action in
return for the payments (paragraph 2.65)?
 14. We provisionally propose that, if there is to be general requirement on social
landlords to use type I agreements, one of the exceptional circumstances justifying
use of a type II agreement would be where the landlord wished to make a
temporary arrangement with a new occupier who has been granted the right to
occupy without the landlord’s consent or in breach of a landlord’s veto (paragraph
2.67).
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PART III: CO-OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS
Joint occupation agreements – creation
 15. We provisionally propose that there should be no limit to the number of people to
whom joint rights of occupation may be granted, subject to the overall limit
imposed by the laws against over-crowding (paragraph 3.17).
Joint occupation agreements – liability
 16. We provisionally propose that, where an occupation agreement is entered into by
more than one occupier, there should be a default term that liability of the
occupiers under that agreement should be on the joint and several basis
(paragraph 3.28).
New joint occupiers entering the agreement
 17. We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in the agreement
that an occupier should be able to apply to the landlord for permission to have
someone else brought into the agreement as a new joint occupier. The landlord
should be able to refuse consent unless it is unreasonable to do so (paragraph
3.40).
 18. In this context, the assessment of reasonableness should take account of all
relevant circumstances including in particular any prejudice to the landlord that
might arise if the new person ended up as sole occupier (paragraph 3.41).
 19. It should also take account of the numbers that would reside in the premises and
the landlord’s interest in retaining control over those numbers (paragraph 3.42).
 20. We invite views on whether the right to apply for a joint occupation agreement
should be limited to particular categories of people. If so, we invite views on what
those categories should be (paragraph 3.43).
 21. We invite views on whether the provisional proposal should be limited to type I
agreements only, or should apply to all agreements falling within our proposed
scheme (paragraph 3.44).
 22. We provisionally propose that where the occupier regards the refusal of consent as
unreasonable, he or she should have the right to apply to the county court for a
determination of the matter (paragraph 3.47).
 23. We further provisionally propose that, in appropriate cases where the landlord was
held to have been unreasonable, the court should have the power to add a new
occupier to the agreement (paragraph 3.48).
 24. We invite views on whether the court should have any wider power to vary the
terms of the agreement (paragraph 3.49).
Joint occupiers seeking to withdraw from the agreement
Type I agreements
 25. We provisionally propose that a joint occupier under a type I agreement should be
able to terminate his or her interest in the agreement by written notice to the
landlord without this bringing the whole agreement to an end (paragraph 3.82).
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 26. We further provisionally propose that a copy of the notice should be served on the
remaining occupiers (paragraph 3.83).
 27. We invite views as to whether the copy should be served by the occupier seeking to
withdraw from the premises, or by the landlord (paragraph 3.84).
 28. We invite views on whether, following the departure of one or more joint occupier
or occupiers, the landlord of a type I tenancy should be able to seek repossession
of the home, subject to reasonableness and the provision of suitable alternative
accommodation, if the home is no longer suitable for occupation by the remaining
occupier or joint occupiers (paragraph 3.85).
 29. If there is to be a special ground of possession, we also invite views on whether the
landlord should be required to make use of it within any defined time limit. If so,
what should the time limit be? Should there be a period before which the landlord
should not be able to take proceedings, to enable the remaining occupiers find a
lodger or a replacement joint occupier (paragraph 3.86)?
Type II periodic agreements
 30. We provisionally propose that a joint occupier under a type II agreement, should be
able by written notice to the landlord to determine his or her interest in the
agreement without this bringing the whole agreement to an end (paragraph 3.92).
Type II fixed term agreements
 31. We provisionally propose that it should be a default term of fixed term type II
agreements with a break clause that where one of a number of joint occupiers
exercises the break clause, it will have the effect of only terminating his or her
rights under the agreement and will not bring the entire agreement to an end. The
remaining occupiers will be entitled to remain in occupation, having assumed all
the rights and obligations under the agreement (paragraph 3.100).
Informal withdrawal of occupier
 32. We provisionally propose that the procedure whereby a landlord may seek to
terminate an occupation agreement, where it appears that the premises have been
abandoned, should also apply where a joint occupier has abandoned the premises.
If the first notice produces no response, the landlord should be required to serve a
second notice giving the occupier another eight weeks in which to apply to court to
challenge the finding of abandonment (paragraph 3.106).
 33. We provisionally propose that, when the landlord intends to use the abandonment
procedure against a joint occupier who has withdrawn from the premises, the
landlord should also notify the other joint occupiers of this intention (paragraph
3.109).
 34. We further provisionally propose that where a landlord has used the proposed
abandonment procedure against a departed occupier, the remaining joint
occupiers would continue to be jointly and severally bound by the agreement in
the same way as if the removed occupier had given notice under a notice clause
(paragraph 3.110).
 35. We provisionally propose that, where there is a response from the departed joint
occupier to the initial notice, which is equivocal as to whether the occupier has or
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has not abandoned, there should be a procedure to enable the landlord to obtain
an declaration from the court. If satisfied that the occupier has demonstrated an
intention no longer to accept being bound by the agreement, the court should
declare that the agreement has terminated in respect of that occupier (paragraph
3.112).
Non-contractual arrangements
Possession proceedings – proposals for protection
 36. We provisionally propose that our new scheme should include rights for non-
contracting occupiers to be notified of any possession proceedings (paragraph
3.120).
 37. We invite views on whether the procedure for so doing should be modelled on the
rights of “qualifying occupiers” in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, sections 14
and 15, or to the provisions relating to mortgage possession hearings in the Civil
Procedure Rules 1998 (paragraph 3.121).
 38. We further invite views as to whether the people who must be notified should also
have a right to be joined as defendants, or should only be able to do so at the
court’s discretion (paragraph 3.122).
 39. We further invite views as to whether these notice requirements should attach to all
discretionary possession proceedings or only those which arise from type I
agreements (paragraph 3.123).
Restricting the landlord’s powers to regulate non-contractual occupiers?
 40. We invite views as to whether there are – currently or potentially – significant
problems arising from attempts by landlords to regulate those who may live with
the occupier on a non-contracting basis (paragraph 3.127).
 41. We provisionally propose that the occupation agreement should contain a default
term which allowed the occupier the freedom to control who would occupy the
premises on a non-contractual basis, with any departures from the default being
regulated under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
(paragraph 3.131).
Amending the Family Law Act 1996
 42. We provisionally propose that Family Law Act 1996, section 30 be amended to
refer to occupiers under our new scheme (paragraph 3.133).
 43. We provisionally propose that, in relation to cases where the occupier obtains an
adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement of a possession order, a partner’s
matrimonial home rights to occupy and tender rent should be preserved until the
possession order is enforced (paragraph 3.136).
 44. We further provisionally propose that the current law should be expanded so that
those with matrimonial home rights are given the right to be joined to possession
proceedings with the same rights as the occupier to defend themselves against the
making of a possession order and to apply after a possession order for any
adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement (paragraph 3.137).
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PART IV: THE RIGHT TO TAKE IN LODGERS
Type I agreements
 45. We provisionally propose that the right of a person to take in a lodger should be
extended to all those with type I agreements, by means of a compulsory term to
that effect (paragraph 4.5).
 46. We provisionally propose that there should be a statutory definition of “lodger” for
the purposes of the right to take in lodgers
 47. We further provisionally propose that “lodger” should be defined as a person who
occupies premises where there is a resident landlord who shares accommodation
with the lodger, irrespective of whether the person does so under a tenancy or a
licence (paragraph 4.18).
 48. We invite views on whether the unprotected status of an occupier as a “lodger”
should continue, even where the resident landlord no longer actually shares the
accommodation with the lodger but retains the contractual right to do so
(paragraph 4.19).
 49. We provisionally propose that the right to take in a lodger should be exercisable
without a consent requirement, as at present (paragraph 4.28).
Application to type II agreements
 50. We invite views on whether or not occupiers under a type II agreement should also
have the right to take in a lodger (paragraph 4.35).
 51. If the answer to the question is yes, we also invite views whether the right should
be an absolute one, or one that can only be exercised with the consent of the
landlord (paragraph 4.36).
Should lodgers have a written agreement?
 52. We provisionally propose that there be no requirement for the provision of a
written agreement between a lodger and his or her resident landlord (paragraph
4.41).
The effect of a lodger on the head landlord
 53. We provisionally propose that, on termination of an agreement covered by our new
scheme, the head landlord should not be bound by any lodging agreement entered
into by the former occupier, irrespective of whether that lodging agreement
amounted to a tenancy or a licence (paragraph 4.46).
PART V: SUB-OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS
Our approach
 54. We provisionally propose that the issue of whether or not an occupier should be
able to enter a sub-occupation agreement of the premises should be determined by
a term in the original agreement (paragraph 5.10).
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Type I agreements
 55. We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in the type I
agreement that the occupier may enter a sub-occupation agreement of part of the
premises, subject to the consent of the landlord, which may not be unreasonably
withheld. This right would not however be available where the occupier would
have to cease to occupy the property as a home in order to grant the sub-
occupation agreement (paragraph 5.18).
 56. We provisionally propose that it should be a default term in the model type I
agreement that there be a landlord’s veto on the granting of a sub-occupation
agreement which would involve the occupier moving out of the whole of the
premises (paragraph 5.28).
Type II agreements
 57. We provisionally propose that the principles relating to sub-occupation agreements
under type I agreements should apply equally to type II agreements (paragraph
5.33).
The type and content of the sub-occupation agreement
 58. We provisionally propose that the model agreements contain a default term which
provides that any sub-occupation agreement should be a type II periodic
agreement (paragraph 5.46).
 59. We provisionally propose that landlords, on giving their consent to the creation of a
sub-occupation agreement should be able to impose reasonable conditions as to
the type or terms of the sub-agreement (paragraph 5.55).
 60. We further provisionally propose that breach of these conditions should not
invalidate the consent, but that any sub-occupation agreement created without
compliance with such conditions should be deemed to be a type II periodic
agreement (paragraph 5.56).
 61. We provisionally propose that, where a sub-occupation agreement has been
properly entered into, the same rules and sanctions relating to the provision of a
written copy of the agreement by the occupier to the sub-occupier should apply as
they apply to the original agreement (paragraph 5.58).
The effect on head landlords of authorised sub-occupation agreements
 62. We provisionally propose that, as between the landlord and the sub- occupier, the
question of what type of agreement the landlord should be bound by should be
determined by the type of agreement created by the original occupier with the sub-
occupier (paragraph 5.65).
 63. We further provisionally propose that if the landlord has given consent, or has
included a term in the agreement allowing sub-occupation agreements to be made
without consent (replacing the default term), then on the termination of the
original agreement:
 (1) The landlord should be bound by the sub-occupation agreement if the
original occupier terminated the agreement by giving notice to quit or by
exercising a break clause or surrendering. The sub-occupier should step
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into the shoes of the original occupier but only under the terms of the sub-
agreement.
 (2) If the landlord brings proceedings for possession against the original
occupier or if the landlord used the abandonment procedure, then the
landlord should have to serve notice on the sub-occupier (at the premises),
who should be entitled to be joined in the action. The sub-occupier should
be entitled to seek an order of the court converting the sub-occupier into a
direct occupier of the landlord, but, again, on the terms of the sub-
agreement. The court should do so unless it would have granted
possession against this person if they had already been the occupier
(paragraph 5.66).
 64. We provisionally propose that the new direct landlord should not take the benefit
or burden of any breaches of the agreement which occurred before the change of
landlord (paragraph 5.72).
 65. We thus provisionally propose that the liability of the new direct landlord to the
former sub-occupier should be limited to breaches of the agreement occurring
after the date on which the new direct landlord became the new direct landlord.
Any claims for breach of the sub-occupation agreement occurring before that date
should be pursued by the former sub-occupier against the former occupier
(paragraph 5.73).
 66. We further provisionally propose that the liability of the former sub-occupier to the
new direct landlord should be limited to breaches of the agreement occurring after
the new direct landlord became the new direct landlord. Where a breach of the
sub-occupation agreement occurred before the new direct landlord became the
new direct landlord, the former sub-occupier should remain liable to the former
occupier (paragraph 5.74).
PART VI: TRANSFERRING RIGHTS OF OCCUPATION TRANSFERS
Transfers
 67. We provisionally propose that any restrictions on the ability of occupiers to transfer
the whole of their rights of occupation should be by way of a term in the
occupation agreement (paragraph 6.6).
 68. We provisionally propose that occupation agreements should contain, as a default
term, a provision stating that there is a landlord’s veto against the transfer of the
right to occupy by the occupier to a third party (paragraph 6.10).
 69. We provisionally propose that the rights of Rent Act statutory tenants to agree with
their landlord to transfer their statutory tenancy should be preserved (paragraph
6.13).
Special cases
A right to transfer by mutual exchange
 70. We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in any type I
agreement granted by a social landlord that the occupier should have the right to
exchange his or her right of occupation with another occupier granted a type I
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agreement by a social landlord. The right to exchange would be subject to consent
being given by the landlords affected (paragraph 6.13).
 71. We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in any type I
agreement granted by a social landlord that the occupier should have the right to
exchange his or her right of occupation with another occupier granted a type I
agreement by a social landlord. The right to exchange would be subject to consent
being given by the landlords affected (paragraph 6.19).
 72. We invite views on the following questions:
 (1) Should private landlords be required to make any provision for a right of
mutual exchange in any type I agreement they may enter into?
 (2) If the answer is yes, should this be by way of a compulsory term, or a
default term?
 (3) Would private landlords who might otherwise consider using type I
agreements be deterred from doing so by the existence of a right of mutual
exchange?
 (4) Would the interests of social landlords be prejudiced if mutual exchanges
led to their receiving type I agreement occupiers from private landlords
who had never been through the allocations procedure of any social
landlord (paragraph 6.26)?
 73. We provisionally propose that such a clause should not be a compulsory term in
any type II agreement (paragraph 6.28).
 74. We provisionally propose that the right to exchange should be subject to the
landlord’s consent (paragraph 6.35).
 75. We invite views as to whether the new scheme should reproduce the current
requirements as to the landlord’s consent to mutual exchange in Housing Act
1985, section 92 and Schedule 3, or whether instead a simpler, more clearly time-
limited procedure should be adopted (paragraph 6.36).
 76. We ask whether, in the alternative, the same criteria of general reasonableness
should be adopted as we are suggesting in other cases where consent is required,
based on Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, section 19 and the Landlord and Tenant
Act 1988 (paragraph 6.37).
 77. We invite views as to whether the current requirement for the existence of a
complete chain of exchanges should be retained, or whether it should be able to be
waived by the landlords concerned (paragraph 6.41).
Transfers to potential successors
 78. We provisionally propose that type I agreements should contain a compulsory term
allowing for the occupier to transfer his or her rights to a potential successor,
subject to the landlord’s consent (paragraph 6.47).
 79. We provisionally propose that there should be a default term in the type II
agreement giving the landlord a veto over the assignment of the agreement
(paragraph 6.51).
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 80. We provisionally propose that it should be possible for the transfer to a potential
successor to lead (subject to any terms in the contract) to the transfer to joint
successors (paragraph 6.56).
Transfer by order of family courts
 81. We invite views on whether Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 24, and
Children Act 1989, Schedule 1, paragraph 1(2)(d) to (e) should be amended so
that they apply to all occupation agreements falling within the scope of our new
scheme, irrespective of whether they would otherwise be regarded as creating a
property interest (paragraph 6.65).
 82. We provisionally propose that the Family Law Act 1996 Schedule 7 should be
amended to refer to any agreement covered by our new scheme (paragraph 6.70).
 83. We provisionally propose that the model agreements under our new scheme should
contain a compulsory term allowing agreements to be transferred by order of the
court made under the Family Law Act 1996 Schedule 7 (paragraph 6.71).
Effects of the transfer of the right to occupy to another
Consent
 84. We provisionally propose that a transfer should not take effect until after any
necessary consent has been given by the landlord (paragraph 6.74).
Method of transfer
 85. We provisionally propose that any transfer should take effect from the moment at
which the intention of the transferor and transferee is confirmed either in writing,
or by the transferor giving up occupation to the transferee, or by the first
instalment of rent which is paid to the landlord by the transferee and not by the
transferor (paragraph 6.77).
Formalities
 86. We provisionally propose that the landlord should be required to serve on the
transferee a written copy of the agreement, amended to show the change of
occupier, within two weeks of the transfer. The same sanctions for failure to
comply should be available as would be apply for failure to give a copy of the
written agreement to the original occupier at the start of the agreement (paragraph
6.81).
The position of the parties after a transfer
 87. We provisionally propose that the effect of a transfer to which the landlord has
given consent should be to vest the rights and liabilities under the occupation
agreement in the transferee. Thus the original occupier would be replaced by the
new occupier as the party to the agreement with the landlord. The transfer should
not of itself confer on the transferee any rights or liabilities relating to any time
before the transfer took place. The former occupier should cease to have rights and
liabilities for any events occurring after the transfer (paragraph 6.100).
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The relationship between sub-occupation agreements and transfers
 88. We provisionally propose that where a sub-occupation agreement has been lawfully
created out of a head agreement which is also covered by our new scheme, and the
landlord (where consent is needed), the occupier and the sub-occupier have all
intended to create a sub-agreement rather than a transfer, then the sub-occupation
agreement should take effect as such and should not be deemed to be a transfer
even if it is for the whole of the remaining term of the head agreement (paragraph
6.112).
PART VII: THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH OF AN OCCUPIER
The effect of the death of the occupier on the agreement
Joint occupation agreements: the principle of survivorship
 89. We provisionally propose that on the death of a joint occupier, the remaining
occupier(s) should take over the occupation agreement (paragraph 7.9).
 90. We provisionally propose that survivorship by joint occupiers should take priority
over the right of succession under other statutory rules. The statutory succession
rules should only take effect on the death of a sole occupier, including the death of
the last of any joint occupiers (paragraph 7.11).
 91. We provisionally propose that the principle of survivorship should apply
irrespective of the number of joint occupiers living in the premises at the date of
the death of the occupier (paragraph 7.15).
Termination of the agreement: periodic agreements
 92. We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in type I and
periodic type II agreements that, if the agreement does not pass to a joint occupier
or to another person under the statutory rules on succession, the agreement should
terminate automatically and without the need for a court order (paragraph 7.18).
 93. We provisionally propose that there should be a default term which specifies the
moment, after death of the occupier, at which the agreement terminates
(paragraph 7.28).
 94. We invite views as to whether that default term should provide that the agreement
terminates immediately on death, or at the point at which the landlord does or
should reasonably have become aware of the death (paragraph 7.29).
 95. We invite views as to whether such provisions would cause problems where
housing benefit is paid direct to the landlord, and whether any such problems
should be dealt with by changes to the housing benefit system rather than to the
law on relations between landlords and occupiers (paragraph 7.30).
Termination of the agreement: fixed-term agreements
 96. We provisionally propose that fixed term type II agreements should contain a
default term providing that the agreement terminates on the death of the occupier.
The statute should provide that the parties can exclude the statutory rules on
succession, but only where they have replaced this default term with a term
allowing for the remaining period of the agreement to pass to another under the
occupier’s will (paragraph 7.39).
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 97. We provisionally propose that fixed term occupation agreements that are licences
not tenancies should only be capable of being transferred, on the death of the
occupier, under the statutory right of succession (paragraph 7.41).
A statutory right of succession
 98. We provisionally propose that a statutory right of succession should be part of the
proposed new scheme for the regulation of all the occupation agreements falling
within the scope of our proposed scheme (paragraph 7.45).
 99. We further provisionally propose that, save for special arrangements made in
relation to fixed-term agreements, and cases where the principle of survivorship
applies, the only means whereby the benefit of an occupation agreement can be
passed on following the death of the occupier should be though the right of
succession (paragraph 7.47).
Who should have the right to succeed?
 100. We provisionally propose that a surviving spouse should have the right to succeed.
“Spouse” should be defined to include the survivor of couples who have lived
together as husband and wife, or of same sex couples who have co-habited. We
provisionally propose that these principles should apply whether or not either
partner has undergone gender re-assignment. Any spouse should have been living
in the premises as his or her only or principal home at the time of the death
(paragraph 7.59).
 101. We further provisionally propose that a list of those potentially entitled to succeed
should be set out in the legislation, which would then be capable of being set out
in the agreement (paragraph 7.62).
 102. We invite views on the categories that should be included in the list (paragraph
7.63).
 103. We provisionally propose that a member of the family who wishes to exercise a
right to succeed should have resided in the premises as his or her only or principal
home before the occupier died (paragraph 7.65).
 104. We invite views on what the period of occupation should be (paragraph 7.66).
 105. We invite views on the question whether the right to succeed should be specifically
extended to carers, on a basis similar to that set out in the Housing (Scotland) Act
2001 (paragraph 7.68).
 106. We provisionally propose that the rights of succession currently available to Rent
Act protected tenants are preserved for that group (paragraph 7.70).
How many successions should be permitted?
 107. We provisionally propose that a surviving spouse should have the automatic right
to succeed to a deceased occupier who was not him or herself a successor
(paragraph 7.78).
 108. We further provisionally propose that, after succession by a spouse, there should be
a further right to succeed by another member of the family of either the original
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deceased occupier or the successor occupier. The spouse of the successor occupier
would be included in this category (paragraph 7.79).
What counts as a use of succession rights?
 109. We provisionally propose that where a person succeeds to an occupation
agreement through the operation of the principle of survivorship, this should not
count as the use of the statutory right of succession (paragraph 7.85).
 110. We similarly propose that where a person succeeds by will or on intestacy to a
fixed-term occupation agreement, this should not count as the use of the statutory
right of succession (paragraph 7.86).
 111. We further propose that the exercise of any analogous contractual rights of
succession should be regarded as the use of the statutory right of succession
(paragraph 7.87).
When can the status of successor be lost?
 112. We provisionally propose that, so long as the successor remains in the same
premises under the same or a different landlord, or acquires an occupation
agreement by exercise of the right of mutual exchange, that person should retain
the status of successor (paragraph 7.93).
 113. We further provisionally propose that if that occupation agreement were
terminated, and a wholly new agreement relating to different premises was made,
whether by the same or a different landlord, the occupier should enter this
agreement not as a successor (paragraph 7.94).
 114. We propose that where a landlord grants an agreement to another under the
mistaken belief that the occupier was entitled to succeed, this should not invalidate
the agreement, but rather the agreement should be deemed to be fully valid
(paragraph 7.95).
 115. Where there is evidence that the occupier had sought to mislead the landlord as to
his or her status as successor, this should be the basis for possession proceedings in
the normal way (paragraph 7.96).
To what should successors succeed?
 116. We provisionally propose that a person who succeeds under the statutory right of
succession should succeed to the same agreement. (The only exception would be
that a non-spouse successor of a former Rent Act tenant would not succeed to the
right to a fair rent.) Save as to the identity of the occupier, the terms of the
agreement will not change unless a variation is agreed or permitted by the
agreement (paragraph 7.99).
Should joint succession be possible?
 117. We provisionally propose that it should be possible for joint occupiers who have
the right to succeed, to have the rights of occupation under the agreement
transferred to them jointly (paragraph 7.103).
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How should disagreements about who should succeed be resolved?
 118. We provisionally propose that where there was more than one potential successor,
they should seek to resolve any dispute between themselves. However, where there
has been a failure to resolve the matter, it should be resolved by the landlord
(paragraph 7.107).
 119. We invite views as to whether there are special cases where the matter should be
resolved by a court (paragraph 7.109).
An alternative approach?
 120. We invite views on whether an alternative approach based on a more limited right
of succession, but one which was not limited in the number of successions, and/or
was open to a wider group of potential successors, is to be preferred (paragraph
7.112).
Effects of succession on past and future rights and liabilities under the
agreement
 121. We provisionally propose that, where the agreement does not terminate following
the death of the occupier, the landlord should be required to serve an amended
copy of the agreement on the new occupier. The same rent and criminal penalties
and time limits for non-compliance should apply as do on the creation of a new
agreement. The time limit for this should run from the date on which the landlord
is satisfied, or should reasonably be satisfied, that the former occupier has died and
a successor has been entitled to take over the agreement without the agreement
terminating (paragraph 7.115).
 122. We provisionally propose that, in cases of succession under our scheme, the
deceased occupier’s estate should retain all the deceased occupier’s rights and
liabilities relating to the period before the succession, and the statutory successor,
as such, should neither benefit from nor be burdened by them. The statutory
successor, and not the estate, should take all the rights and liabilities under the
agreement in relation to the period after the succession (paragraph 7.126).
 123. We provisionally propose that on the date of the death of the occupier, or the date
on which the agreement is terminated, if later, the rights and liabilities of the
deceased occupier for events occurring before that date should be taken over by
the deceased’s estate. The estate should not be liable for any rights and liabilities
arising after that date (paragraph 7.131).
PART VIII: OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS AND THIRD PARTIES: TRANSFERS OF
LANDLORD'S RIGHTS AND OTHER MATTERS
The need to use principles of land law?
 124. We provisionally propose that, in determining whether occupation agreements are
binding on successors to the original landlord, existing principles of landlord and
tenant law should continue to apply to determine whether such agreements
constitute a lease or a licence (paragraph 8.42).
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Rent Act 1977 statutory tenancies
 125. We provisionally propose that statutory tenancies under the Rent Act 1977 should,
on conversion to type I agreements, take effect as a property interest (paragraph
8.46).
Other third party matters
 126. We provisionally propose that our new scheme should not interfere with land law
on the determination of questions such as whether the occupier has the rights of a
leaseholder in relation to third parties such as trespassers or neighbouring
landowners who commit the tort of nuisance (paragraph 8.48).
Application of the land law approach to landlords’ successors in title
 127. We provisionally propose that our scheme should not make any special provision,
above that imposed by general landlord and tenant law, for head landlords, whose
leases fall outside our scheme, to be bound by occupation agreements covered by
our scheme which are created by mesne landlords (paragraph 8.73).
The responsibilities of the new landlord: the effects of assignment of the
landlord’s reversion
 128. We provisionally propose that the process of converting an existing tenancy into an
occupation agreement within our scheme should be deemed to be the creation of a
“new tenancy” for the purposes of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995
(paragraph 8.86).
 129. We further provisionally propose that, save for sections 16 to 20, the provisions of
the Act of 1995 which deal with the rights and obligations of assignors and
assignees should apply to transfers of occupation agreements, classified in law as
tenancies, within the scope of our scheme (paragraph 8.87).
Notice of disrepair
 130. We provisionally propose that any notice of disrepair given to a landlord should be
effective as notice to a new landlord, though the new landlord’s liability should
only start to run from the date of acquisition of their interest in the property
(paragraph 8.87).
New landlord’s duty to give details to the occupier
 131. We provisionally propose that the new landlord should have to serve written notice
on the occupiers of a name and address for service for themselves and any agents
(matching the requirements of the core term in the original agreement) (paragraph
8.95).
 132. We provisionally propose that on receipt of this notification the occupier should be
entitled to require the new landlord to supply a revised copy of the agreement, as
happens on a variation of the agreement (paragraph 8.96).
 133. We provisionally propose that if the new landlord fails to give the prescribed
information to the occupier within two weeks of the assignment, the new landlord
should be liable to an equivalent rent sanction as applies in the case of the original
agreements. He or she should be deemed to owe the occupier the equivalent of one
day’s rent for each day’s delay, starting with the date of the assignment, up to the
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date of notification or two months from the assignment, whichever is the shorter
(paragraph 8.101).
 134. We seek consultees’ views as to whether an ongoing sanction is required for cases
where new landlords still fail to provide notification, despite the loss of rent. Do
consultees feel that it would be useful and appropriate to create, in addition, a
continuing criminal offence of failure to provide notification by the end of the first
two months after the assignment (paragraph 8.102)?
 135. We provisionally propose that a compulsory term in occupation agreements should
require the original landlord, on disposing of their interest to a new landlord, to
give the occupier notice of the new landlord’s identity and address for service, or
ensure that the new landlord does so. The term should render the former landlord
liable for any breaches by the new landlord until either the former or new landlord
gives the occupier the required notice (paragraph 8.104).
Where occupiers can stop a landlord dealing with the landlord’s interest
 136. We provisionally propose that current rights for occupiers of social landlords to
consultation and participation, including those on disposals of the landlord’s
interest, should be retained in our new scheme for those occupiers by being
incorporated as a compulsory term in the occupation agreement (paragraph
8.111).
 137. We provisionally propose that Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, section 3(1) should
be amended so as to continue to apply the right of first refusal to those type I




THE EXISTING SUCCESSION RULES
 A.1 The present law on the right to succeed to a residential tenancy is contained in the
following legislative provisions. We include here consideration of the Housing
(Scotland) Act 2001 as useful modern model, even though it does not apply to
England and Wales.
 (1) The Rent Act 1977.
 (2) The Housing Act 1985.
 (3) The Housing Act 1988.
 (4) The Housing (Scotland) Act 2001.
THE RENT ACT 1977
 A.2 On the death of a regulated tenant the provisions of schedule 1 (as amended) of
the Rent Act 1977 determine who may succeed to the tenancy. They also
determine the nature of the tenancy to which the successor may succeed.
Succession is not possible if the tenancy has been determined, either by the tenant
giving up possession, or because a final order for possession has been made against
the tenant.
 A.3 There is a complex range of possibilities which can occur.
 (1) If there has been no previous succession, and the succession is to a spouse,
the spouse succeeds to a (Rent Act) statutory tenancy.1
 (2) If there has already been a previous succession and the second succession
is to a spouse, the spouse succeeds to a (Housing Act 1988) assured
tenancy.2
 (3) Where there is a succession to a person other than a spouse (that is, a
member of the deceased’s family), the succession is to an assured tenancy.3
 A.4 The importance of the distinction between succession to a Rent Act protected
tenancy and a Housing Act assured tenancy is that more (mandatory) grounds for
possession are available in the case of the latter than the former.
1 Rent Act 1977, Sched 1, para 2 (as amended). The terms of the statutory tenancy will
essentially be the same as for the previous protected tenancy. However the successor is not
liable for any rent arrears incurred by the deceased; nor can such arrears be a ground for
possession: Tickner v Clifton [1929] 1 KB 207.
2 Rent Act 1977, Sched 1, para 6 (as amended).
3 Ibid, paras 3 and 6 (as amended).
142
 A.5 For these purposes “spouse” is statutorily defined to include not only a husband or
wife but also a person living with the original tenant as husband or wife.4 A spouse
does not have to have been residing with the deceased tenant prior to the death of
the tenant.
 A.6 A “member of the deceased’s family” has to have been residing with the deceased
tenant at the time of the death and for at least two years prior to the death.5 This
test raises a number of subsidiary questions.
 (1) Who is to be regarded as a member of the family?
 (2) What is the nature of the residence that establishes the qualification?
Member of the family
 A.7 Where there is a legal or blood relationship, there is usually little difficulty in
determining whether a person is a member of the family. (There may be more
difficulty determining residence.) Case law has decided that the phrase embraces:
mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, mothers- fathers-
brothers and sisters-in-law, grandchildren (including adopted grandchildren),
adopted children, step children, and illegitimate children.6 Case law has gone
beyond legal or blood relationships to include a number of people who would be
regarded by the ordinary person as a member of the deceased person’s family.
However judicial views on the scope of this test have varied.7 And while the courts
have held that the phrase should be treated not as a technical legal term but in a
popular sense, the courts have been the ultimate arbiter of the scope of the phrase.8
Lodgers have not been included as a member of the family.9
Residence
 A.8 Additionally the test of residence has to be satisfied. This has been held to be a
question of fact.10 Residence does not imply immediate presence; thus the fact that
a successor was in hospital at the time of the tenant’s death did not prevent
“residence with” the tenant.11 But there must be something that can be described
as residence, rather than merely casual visits.
 A.9 As a result of amendments in the Housing Act 1988, the period of residence is
now 2 years; under the unamended Rent Act 1977, the qualifying period was 6
months.
4 Ibid, para 2(2).
5 Ibid, para 3 (as amended).
6 R E Megarry, The Rent Acts (11th ed 1988) pp 276 to 279.
7 See the discussion of the history of the case law in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association
Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27.
8 Dyson Holdings v Fox [1976] QB 503.
9 Brock v Wollams [1949] 2 KB 388.
10 Middleton v Bull (1951) 2 TLR 1010.
11 Tompkins v Rowley (1949) 153 EG 442.
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Determining priority
 A.10 Given the breadth of definition of those who might be entitled to succeed, and the
fact that the legislation prescribes no order of priority (other than a spouse who
always takes precedence), those who might be entitled have to agree amongst
themselves who should succeed. Any dispute may be resolved by application to the
county court.
THE HOUSING ACT 1985
 A.11 On the death of a secure tenant with a periodic tenancy, there is a single right of
succession.12 The person qualified to succeed is either the spouse of the deceased if
he occupied the dwelling as his only or principal home at the time of the death; or
is another member of the tenant’s family who has resided with the tenant for a year
before the tenant’s death. 13
 A.12 Where the secure tenant occupied under a fixed term tenancy, this can be left by
will or on intestacy. If the person to whom the tenancy is thereby devolved also
qualifies as a successor, he takes as a secure tenant. Otherwise the successor tenant
is a mere contractual tenant.14
Member of the family
 A.13 Unlike the position under the Rent Act 1977, “member of the family” is defined
by statute.15
Successor
 A.14 In addition to succession under the above provisions, “successor” also includes the
following.16
 (1) A joint tenant who becomes the sole tenant following the death of the
other joint tenant.
 (2) A tenant who occupies under a periodic tenancy which arose at the end of
a fixed-term tenancy.
 (3) A tenant to whom the tenancy has been assigned, under the provisions
enabling assignment to a potential successor.
 (4) A tenant who has had the tenancy vested in him on the death of the
previous tenant.
12 Housing Act 1985, s 89.
13 Ibid, s 87. Such residence need not be in the premises in question: Waltham Forest London
Borough Council v Thomas [1992] 2 AC 198.
14 Housing Act 1985, ss 90 (2) and (3).
15 Ibid, s 113. The definition includes persons living together as husband and wife.
16 Housing Act 1985, s 88.
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 (5) A tenant to whom the tenancy was assigned under section 24 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, if the other party to the marriage was also
a successor.
 (6) A tenant to whom the tenancy was assigned under the right to mutual
exchange in section 92 of the Housing Act 1985, if the tenant had been a
successor in the tenancy which they assigned in exchange.
 (7) A tenant who was a successor in relation to one tenancy may remain so in
relation to a subsequent tenancy. This will happen, unless the new tenancy
agreement otherwise provides, where within 6 months of the
determination of the previous tenancy, the tenant is granted a new
tenancy, either of the same dwelling or a different one from the same
landlord.
 A.15 The effect of a tenant being a “successor” under these provisions is that the
“successor’s” tenancy cannot be the subject of a further succession. If the
successor obtains a new tenancy in which they do not count as a successor under
these rules, then that new tenancy will be able to be passed on in turn to their
successors. This can create problems where landlords wish to operate succession
policies which are more generous than the statute.17 The person who obtains a
tenancy under such a policy will not count as a successor for the purposes of the
Act. That person will therefore be able to pass on their tenancy under the right of
succession, whereas a person who has already succeeded under the Act could not
do so. This is seen as an unnecessary disincentive to operating succession policies
which are cast more widely than the statutory scheme.18
Determining priority
 A.16 Where more than one person has the right to succeed, the tenant’s spouse is to be
preferred to any other member of the family.
 A.17 If there is no spouse and there are two or more members, priority is given to
whichever member of the family is agreed to have priority. Failing agreement, the
decision is to be made by the landlord.19
THE HOUSING ACT 1988
 A.18 Under the assured tenancy scheme, where the assured tenancy was a periodic
tenancy and the tenancy was a joint tenancy, the right of survivorship applies and
the surviving joint tenant becomes the assured tenant. This is deemed to be a
succession for the purposes of the right of succession.20
17 In the sense that succession to a wider group of people is permitted than the list prescribed
in the Housing Act 1985.
18 Whether entirely voluntarily or to comply with the guidance discussed in para 3.33 above.
19 Housing Act 1985, s 89(2)(b).
20 Housing Act 1988, s 17.
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 A.19 Where the tenant was a sole tenant, there may be one succession to a spouse21 who
must be in occupation of the dwelling at the time of the death as his only or
principal home.
 A.20 There is no right of succession to any other member of the family.
 A.21 Where the assured tenancy was for a fixed term, such tenancy may devolve by will
or on intestacy. But the person to whom the tenancy is thereby devolved is deemed
to be a successor, and thus precluding any further right of succession.22
 A.22 Under sections 17(2) and (3) there are rules on when a tenant is deemed to have
used up the right of succession, which differ slightly from those in the Housing Act
1985 listed above. They include not only where the tenant obtained the tenancy by
statutory succession, but also where that person has succeeded under a will, by
intestacy, or joint survivorship.
 A.23 The rules do not contain any provision whereby the tenant retains successor status
where the tenant moves to another property, whether by taking an assignment of a
tenancy of that property or by taking a fresh tenancy of that property. But, under
section 17(3), if the tenant is a successor, they remain so if they stay as a tenant in
the same (or substantially the same) property continuously, even though they do so
under a series of new tenancies and even if with a series of new joint tenants or a
series of new landlords.
THE HOUSING (SCOTLAND) ACT 2001
 A.24 This is the latest Act to set out rules for succession to tenancies. Under its
provisions two rights of succession are permitted.23 Succession is to a “qualified
person”. If there is no qualified person, the tenancy terminates.24 The tenancy also
terminates on the death of the second successor.25 However, this rule does not
apply to a tenant under a joint tenancy where such a joint tenant continues to use
the house as that person's only or principal home.26 Further, where a tenancy
terminates on the death of the second successor, and there is a qualified person
(other than a joint tenant) who would otherwise be entitled to succeed, that person
is entitled to continue as tenant for a period not exceeding six months, but the
tenancy ceases to be a Scottish secure tenancy.27
 A.25 The striking thing about this right to two successions is that it appears that a
second successor, who cannot otherwise pass on their tenancy, can nevertheless
21 This includes persons living together as husband and wife.
22 It is expressly provided that statutory succession pre-empts devolution under a will or
intestacy.
23 Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, s 22 (1) and (2).
24 Ibid, s 22(3).
25 Ibid, s 22(4).
26 Ibid, s 22(8).
27 Ibid, s 22(9).
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obtain the right to pass it on twice more simply by obtaining a new tenancy.28
There is no equivalent in the Act to the provisions of section 88 of the Housing
Act 1985 or sections 17(2) and (3) of the Housing Act 1988. The only exception is
found in section 22(10) which provides that, where the tenant moves to suitable
alternative accommodation under a court order made under what we have
described as the estate management grounds,29 the new tenancy is deemed to be
the same as the old one for succession purposes. By implication therefore any
voluntary move to a new tenancy, even with the same landlord, will revive the right
to pass on the new tenancy twice even if the tenant had been a second successor in
the old tenancy.
Qualified persons
 A.26 Qualified persons are defined in Schedule 3, paragraph 2 of the 2001 Act as:
 (1) a person whose only or principal home at the time of the tenant's death
was the house and
 (a) who was at that time
 (i) the tenant's spouse, or
 (ii) living with the tenant as husband and wife or in a
relationship which has the characteristics of the relationship
between husband and wife except that the persons are of
the same sex,30 or
 (b) who is, where the tenancy was held jointly by two or more
individuals, a surviving tenant;
 (2) a member of the tenant's family aged at least 16 years where the house was
the person's only or principal home at the time of the tenant's death; or
 (3) a carer providing, or who has provided, care for the tenant or a member of
the tenant's family where
 (c) the carer is aged at least 16 years,
 (d) the house was the carer's only or principal home at the time of the
tenant's death, and
 (e) the carer had a previous only or principal home which was given
up.
28 It is arguable, given the wording of the Act generally, that a new tenancy of the same
property would either not be a new Scottish secure tenancy or would not bring new rights,
but it seems clear that a new tenancy of a different property would attract a new set of
succession rights.
29 CP 162, paras 7.77 to 7.83.
30 In the case of a person in this category, the house must have been the person's only or
principal home throughout the period of six months ending with the tenant's death: Housing
(Scotland) Act 2001, Sched 3, para 2(2).
147
 A.27 Special rules relate to the right to succeed to a specially adapted house; in essence
the successor can only succeed to the same house if he or she requires
accommodation of the kind provided by the house. If that is not the case, the
landlord must provide suitable alternative accommodation.31
 Order of priority
 A.28 The tenancy passes to a person within paragraph (1) above unless that person
declines the tenancy. If the tenancy does not pass to a person in paragraph (1), it
passes to a person in paragraph (2) unless the person declines the tenancy. If that
happens the tenancy then passes to a person in paragraph (3). If there is more than
one person in any class, they must either agree which is to take the tenancy or,
failing that, a choice will be made by the landlord.32
31 Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, s 22(6).
32 Ibid, Sched 3, paras 6 to 9.
